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From the Editor
We open the Winter issue with two views of Exploring War’s Character
& Nature. Emile Simpson’s article “Clausewitz’s Theory of War and
Victory in Contemporary Conflict” considers whether Clausewitz’s
theory of the nature of war is universal to all armed conflicts. He
argues critical aspects of it are not; that means Clausewitz’s concept of
victory is not universal to all wars, especially not those fought against
transnational terrorist networks. F. G. Hoffman’s “Will War’s Nature
Change in the Seventh Military Revolution?” examines how robotics,
artificial intelligence, and deep learning may affect the character and
nature of war. He defines war’s essence as politically directed violence
fraught with friction, and argues it will not fundamentally change.
In our second forum, Learning from Military Transformations, two
essays consider different aspects of military change. Pat Proctor’s
“Lessons Unlearned: Army Transformation and Low-Intensity
Conflict” examines the lessons the US Army drew from its experiences
in Bosnia-Herzegovina and Kosovo, and why those lessons did not
affect the Army’s transformation in the late-1990s. Damon Coletta’s
“Navigating the Third Offset Strategy” argues the US Department of
Defense would benefit by adding a “craftsman” at lower ranks to steer
private-sector projects through the Third Offset Strategy.
Our third forum, Regional Challenges takes a closer look at developments in Asia, Eastern Europe, and Latin America. Tommy Ross’s
“Deterrence & Security Assistance: The South China Sea” explores
how the United States can apply security assistance to support regional
stability in the South China Sea and counter China’s assertiveness.
Alexander Lanoszka’s “The Belarus Factor in European Security”
suggests strategists ought to reconsider the nature of the alliance between
Belarus and Russia when planning military support for the Baltic states.
In “Making Peace: Next Steps in Colombia,” Seth Cantey and Ricardo
Correa review the long history and dissolution of the FARC insurgency
and recommend the next series of steps for US policymakers.
This issue’s final forum, A rmy E xpansibility, features two articles
discussing the US Army’s ability to expand in the event of a major
war. Rose Keravuori’s “Expansibility and Army Intelligence” provides
insights into transitioning America’s military intelligence resources from
counterinsurgency operations to confronting a near-peer competitor.
Lastly, Eric Shwedo’s “Expansibility and Army Special Operations”
examines how the Army might increase its special operating forces
without sacrificing quality. ~AJE
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Exploring War’s Character & Nature

Clausewitz’s Theory of War and
Victory in Contemporary Conflict
Emile Simpson
©2018 Emile Simpson

ABSTRACT: This article considers whether Clausewitz’s account of
the nature of war is universal to all wars, in order then to assess how
far his concept of victory is universal. While aspects of Clausewitz’s
concept of war are still universal, others are not. Accordingly, his
theory of victory is not universal to all wars, and especially not to
wars fought against transnational terrorist networks.

W

estern strategic thought is still heavily conditioned by the
work of the Prussian soldier-scholar Carl von Clausewitz.
In his main work, On War, he sets out a theory of war and a
theory of warfare. The two are intrinsically related; his theory of warfare
is designed to work within his theory of war. This article considers first
how far Clausewitz’s theory of war applies today, and then, considers the
applicability of the idea of victory within his theory of warfare.

Clausewitz’s Theory of the Nature of War

To assess both continuity and change in war, a standard distinction
in contemporary debate is drawn between the nature (permanent
features) and character (context dependent features) of war. Although
this distinction is commonly misattributed to Clausewitz, he did not use
the term “nature” in quite this way. Hence at the end of book 1, chapter 1,
he writes: “War is thus more than a mere chameleon, because it changes
its nature (seine natur) to some extent in each concrete case.”1 If nature
is supposed to be unchanging, how can we make sense of this passage?
As Antulio J. Echevarria II sets out, Clausewitz followed a
dialectical analytical framework in which the world could be seen either
in the abstract, through the lens of reasoning based on pure logic, or in
reality, through the lens of reasoning based on practical experience.2 To
understand the nature of a given phenomenon through this dialectical
analysis, the abstract perspective is tested against practical reality.
In On War, this dialectical analysis produces a narrow and a broad
account of what war is. Both are set out in book 1, chapter 1, which
opens with this definition of war as an abstract phenomenon:

1      For this translation as well as the original German, “Der Krieg ist also nicht nur ein wahres
Chamäleon, weil er in jedem konkreten Falle seine Natur etwas ändert,” see Christopher Bassford,
“Teaching the Clausewitzian Trinity: A Teaching Note,” Clausewitz.com, 2007, https://www
.clausewitz.com/readings/Bassford/Trinity/TrinityTeachingNote.htm. Note that Michael Howard
and Peter Paret’s translation translates natur here as “characteristics.” Carl von Clausewitz, On War,
ed. Howard and Paret (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1976), 89.
2      One can identify this approach as Kantian or Hegelian. See Antulio J. Echevarria II, Clausewitz
and Contemporary War (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2007).

Dr. Emile Simpson
is a research fellow at
the Harvard University
Society of Fellows.
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War is thus an act of force to compel our enemy to do our will. . . . To secure
that object we must render the enemy powerless; and that, in theory, is the
true aim of warfare. That aim takes the place of the object, discarding it as
something not actually part of war itself.3

What Clausewitz does here is to delimit a narrow account of war as
a purely military act in which the military objective takes the place of
the political aim, which is then classified as being outside war itself. This
idealized, abstract view of war is sequential: the focus during war—the
true aim of warfare—is on the military objective; only when the military
objective is satisfied does the political objective once again come to the
fore. In other words, there is a clear line between military action in war
and political action in peace.
Clausewitz posits how in the abstract: “If you want to overcome
your enemy you must match your effort against his power of resistance.
. . . But the enemy will do the same; competition will again result and,
in pure theory, it must again force you both to extremes.”4 Crucially,
however, Clausewitz notes that a war would only conform to the ideal if
it was a single decisive act isolated from its political context, which for
that reason, means that no war in reality has ever met this ideal.5 That
said, in the next chapter he notes “many wars have come very close” to
the abstract form.6
Clausewitz goes on to list several reasons why the nature of war in
the abstract is moderated by a variety of factors that affect war in reality,
namely: (a) Making the maximum effort to achieve the military objective
will often be disproportionate to the political aim; (b) Belligerents will
typically not be able to, or want to, mobilize all their forces for one
decisive act; (c) The result in war is never final, which frustrates the
idea of a neat line between war and peace; (d) Strategic thought is much
more a subjective question of weighting probabilities based on one’s
knowledge of the enemy than an exercise in abstract logic; (e) The
political object during the war may or may not motivate the people to
support the war; (f) One side may refuse battle or suspend hostilities to
wait for a better moment to act; (g) There will often not be “polarity,”
by which he means symmetry of objective, and when a war is not fought
over the same thing, the incentives on either side are clearly different
(Clausewitz seems to mean both military and political objectives, but he
is not clear on the point.); (h) Defense is the stronger form of war, so
the side on the defensive need not make as much effort at the attacking
side; (i) Commanders on each side typically have imperfect knowledge
of the situation; (j) “No other human activity is so . . . bound up with
chance”; And finally, (k) that the means by which war is actually fought
involves analysis of moral qualities, above all courage, that are not
susceptible to logical analysis, but are far more a question of weighting
probabilities, and this aspect makes war “like a game of cards,” gambling
on probabilistic assumptions, not logic.7

3      Clausewitz, On War, 75.
4      Clausewitz, On War, 77.
5      Clausewitz, On War, 78.
6      Clausewitz, On War, 90.
7      Clausewitz, On War, 77–86.
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Having gone through all these reasons, Clausewitz summarizes:
War, therefore, is an act of policy. Were it a complete, untrammeled, absolute
manifestation of violence (as the pure concept would require), war would of
its own independent will usurp the place of policy the moment policy had
brought it into being; it would then drive policy out of office and rule by the
laws of its own nature, very much like a mine that can explode only in the
manner or direction predetermined by the setting.8

On this basis, Clausewitz sets up a distinction between absolute
and more limited forms of war, which he develops mainly in book
8. Absolute war is only found in the abstract, but provides a pole the
further from which one moves, the more limited the war in reality. This
polarity sets up a spectrum in which at one end, as noted above, one
finds wars that get very close to being absolute, while at the other end,
one gets to a vanishing point where war becomes merely “a matter of
mutual observation.”9 The more absolute the war—that is, the more war
conforms to its “natural tendency,” the less there is a distinction between
the military and political objective, and so the more the destruction
of the enemy comes to the forefront of warfare. Conversely, the more
limited the war, the more political considerations will displace purely
military considerations in the practice of warfare.10
In summary, to understand what Clausewitz means by the nature
of war, it is necessary to recognize that there are two ideas of war
at play in On War. One is the abstract version found in the realm of
logic, which Clausewitz identifies as the nature of war. As Clausewitz
stresses, “it must be observed that the phrase the natural tendency of war,
is used in its philosophical, strictly logical sense alone and does not refer
to the tendencies of the forces that are actually engaged in fighting—
including—for instance, the morale and emotions of the combatants.”11
The other idea of war is the phenomenon produced when the
abstract concept of war is modified by reality, to give us real war. This
is the idea of war that we reach at the end of book 1, chapter 1, in which
Clausewitz presents his well-known image of the “total phenomenon”
of war as it appears in reality as a “trinity” comprised of three “dominant
tendencies.”12 These three tendencies effectively provide categorical
buckets within which to place the various reasons listed above for why
war in reality moderates the abstract concept.
These dominant tendencies were: “primordial violence, hatred and
enmity, which are to be regarded as a blind natural force”; “the play of
chance and probability within which the creative spirit is free to roam”;
and “its element of subordination, as an instrument of policy, which
makes it subject to reason alone.” He continues, “the first of these three
aspects mainly concerns the people; the second the commander and
his army; the third the government.” He summarizes, “these three
tendencies are like three different codes of law, deep-rooted in their
subject and yet variable in their relationship to one another. . . . Our task,
8      Clausewitz, On War, 87.
9      Clausewitz, On War, 488.
10      Clausewitz, On War, 88.
11      Clausewitz, On War, 88.
12      Clausewitz, On War, 89.
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therefore, is to develop a theory that maintains a balance between these
three tendencies, like an object suspended between three magnets.”13
We can now answer the problem stated above: that if nature is
supposed to be unchanging, how can we make sense of Clausewitz’s
assertion that “war,” as Bassford translates, “changes its nature (seine
natur) to some extent in each concrete case?” Read in the context of
the whole of the chapter, we can clearly see Clausewitz is referring to
the modification of the abstract, logical idea of war in practice. Hence
this passage is immediately followed by the presentation of the trinity,
which identifies categories of reasons why war in its pure form tends to
be modified in practice.

Is Clausewitz’s Theory of War Universal?

We just saw how the nature of war was, for Clausewitz, war in its
abstract form, as distinct from the concept as it appeared in reality.
However, in contemporary debate, the “nature” of war in Clausewitz’s
theory is generally identified with the trinity, rather than the abstract
concept. This association is confusing, because Clausewitz himself
never identifies the trinity with the nature of war. Rather, he explains
the trinity is comprised of the three dominant tendencies representing
the various factors that in reality moderate war’s abstract nature. Hence,
as noted above, he sees the trinity as part of war understood as a total
phenomenon, that is, its abstract nature modified in reality by the three
dominant tendencies of the trinity.
In my view, it follows from Clausewitz’s abstract account of the
nature of war that his account of war in On War  is not universal. Consider
again, in more detail, the passage at the start of book 1, chapter 1, in
which he identifies war’s abstract nature:
I shall . . . go straight to the heart of the matter, to the duel. War is nothing
but a duel on a larger scale. Countless duels go to make up war, but a picture
of it as a whole can be formed by imagining a pair of wrestlers. Each tries
through physical force to compel the other to do his will; his immediate aim is
to throw his opponent in order to make him incapable of further resistance.
War is thus an act of force to compel our enemy to do our will. . . . Force . . .
physical force . . . is thus the means of war; to impose our will on the enemy
is its object. To secure that object we must render the enemy powerless; and
that, in theory, is the true aim of warfare. That aim takes the place of the
object, discarding it as something not actually part of war itself.14

Three features of this abstract definition make clear that Clausewitz’s
notion cannot be regarded as universal to all war.15 First, it demands a
two-way fight between one side and another, as the image of the duel
makes clear. Hence genuinely multiplayer conflicts, such as the recent
war in Syria, are not comprehended.
13      Clausewitz, On War, 89.
14      Clausewitz, On War, 75.
15      These factors differ from the debate over the universality of the trinity as it has developed
since the 1990s, which tends to focus on the state versus nonstate issue. See Bassford, “Tip-Toe
through the Trinity: The Strange Persistence of Trinitarian Warfare,” Clausewitz.com, January 5,
2017, https://www.clausewitz.com/mobile/trinity8.htm; and Martin van Creveld, The Transformation
of War: The Most Radical Reinterpretation of Armed Conflict since Clausewitz (New York: Free Press, 1991).
On the debate, see Christopher Daase, “Clausewitz and Small Wars” in Clausewitz in the Twenty-First
Century, ed. Hew Strachan and Andreas Herberg-Rothe (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2007).
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Second, the idea assumes the enemy is a unified entity. If not
already evident in the image of the enemy personified as a wrestler, this
assumption must follow from the claim that war is an act of force to
compel our enemy to do our will. The assumption here is that the enemy
himself is imagined as having a “will” that can be compelled through
military action in war to accept a given political outcome. This image fits
badly with war against networked terrorist groups, where military action
against one part of the network may well have no effect on the network
as a whole, precisely because one is not dealing with a unified entity, but
a network. To the extent that the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan, as well
as the so called war on terror, have involved the use of force against
networked terrorist groups, they resist inclusion in Clausewitz’s abstract
definition of war.
Third, this definition is combat-centric: combat is the only means of
war.16 Of course, Clausewitz is talking about the abstract nature of war
here, and he may well accept that diplomacy and other nonviolent means
have a role to play in more limited forms of war. But, in On War, he
devotes virtually no attention to such nonviolent means. To the extent
that nonviolent means have been central to various types of conflict,
from the Cold War to the kind of contemporary “hybrid warfare”
conducted, for example, by Russia—and the fact that such means as
economic sanctions and cyber-resources are today increasingly effective
as tools of statecraft—they are not accounted for in Clausewitz’s abstract
definition of war.
In summary, Clausewitz’s account of war identifies a two-way
military fight between unified entities. These unified entities are
primarily imagined as states, as is clear by the association of each part of
the trinity with a part of the state at war (i.e. government, people, army).
Indeed, even when Clausewitz contemplated insurgency, he assumed
that insurgents would fight on behalf of their state.17 That said, if a
nonstate actor is a unified entity rather than a network, one might well
see the entity as included within Clausewitz’s abstract definition of war.
Yet, if Clausewitz’s abstract account of war is not universal, what
about his broad concept of the total phenomenon of war in reality, as
represented in the trinity: is that universal to all war? A simple answer
is no, given how the total phenomenon is but the abstract concept
moderated by the trinity, and so is not a universal concept of war for
exactly the same reasons as the abstract concept is not. That said, one
might nonetheless ask whether the trinity on its own can attach to other
types of war, beyond those within Clausewitz’s abstract account of war.
The problem one immediately encounters here is, what does one
mean by other types of war in the abstract, beyond those identified in
Clausewitz’s definition? We can say, based on the analysis above, that
in a negative sense, these are wars that are not two-way but genuinely
multiplayer, in which the enemy is not a unified entity, or in which
16      That is made explicit in Clausewitz, On War, 95.
17      Hew Strachan argues that even Clausewitz’s treatment of insurrections is framed in terms
of an extension of state-on-state warfare, where the people continue the state’s struggle through
unconventional means. Hew Strachan, Clausewitz’s On War, A Biography (New York: Atlantic Monthly
Press, 2007), 182. On Clausewitz’s view of small wars, see Sebastian Kaempf, “Lost through NonTranslation: Bringing Clausewitz’s Writings on ‘New Wars’ Back In,” Small Wars & Insurgencies 22, no.
4 (October 2011): 548–73, doi:10.1080/09592318.2011.599164.
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combat is not the only means. But, that still does not provide a positive
definition. Furthermore, and more importantly, this clarification does
not tell us why Clausewitz’s account of war in the abstract and other
types of war in the abstract should both be understood as war: what is
this higher-level account of war’s abstract nature? There are two ways
to answer this question, which will in turn tell us if the trinity is indeed
universal to all types of war.
The first way is to stay within the realm of abstract definitions of
war’s nature, and thus to come up with a universal definition of war
that focuses on an element, or set of elements, that all wars must have
in common. While I am skeptical that such a perfect definition exists,
the essence of any such definition would be based on the element of
collective political violence, notwithstanding that each of those terms is
to an extent subjective.
The second way moves outside of the realm of abstract thought
and rather traces the conceptual varieties in the meaning of war over
time, like a family tree; although, what counts as war will, of course,
also be subjective in this approach. This approach does not seek a single
universal definition of war. It merely identifies as empirical facts the whole
universe of phenomena that have been called war (or their equivalent in
other languages), and classifies them according to the way the term was
used in historical context. Of course, this approach is subjective too, in
that what has been called war has meant different things to different
people at different times, not to mention linguistic subjectivity.
The key difference between the first and second approach is that while
the first seeks to exclude all differences to achieve a universal definition
of war, the second actively looks for differences in its classification.
This second approach is fundamentally attuned to distinctions in the
sociopolitical context in which war takes place.
Key types of distinction in this regard are legal classifications of war.
Before 1945, for example, the idea of a “state of war” demanded, at least
in legal theory, declared war between sovereign states. Indeed, the very
term “regular war” (as distinct from irregular war) originates in the idea
of a state of war. The term was coined by the Swiss international lawyer
Emer de Vattel (1714–67), who changed the Latin bellum solemne (formal
war) in the work of Hugo Grotius (1583–1645), into the French guerre
en forme (war in due form), which he also called guerre règlée (regulated or
regular war).18
Yet, on the first page of On War, Clausewitz expressly dismissed law
as irrelevant.19 He says international law is barely worth mentioning,
and that law only has force within the state, which further implies that
the type of war he is dealing with is interstate. Clausewitz’s dismissal
of international law is ironic because it provided the basic category
of regular war that was his main focus, that is, two-way fighting
between states. Indeed, the idea of war as a duel, or as an analogy to
litigation, which is another analogy Clausewitz relies upon, is routinely
encountered in the work of international lawyers in the two centuries
18      Emer de Vattel, Le Droit de Gens, ou, Principes de la loi Naturelle, Appliqués à la Conduit et aux
Affaires des Nations et des Souverains (Buffalo, NY: W. S. Hein, 1995), 507.
19      Clausewitz, On War, 75.
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before Clausewitz.20 In this respect, Clausewitz’s account of the nature
of war would have surprised no one in his day as a standard abstract
description of regular war.
Conversely, Clausewitz wrote nothing about the wars some European powers fought in distant colonies, let alone about measures short
of war, which was also a legally defined category outside a formal state
of war that tended to come about in the context of the maritime naval
and commercial competition between European powers associated with
imperial expansion.21 Given that Prussia did not have an overseas empire,
or any serious naval capability, Clausewitz’s silence with regards to the
imperial dimension of the European experience of war is unremarkable,
but does not change the fact that he said nothing about a large expanse
of the European experience of war in his day.
Conversely, Clausewitz’s dismissal of domestic law is not ironic, since
he recognized it had force within the state, but he does not write about
war within the state in On War. However, today many contemporary
conflicts are internal conflicts in which the domestic law of the local
state matters a great deal. In Afghanistan, for example, Afghan law
governs the detention process, including the evidentiary requirements.
More generally, Afghan law significantly restricts what coalition forces
can realistically do. If coalition forces are working with a corrupt local
official, for example, the local coalition commander, having no authority
to do so under Afghan law, cannot directly fire the official.
There is an open-ended range of types of war according to this
second approach of sketching a universal account of war. Beyond variety
in legal classification, one could look at religious, cultural, economic,
social and geopolitical classifications of war, and so on. It seems clear,
for example, that religious wars—past and present—have different
characteristics to nonreligious wars, and no doubt one could make
further distinctions therein. From this perspective, new types of war
are not a problem for the coherence of the concept, but responsive to
differences in the sociopolitical context in which war takes place. Does
the use of autonomous weapon systems, for instance, demand new
categorical distinctions in war? Either way, the answer tells us something
about what war is or is not.
Furthermore, these historical classifications of war can overlap. A
religious war, for example, might be several other types, too, whether
regular or irregular, hybrid in its means, or combat-centric, and so
on. In short, like a human being, a war can have several aspects to its
character—if character is the framework one wants to use to account
for variety and change—in contrast to a phenomenon’s permanent
nature, which really just means common features across examples of the
phenomenon as it appears in historical reality.
Finally, note how these two ways of arriving at a universal account of
war are not mutually exclusive, but depend on one another. The abstract
20      For example two centuries before Clausewitz, Grotius writes: “War is the state or situation of
those . . . who dispute by force of arms. . . . This agrees very well with the etymology of the word;
for the Latin word bellum (war) comes from the old word duellum (a duel).” Hugo Grotius, The Rights
of War and Peace, ed. Richard Tuck (Indianapolis, IN: Liberty Fund, 2005), 134–35. On Clausewitz’s
analogy of war as a form of litigation, which again is a standard idea in international law from
Grotius onwards, see Clausewitz, On War, 357–58.
21      Clausewitz, On War, 98.
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account of war tries to find common features across all the presentations
of war as it has presented itself in historical reality. Conversely, the
historical account demands an abstract standard to identify the edges of
its universe of what counts as war. Hence the term “war” is frequently
used linguistically in ways everyone would agree are outside this universe
because the term is used in a different way, or by loose analogy, or for
merely rhetorical impact—a “war on cancer” for example.
We can now return to the question of whether the trinity applies
universally to all types of war, regardless of the fact that in On War
itself, the concept is presented within an abstract account of war that is
clearly not universal. In my view, the trinity does apply universally, but
not as a universal account of all the normative sources—the dominant
tendencies that are similar to codes of law—that inform war in reality.
When I say it applies universally, I mean I cannot imagine a proposed
abstract universal definition of war that does not present a phenomenon
in which the trinity’s three dominant tendencies do not apply. However,
when I say it is not a universal account of all the normative sources that
inform war in reality, I mean there exist other normative sources in war’s
sociopolitical context, such as geopolitics (as distinct from policy), law,
religion, culture, economics, robotics, and so on, that can also potentially
inform what a given war is.
One might argue that Clausewitz himself acknowledged the
possibility that other normative sources from the sociopolitical context
in which war took place could inform the character of war beyond those
normative sources identified in the trinity. Hence, he writes in book 8
how “the aims a belligerent adopts, and the resources he employs, must
be governed by the particular characteristics of his own position; but
they will also conform to the spirit of the age and to its general character.
Finally, they must always be governed by the general conclusions to be
drawn from the nature of war itself.”22 However, whether this was in fact
Clausewitz’s subjective view is beyond the scope of this article, and not
relevant to our purposes. Whether Clausewitz meant it or not, while it is
suggested here that the trinity applies to all wars, it is also suggested that
the trinity should not be taken as an exclusive account of the normative
sources that potentially inform the character of a given war.
Clausewitz’s view of war in the trinity, which resists its reduction
to scientific models, is a fundamentally important insight. In this light,
the most useful way to think about war is to read about its history, and
thus come to understand it in different historical contexts that serve
as analogies, or distinctions, to the present day. This is an exercise
in historical judgement, not scientific logic. It fits with the fact that
Clausewitz himself wrote military history, and relied upon it for vicarious
experience to inform his analysis in On War.23
Nonetheless, the scientific mode of approaching war resurfaces
from time to time, with predictably negative consequences. Look at
Robert McNamara’s systems analysis approach during the Vietnam War,
for example. The trinity also inhibits “big-hand, small-map” strategy,
in which one forgets that war acts upon real people, who have their
22      Clausewitz, On War, 594.
23      On Clausewitz the military historian, see Andreas Herberg-Rothe, Clausewitz’s Puzzle: The
Political Theory of War (Oxford: Oxford University Press: 2007), 32.
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own story, and will not simply submit to the use of force as understood
through some quasiscientific model. One might think of the failure of
neoconservative projects to violently reshape the Middle East in the
image of Western democracies, for example.
That said, the trinity has its limits. It says nothing about a range
of normative sources that potentially inform the character of war,
such as law, religion, and robotics, that lie outside the trinity. These
considerations, when they arise, can be fundamental, too. For example,
the idea of a criminal enemy is a fundamentally different notion to a
noncriminal enemy. That much is clear if one but contrasts the normality
of collecting evidence on a battlefield in a counterinsurgency to how
odd such a notion typically would be during an interstate war, and what
each of those scenarios implies for how that conflict will end. Fighting
criminals with force is a form of armed governance, which is a far more
open-ended idea than the use of force against regular enemies, who do
not fall within one’s jurisdiction to invigilate or govern. And this rather
fundamental legal difference is but one feature of one normative source
outside the trinity.
In sum, while there is still real value in Clausewitz’s account of the
trinity, one should not make a fetish out of it, nor out of the persona
of Clausewitz himself, whose writings are unfortunately all too often
treated in a quasireligious manner as if departure from a given canon
of interpretation is some kind of sin. That attitude only frustrates clear
appreciation of what parts of his theory of war still work, and which do
not, or need adaption or extension. On War is simply a text, and should
be read unsentimentally in its own context, retaining what works, if
necessary by adaptation or analogy to new situations, but distinguishing
what does not.

Networks, Hierarchies, and Victory in Clausewitz’s
Theory of Warfare

Clausewitz’s theory of war assumes certain types of situations that
his theory of warfare was designed to work within. As noted above, the
basic situation was a two-way military fight between unified entities, who
would typically be states. There is not space here to deal with the entirety
of the applicability of Clausewitz’s theory of warfare to contemporary
conflict. Rather, I will focus on but one element which is particularly
relevant today, namely, his concept of victory.24
Our start point here is that Clausewitz’s abstract definition of war
does not account for situations in which the enemy is not a unified entity.
Following General Stanley McChrystal’s insightful distinction between
hierarchical and networked enemies, one can say Clausewitz’s definition
of war assumes a hierarchical enemy.25 Against a hierarchical enemy,
military action on the battlefield tingles up the nervous system to the
political leadership at the top. This connectedness is what ultimately
allows military action to translate into political effect in a clear sequence
in which war sets conditions for peace. The moment of translation is
24      For a detailed account of Clausewitz’s concept of victory, see Beatrice Heuser, “Clausewitz’s
Ideas of Strategy and Victory,” in Strachan and Herberg-Rothe, Clausewitz in the Twenty-First Century.
25      See Stanley A. McChrystal, et al., Team of Teams: New Rules of Engagement for a Complex World
(New York: Penguin, 2015).
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the moment of victory, which comprehends a military and a political
dimension; that is, the battlefield result is locked into a political result
because the enemy as a whole—the entire hierarchy—recognizes the
verdict of battle (whether that verdict is decisive or not).
A hierarchical enemy is presupposed in any strategic theory based
on Clausewitz, given how he assumed the enemy to be a unified entity.
This assumption provided the basis for his most important strategic
concept, the center of gravity, which necessarily presupposed the enemy
had a “will,” in the sense that it was a unified entity. Thus, Clausewitz
envisaged the military strategist striking at the enemy’s center of gravity
to translate a military result into a political result because it was a physical
representation of the center of the enemy’s will: “By constantly seeking
out the center of his power . . . will one really defeat the enemy.”26 The
location of the center of gravity was wherever the enemy’s will could
be defeated, which would normally require destruction of the enemy’s
main force, but it could also involve the occupation of the capital, or
influencing communal interests in the case of an alliance. In this way,
the center of gravity provided for a unified concept of victory: because
the enemy’s military defeat was translated into a political result binding
on the enemy as a whole—for Clausewitz understood the enemy to be
a unified whole.
Now consider the position of victory in relation to the networked
enemy. When the enemy is not a vertical hierarchy but a relatively flat
network, while military action may produce localized political effect
against localized contours of political leadership within the network,
other parts of the network might well ignore that effect, and keep
fighting. This condition makes it very hard to translate military effect
into decisive political effect, for the very notion of decision in this context
implies that it is binding, not ignored. The United States has degraded
the core of al-Qaeda, but many of its franchises are still fighting, or have
mutated into new groups. The same can be said about the Islamic State
and radical jihadi terrorist networks more broadly.
One can try to force a networked enemy into traditional strategic
models based on the hierarchical paradigm of the enemy by treating all
people even loosely connected to a network as if they were a single enemy,
and make a massive commitment to defeat the entire network militarily.
However, this approach has the effect of aggregating constituencies who
may not otherwise have strong links to one another, and treating them
as if they were a single entity. The chances are, one will inflate the size
of the problem and be fighting for a long time while disabling one’s
own ability to exploit a networked enemy’s greatest vulnerability, which
is precisely the fact that it can be broken up as a network along the
lines of its internal fissures. Against this temptation, a better approach
is to disaggregate the various parts of the enemy to understand them on
their own terms, which rightly was David Kilcullen’s central point in The
Accidental Guerilla.27
If we take an aggregate-and-destroy-the-network approach anyway,
victory simply comes to mean physical destruction: there is no need to
26      Clausewitz, On War, 596.
27      David Kilcullen, The Accidental Guerrilla: Fighting Small Wars in the Midst of a Big One (London:
Hurst, 2009).
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bind an enemy into a political settlement if they have been physically
destroyed, or at least severally degraded to the point of no longer posing
a threat worth fighting. So military force can be decisive in this qualified
sense against a networked enemy, yes. But, networked insurgents will
rarely fight Western forces in conventional battle, preferring to perform
hit-and-run attacks while hiding within civilian populations. So one
must be clear that the consequences of achieving decision through brute
force alone is likely wide-scale loss of civilian life in a manner that may
well be morally, if not legally, repugnant to Western publics.
Moreover, the brute force approach assumes a networked enemy
can all be targeted militarily in the first place. That is unlikely to be
the case if the enemy is a globalized network. Rather, it is a recipe for
forever war, which as the name suggests, is never going to be decisive. In
short, if one simply treats a networked enemy as if it were a hierarchical
enemy, victory becomes a purely military concept without a political
counterpart. Victory understood in decisive terms becomes an ever
receding light at the end of the tunnel of forever war. Of course, no wars
actually have lasted forever; the point is that forever war simply identifies
a type of war with no apparent mechanism of decision.

Conclusion

In one sense, On War represents Clausewitz’s attempt to understand
a massive transformation in the character of war as he had experienced
it in his lifetime. With the withering Prussian defeat at the Battle of Jena
in 1806 in mind, he writes:
In the eighteenth century…war was still an affair for governments alone.
. . . At the onset of the nineteenth century, peoples themselves were in the
scale on either side. . . . Such a transformation of war might have led to
new ways of thinking about it. In 1805, 1806, and 1809 men might have
recognized that total ruin was a possibility—indeed it stared them in the
face. . . . They did not, however, change their attitude sufficiently. . . . They
failed because the transformations of war had not yet been sufficiently
revealed by history.28

As Hew Strachan’s biography of On War tells us, Clausewitz saw
as fundamental the social changes of the French Revolution, which
produced the citizen-solider and the idea of the nation in arms. Allied
to expansive ideological claims, war ripped apart European order from
1789 to 1815. Clausewitz’s achievement was to provide a flexible account
of war that could comprehend the lived reality of near-absolute war
without claiming all wars would always be like this, and might well be
far more limited. On this basis, Clausewitz offered military strategists
in his day a set of strategic principles to translate military outcomes into
political outcomes, that is, a clear account of victory in war.
However, the fragmented, networked enemy, produced by today’s
information revolution—which might well turn out to be just as
transformative as the French Revolution, or the Industrial Revolution—
fits badly into Clausewitz’s abstract account of war as a two-way military
fight between unified entities. This enemy is not new but well-known to
the Western tradition of strategic thought in the imperial and small-wars
context—though historically known more at a local or a regional level
28      Clausewitz, On War, 583–84.
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than at the global-level networks of today’s Information Age. But, this
latter context was not the type of war about which Clausewitz wrote.
The center of gravity concept breaks down in relation to the fragmented,
networked enemy. By plugging in modern operational doctrine to the
wrong historical tradition, we misunderstand the conflicts we fight in.
Regardless of abstract theory, the further the factual reality of early
twenty-first century combat—war as it has actually been lived by several
thousand Western soldiers—departs from the interstate land warfare of
early nineteenth century Europe, the harder it is to understand today’s
warfare in Clausewitzian terms, even if the trinity in the specific sense
suggested above applies universally to all war.
Clausewitz updated the theory of war and warfare to account for
the experience of his own day. Today, the same ambition to update the
theory of war and warfare in light of lived experience can safely be
described as Clausewitzian.
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Will War’s Nature Change in the
Seventh Military Revolution?
F. G. Hoffman
ABSTRACT: This article examines the potential implications of the
combinations of robotics, artificial intelligence, and deep learning
systems on the character and nature of war. The author employs
Carl von Clausewitz’s trinity concept to discuss how autonomous
weapons will impact the essential elements of war. The essay argues
war’s essence, as politically directed violence fraught with friction,
will remain its most enduring aspect, even if more intelligent
machines are involved at every level.

O

ver 25 years ago, Manuel De Landa wrote in War in the Age of
Intelligent Machines, that when we move past cruise missiles that
merely hit their intended targets to the day when “autonomous
weapons begin to select their own targets, the moment the responsibility
of establishing whether a human is friend or foe is given to the machine,
we will have crossed a threshold and a new era will have begun.”1 More
recent works also indicate the era of disruptive technologies, with the
potential to change both the nature and character of war, is swiftly
approaching.2 The combined impact of artificial intelligence (AI) and
unmanned systems might quickly evolve into the age of autonomy,
and consequently raise critical ethical and moral issues. But this article
addresses the rising awareness in the national security community about
the technologies’ prospective impact. This perspective is followed by an
examination of the scale of the potential changes caused by lethal weapons
in the context of Carl von Clausewitz’s invaluable trinitarian framework.
The major technological breakthroughs that could occur in
robotics as well as information, cognitive, and material sciences are, by
themselves, truly revolutionary.3 In the context of one construct, such
emerging opportunities and challenges reinforce a theory of five military
revolutions (see table 1). Defined as uncontrollable, unpredictable, and
unforeseeable changes in politics and society, these eras “recast society
and the state as well as military organizations. They alter the capacity
of states to create and project military power. And their effects are
additive.”4 Stopping at five historical cases, the construct alludes to the
ongoing sixth revolution, the Information Age.

1      Manuel De Landa, War in the Age of Intelligent Machines (New York: Zone Books, 1991), 46.
2      Jeffrey L. Caton, Autonomous Weapons Systems: A Brief Survey of Development, Operational, Legal
and Ethical Issues, Letort Papers (Carlisle, PA: Strategic Studies Institute, 2015).
3      James Kadtke and Linton Wells II, Policy Challenges of Accelerating Technological Change: Security
Policy and Strategy Implications of Parallel Scientific Revolutions (Washington, DC: National Defense
University [NDU], 2014).
4      MacGregor Knox and Williamson Murray, eds., The Dynamics of Military Revolution, 1300–2050
(New York: Cambridge University Press, 2001), 6–7.
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Military Revolution

Implications
First Revolution

Westphalian System

Revenue generation, banking and taxes
for financing wars, and professional
militaries
Second Revolution

French Revolution

National mobilization, levy en masse, and
large-scale armies with conscription
Third Revolution

Industrial Revolution

Mass production, standardization, and
large-scale economic exploitation
Fourth Revolution

World Wars I & II

Combined arms, armored blitzkrieg,
carriers, bombers, and jets
Fifth Revolution

Nuclear Revolution
and missiles

Nuclear weapons and intercontinental
ballistic missiles

Information Revolution

Command and control, connectivity and
instant global reach, imagery, and cyber
levy en masse by violent extremists

Sixth Revolution

Seventh Revolution

Autonomous Revolution Autonomous weapons, swarms of
robotic vehicles in multiple domains,
self-organizing defensive systems,
automated weapons, big data analytics,
and machine and deep-learning programs
Table 1. Military Revolutions5
A seventh revolution, the autonomous revolution, looms ahead of
us. By combining machines and computers in ways thus far envisioned
mostly through science fiction, this era will merge the changes generated
by the Industrial Revolution and the Information Age with potentially
significant alterations in how war is conducted. Of particular salience
in this new era are developments in artificial intelligence, especially
machine learning and deep-learning AI, combined with unmanned
systems.6 These developments are the underlying breakthroughs that
5      This table expands on the information provided by Knox and Murray in Dynamics of Military
Revolution, 13.
6      Artificial Intelligence means computers executing tasks traditionally left to human cognition
and reasoning. Machine learning means computer systems improving their performance by
automatically discovering patterns in large amounts of data. Deep-learning software attempts
to replicate human brain activity. Adapted from David Schatsky, Craig Muraskin, and Ragu
Gurumurthy, “Demystifying Artificial Intelligence: What Business Leaders Need to Know about
Cognitive Technologies,” Deloitte Insights, November 4, 2014.
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make self-driving cars and operational robots possible, with greater
functionality and self-learning. Only after examining the progress in AI
being made today do functioning androids seem to be more of a reality
than like something out a science fiction movie.7

The Autonomous Revolution

Senior Pentagon leaders have already grasped the enormous potential
of applying AI to enhance decision-making, improve intelligence
production, and safeguard computer systems. A common understanding
of “autonomy” enables the discussion to proceed. “To be autonomous,”
a government advisory body notes, “a system must have the capability
to independently compose and select among different courses of action
to accomplish goals based on its knowledge and understanding of the
world, itself, and the situation.”8
Autonomous systems are not entirely new. During World War II, the
Germans employed a torpedo with an acoustic homing seeker that was
recognized as the first guided and autonomous weapon.9 Other weapons
during that war also approached some degree of independence. The US
Navy and US Army now field defensive missile systems with degrees of
autonomy built into their controls. The US Joint Chiefs of Staff identifies
this area as a critical trend:
The next two decades will see significant advances in autonomy and
machine learning, to include the emergence of robots working together in
groups and as swarms. New and powerful robotic systems will be used to
perform complex actions, make autonomous decisions, deliver lethal force,
provide [intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance] coverage, and speed
response times over wider areas of the globe.10

The Army forecasted the upcoming revolutionary shifts in
technology “may even challenge the very nature of warfare itself.”11
A British assessment noted “the increased capability of robots is likely
to change the face of warfare” and some countries may replace large
numbers of troops with robots by 2045.12
While the potential of AI has been hyped for more than a generation
of very halting progress, breakthroughs during the last five years alone
suggest an age of autonomy is much closer than previously anticipated.13
Yet, while legal, ethical, and moral dimensions are being debated,
  7      For a comprehensive and balanced assessment of the moral, political, and military
implications, see Paul Scharre, Army of None, Autonomous Weapons and the Future of War (New York:
W. W. Norton, 2018).
  8      Defense Science Board, Final Report of the Defense Science Board (DSB) Summer Study on Autonomy
(Washington, DC: Department of Defense, 2016), 4.
  9      I thank Dr Andrew Ilachinski, AI, Robots and Swarms: Issues, Questions and Recommended Studies
(Arlington, VA: CNA, 2017), v. For additional detail, see John Campbell, Naval Weapons of World War
Two (London:, Conway Maritime Press, 1985), 264.
10      Joint Force Development, Joint Operating Environment JOE 2035: The Joint Force in a Contested
and Disordered World (Suffolk, VA: Joint Chiefs of Staff, 2016), 17.
11      US Army Training and Doctrine Command (TRADOC), The Operational Environment and the
Changing Character of Future Warfare (Fort Eustis, VA: 2017), 6.
12      Development, Concepts and Doctrine Command, Strategic Trends Programme: Global Strategic
Trends—Out to 2045, 5th ed. (Shrivenham, UK: Ministry of Defence, 2016), 67.
13      Samuel R. White, Jr., ed., Closer Than You Think: The Implications of the Third Offset Strategy for
the U.S. Army (Carlisle, PA: Strategic Studies Institute, 2017); and Larry Lewis, Insights for the Third
Offset: Addressing Challenges of Autonomy and Artificial Intelligence in Military Operations (Arlington, VA:
CNA, 2017).
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little work addresses operational concepts, organizational and tactical
reforms, or verification and validation tests for the emerging systems.
Presently, human cognition is perceived to be superior to autonomous
technologies in situations that are complex, ambiguous, and dynamic.
We know human beings are very talented at making decisions in closed
systems with repeatable data and feedback, including complex games like
chess. But our decision-making and cognitive processes can be skewed
negatively or produce irrational decisions because of bias, attribution,
optimism, framing, and anchoring influences.
The computational power of computers is accelerating, and machines
can now defeat humans in intellectual contests. Deep Blue defeated
chess master Garry Kasparov more than 20 years ago. Advancing from
a system with more than 100,000 replications of previous Go strategies
that achieved early victories, a newer AI-based version was merely
programmed with the basic rule set and developed its own strategies by
playing simulated games over three days. With unorthodox moves, the
AI crushed the human Go masters pitted against it.14 Machine learning
even composes quality musical symphonies.15
Advances in autonomous systems should continue to outsmart
humans where routine, known, “predictable tasks are being performed,
where reaction time is critical.”16 One source emphasizes, “Increased
automation or autonomy can have many advantages, including increased
safety and reliability, improved reaction time and performance, reduced
personnel burden with associated cost savings, and the ability to continue
operations in communications-degraded or -denied environments.”17
The greatest advantages of autonomy will come from eliminating the
need for mundane tasks and augmenting human decision-making,
not replacing it. This outlook suggests combinations of humans and
machines represent the future. As former Deputy Secretary of Defense
Robert O. Work concluded, “Rapid advances in artificial intelligence—
and the vastly improved autonomous systems and operations they
will enable—are pointing towards new and more novel warfighting
applications involving human-machine collaboration and combat
teaming.”18 The role of educated humans will begin to concentrate on the
higher cognitive tasks of processes such as mission analysis, operational
planning, and assessments.
Yet, our appreciation of the implications of the seventh military
revolution is weak.19 Time may not be on our side, as these technologies—
with new commercial and military applications—are already available.
The Chinese realize the inherent opportunities of these advances, and

14      Christof Koch, “How the Computer Beat the Go Master,” Scientific American, March 19, 2016.
15      Yuval Noah Harari, Homo Deus: A Brief History of Tomorrow (New York: Harper, 2017).
16      Robert O. Work and Shawn Brimley, 20YY: Preparing for War in the Robotic Age (Washington,
DC: Center for a New American Security, 2014), 24.
17       Brian Hall, “Autonomous Weapons Systems Safety,” Joint Force Quarterly 86 (3rd Quarter
2017), 87.
18      Robert O. Work, foreword to DoD Artificial Intelligence, Big Data and Cloud Taxonomy
(Washington, DC: Govini, 2017), 2.
19      See Shawn Brimley, Ben Fitzgerald, and Kelley Sayler, Game Changers: Disruptive Technology and
U.S. Defense Strategy (Washington, DC: Center for a New American Security, 2013).
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are pursuing each of them with varying degrees of emphasis.20 The
People’s Liberation Army is also moving beyond informationalization
of warfare into smart, or intelligentization of, warfare to pursue the
same lines of effort identified by America’s science and technology
community and national security officials. This focus includes shoring
up currently disadvantaged sectors, such as anti-submarine warfare. The
Russians think AI has enormous potential, with President Vladimir
Putin claiming a state that monopolizes this dimension could dominate
the globe.21 The notion of a Sputnik moment involving AI is only a slight
bit of hype, but it does serve to alert us to the dangers of complacency.

The Nature and Character of War

The professional military community generally differentiates
between an objective nature and a subjective character of war by drawing
upon Clausewitz.22 The former describes what war is, and the latter
describes how it is actually fought. The nature captures war’s essence—
the things that differentiate war, as a type of phenomenon, from other
things. War’s nature is violent, interactive between opposing wills, and
driven by politics. War’s character, its conduct, constantly evolves under
the influence of technology, moral forces (law or ethics), culture, and
military culture, which also change across time and place.
Colin Gray captures this essence cogently: “There is a unity to
all strategic experience: nothing essential changes in the nature and
function (or purpose) in sharp contrast to the character—of strategy
and war.”23 Clausewitz observed every age has its “own kind of war, its
own limiting conditions and its own peculiar preconceptions.”24 In his
day, the major changes in conditions were social and political, but he was
aware that technological advances generate changes in war character.
Close adherents of Clausewitz remain extremely skeptical that
war’s objective nature can be modified. They insist war’s fundamental
nature cannot change. They contend war is inherently human, a clash of
wills, politically driven. Technology cannot mitigate its essence, or shed
reliable insights to remove its uncertainty. Historian Williamson Murray
is skeptical the Information Age can dissipate war’s nature, especially
battlefield uncertainty. He contends war’s nature includes the fog and
the friction of war, and that arguments contending its nature can be
altered are false.25 Murray argues, “No amount of computing power can

20      Elsa B. Kania, “Chinese Advances in Unmanned Systems and the Military Applications
of Artificial Intelligence—the PLA’s Trajectory towards Unmanned, ‘Intelligentized’ Warfare”
(testimony, Hearing on China’s Advanced Weapons, Before the U.S.-China Economic and Security Review
Commission, February 23, 2017).
21      Associated Press, “Putin: Leader in Artificial Intelligence Will Rule World,” AP
News Archive, September 1, 2017, http://www.apnewsarchive.com/2017/Russian-President
-Vladimir-Putin-says-that-whoever-reaches-a-breakthrough-in-developing-ar tificial
-intelligence-will-come-to-dominate-the-world/id-bb5628f2a7424a10b3e38b07f4eb90d4.
22      Christopher Mewett, “Understanding War’s Enduring Nature alongside Its Changing
Character,” War on the Rocks, January 21, 2014, http://warontherocks.com/2014/01/understanding
-wars-enduring-nature-alongside-its-changing-character/.
23      Colin Gray, Modern Strategy (New York: Oxford University Press, 1999), 362.
24      Carl von Clausewitz, On War, trans. and ed. Michael Howard and Peter Paret (Princeton, NJ:
Princeton University Press, 1976), 593.
25      Admiral William A. Owens, Lifting the Fog of War, with Edward Offley (New York: Farrar,
Straus, and Giroux, 2000).
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anticipate the varied moves and the implications of an enemy’s capacity
to adapt in unexpected ways.”26
A new generation has entered the debate, and these modern-day
heretics argue for capabilities in robotics, artificial intelligence, and
human-machine teaming that will change more than just the way
warfare is waged. As deputy secretary of defense, Work identified AI
and human performance enhancements as potential breakthroughs in
defense technology: “We believe we are at an inflection point at artificial
intelligence and autonomy.”27 He later told an AI conference, “I am
starting to believe very, very deeply that it is also going to change the
nature of war.”28
But what does asserting that the nature of war has changed or that
the essence of war is immutable mean? Does it mean revolutionary
changes that alter the weight, or entirely eliminate the objective elements
Clausewitz defined nearly two centuries ago, cannot occur? Or by
overemphasizing war’s unchangeable essence, are we suggesting these
aspects are completely unalterable, even in degrees? Does the standard
for changing war’s essential nature stand too high, with the elimination
of a central tendency?
Other Clausewitzian scholars contend the terminology and method
used by the Prussian theorist makes the “nature” distinction irrelevant.29
They point out that Clausewitz compared war’s objective (essential)
nature to its subjective (expressed) nature, which deals with how warfare
is conducted.30 Clausewitz did distinguish between types of elements,
but he believed each interacted and influenced the others. As Antulio J.
Echevarria II has stated, “Under Clausewitz’s concept, the objective and
subjective natures of war are closely connected to one another and interact
continuously. New weapons or methods, for example, can increase or
diminish the degree of violence or uncertainty, though probably never
eliminate them entirely.”31 Note this increase or decrease is a change
in degree. Echevarria also adds an important insight: “War’s internal
tendencies, on the other hand, can change in intensity, proportion,
and relative role as the external features themselves transform.”32 This
contrast captures how war’s nature may be altered, at least in degree and
in relation to other factors.
The early philosopher of war thought of war, and warfare, as a series
of interactions: the nature of war never existed in isolation but was always
the product of the interactions of the various elements.33 Clausewitz did
26      Williamson Murray, America and the Future of War: The Past as Prologue (Stanford, CA: Hoover
Institution Press, 2017), 34–35.
27       Robert O. Work, “Reagan Defense Forum: The Third Offset Strategy” (speech, Reagan
Presidential Library, Simi Valley, CA, November 7, 2015), https://www.defense.gov/News
/Speeches/Speech-View/Article/628246/reagan-defense-forum-the-third-offset-strategy.
28      Sydney J. Freedberg Jr., “War without Fear: DepSecDef Work on How AI Changes Conflict,”
Breaking Defense, May 31, 2017.
29      Antulio J. Echevarria II, Clausewitz and Contemporary War (Oxford: Oxford University Press,
2013), 61–83.
30      Antulio J. Echevarria II, “Globalization and the Clausewitzian Nature of War,” European
Legacy 8, no. 3 (2003): 317–32, doi:10.1080/10848770309442.
31      Antulio J. Echevarria II, Globalization and the Clausewitzian Nature of War (Carlisle, PA: Strategic
Studies Institute, 2003), 8.
32      Echevarria, Globalization and the Clausewitzian Nature of War, 8.
33      Azar Gat, A History of Military Thought: From the Enlightenment to the Cold War (New York:
Oxford University Press, 2001), 237–38; and Clausewitz, On War, 605.
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not limit the reciprocal nature of war to a clash of opposing trinities, but
expressed interaction within the trinity. In short, a change in character
could impact an essential element, and could, to a degree, be changed
by it. Thus, such a change in the character and the conduct of war could
influence war’s nature.

An Analytical Framework

To explore the possible dynamics of warfare in an age of autonomy,
we can use Clausewitz’s remarkable trinity model.34 The trinity captures
the interactive elements at the core of violence: irrational forces of
“primordial violence, hatred, and enmity”; nonrational forces per “the
play of chance and probability” and the genius of the commander, which
produce friction; and purely rational forces from war’s subordination to
policy and reason.35 Clausewitz associated each of these elements with
actors or components of the state—policy, the military, and the people.
These components are the main loci of each factor, but not its only
source. Clearly, passions stir the military, and irrational factors affect
even the most deliberative policy-making process. But the true trinity
and the association with actors is secondary.36
The three essential elements interact with each other to influence
the most essential nature of war, its primordial violence. The persistence
of this framework suggests its strong analytical utility across time.37
The concept is often presented graphically as a hierarchy that implies
fixed relationships in an isosceles triangle.38 Even avowed disciples
of Clausewitz will mistakenly refer to the trinity as a triangle. This
representation is at odds with Clausewitz’s interactive and nonlinear
description of war.39 Clausewitz insisted:
These three tendencies are like three different codes of law, deep-rooted in
their subject and yet variable in their relationship to one another. A theory
that ignores any one of them or seeks to fix an arbitrary relationship between
them would conflict with reality to such an extent that for this reason alone
it would be totally useless..40

The reciprocity between the three elements shapes the violence that
makes war so unique, and drives each case contextually. Clausewitz noted
“the conduct of any war affects its character, and its altered character feeds
back into the political ends that guide its conduct.”41 His description of
three suspended magnets represents how the three elements attract and
repel each other. This interaction, changing the nature or relationship of
the other, is central to understanding Clausewitz’s holistic theory of war.
34      Christopher Bassford and Edward J. Villacres, “Reclaiming the Clausewitzian Trinity,”
Parameters 25, no. 3 (Autumn 1995): 9–19; and Andreas Herberg-Rothe, “Clausewitz’s ‘Wondrous
Trinity’ as a Coordinate System of War and Violent Conflict,” International Journal of Conflict and
Violence 3, no. 2 (2009), 204–19, doi:10.4119/UNIBI/ijcv.6.
35      Clausewitz, On War, 86; and Echevarria, Clausewitz and Contemporary War, 192.
36      Hew Strachan, “A Clausewitz for Every Season,” American Interest 2, no. 6 (July 2007).
37      Christopher Bassford, “The Strange Persistence of Trinitarian Warfare,” in International
Security and War: Politics and Grand Strategy in the 21st Century, ed. Ralph Rotte and Christoph Schwarz
(Hauppauge, NY: Nova Science, 2011), 45–54.
38      Murray, America and the Future of War, 47.
39      Clausewitz, On War, 89; and Beatrice Heuser, Reading Clausewitz (London: Pimlico,
2002), 52–55.
40      Clausewitz, On War, 89.
41      Alan Beyerchen, “Clausewitz, Nonlinearity, and the Unpredictability of War,” International
Security 17, no. 3 (Winter 1992/93): 69, doi:10.2307/2539130; and Clausewitz, On War, 87.
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The other metaphor Clausewitz employed, which is often
misunderstood, is a chameleon: “War is more than a true chameleon
that slightly adapts its characteristics to the given case.”42 A cursory
reading might lead the undisciplined reader to think this metaphor is
a reference justifying the idea that war merely changes its color slightly
in response to the environment. But a more detailed reading supports
an interpretation that the phenomenon can escalate into a substantially
different form. Werner Hahlweg translated Clausewitz as this: “War is
thus not only a genuine chameleon, since it alters its nature somewhat in
each particular case.”43

The Impact on War’s Nature

The trinity offers a useful analytical framework for understanding
how the emerging age of autonomy, the seventh military revolution, can
impact the objective and subjective nature of war.
Passion/Enmity. Domestic policy leaders may find AI conducive
to targeted cyber and social media strategies that suppress or inflame
populations. This element in war is not new, but its impact is now felt
more quickly. Because of the public’s growing use of social media and
the internet as a principal source of information, these technologies
become an ideal vector for automated information attacks and influence
tactics. Additional automated methods supported by algorithms will
increase the mass, frequency, and customization of messages.44 As noted
in a recent US Army War College study, “Human perceptions and the
relative value of truth have increasingly become ripe territory for low
risk/high impact manipulation of strategic outcomes,” which gives
small actors with limited resources the promise of disproportionately
high strategic effects.45
Of course, America’s adversaries indicate they may try to do the
same. China is blatant about the potential for using AI to control its
population: “The Communist Party of China (CPC) hopes AI will have
utility in enhancing the ‘intelligentization’ of ‘social management’ and
protecting social stability.”46 Russia also has few qualms about exploiting
its population via state-controlled television and other media outlets for
the same purpose.
Extensive use of robots and unmanned systems, however, could not
only reduce public interest but more importantly weaken public support
for the armed services. The population may feel less engaged or tied to a
nation’s policy actions if robotic forces are employed. At the same time,
42      Clausewitz, On War, 89. Hew Strachan notes Clausewitz actually used “natur” and the original
text implies something more significant than the Paret and Howard translation does. See Hew
Strachan, Clausewitz’s On War: A Biography (New York: Atlantic Monthly, 2007), 194.
43      Carl von Clausewitz, Vom Kriege Hinterlassenes Werk des Generals Carl von Clausewitz: vollständige
Ausgabe im Urtext, drei Teile in einem Band, ed. Werner Hahlweg, 19th ed. (Bonn: Dümmlers Verlag,
1980), 213 (emphasis added); Echevarria, Clausewitz and Contemporary War, 69; and Antulio J.
Echevarria II, “Globalization and the Clausewitzian Nature of War,” 317–32.
44      Rand Waltzman, “The Weaponization of Information: The Need for Cognitive Security”
(testimony, Hearing on Cyber-Enabled Information Operations, Before the Senate Armed Services Committee,
Subcommittee on Cybersecurity, April 27, 2017).
45      Nathan P. Freier, “Strategic Insights: Speed Kills, Enter an Age of Unbridled
Hyperconnectivity,” Strategic Studies Institute, June 9, 2017, http://ssi.armywarcollege.edu/index
.cfm/articles/Speed-Kills/2017/06/09.
46      Elsa Kania, “Chinese Advances”; and Elsa B. Kania, “China’s Artificial Intelligence
Revolution,” Diplomat, July 27, 2017.
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cabinet wars that entail few core national interests are more likely to
occur since they may be perceived as politically low-risk. Such conflicts
can also be protracted because of the government’s desire to keep the
nation’s sons and daughters out of harm’s way. Overall, the impact of
these convergent technologies may impair the connection between a
population and its government while severing the relationship between
the military and the community it serves.
The populace may ultimately see the need to send humans into combat
as an indication of policy failure, further restricting the government.
The infusion of machinery, the reduction of human decision-making,
and the rise of remote standoff warfare could erode the identity of the
military as professionals with a unique social responsibility that involves
risk and danger. The corrosion of this role might undermine the ideal
of the profession of arms, accelerating the impact of the post-heroic age
on the military.47
Chance/Friction. The introduction of new information-based
technologies and robotic systems will not reduce strategic friction
or eliminate the potential for chance; however, friction from human
sources at the tactical level may be trimmed. Even if machines only clash
with other machines, unpredictable interactions with adversaries or a
nation’s own robots will ensue. Both sides, even when fully autonomous,
will contain flaws and vulnerabilities, with avenues for opponents to
inject uncertainty deliberately.
At the strategic and operational levels, AI is expected to enhance
the clarity of intelligence and reduce human biases in assessing small
changes in big databases. Some improvement in decision-making
quality can be expected. Yet, one potential impact is a higher chance for
miscalculation by decision-makers or headquarters whose information
sources or databases are compromised.
At the tactical level, contingency factors emanating from human
fatigue or fear will be reduced. That said, new sources of friction will be
introduced by mechanical failure, algorithmic degradation, and learning
and adapting in a way inconsistent with intent. Moreover, the second
order effects of the nonlinear developments of deep learning AI being
introduced at this time are entirely unknown.
Artificial intelligence and computer support are not necessary to
remove human judgment at any or all levels of warfare decisions, but
may be used simply to improve the efficacy of human judgement. Such
technology could be used to eliminate wasted human cognitive capacity
on mundane tasks. The challenge for warfighting applications involves
building learning systems that recognize when to break the algorithms
and the rule set inherent to their programing. Within this decision point
resides the human genius of warfare. Thus, decision-making in the age
of autonomy will rely upon human-machine teaming.
Since warfare is an exercise in organizational learning and adaptation,
the ability of AI to automatically update programming with the results
of each engagement or operation should be a positive influence.
The availability of this information will promote faster learning and
47      Edward N. Luttwak, “Towards Post-Heroic Warfare,” Foreign Affairs 74, no. 3 (May/June,
1995): 33–44.
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dissemination of experiences than existing human-based methods.
Thus, if learning and adaptation are positively correlated with success in
warfare, AI should help.
At the tactical level, machine learning will also support human
decision-making, and begin to displace some decision-making as deep
learning is introduced. As Work once pointed out, “learning machines
are going to give more and more commanders coup d’oeil.”48 Warfare
will become less human-centric as it becomes more automated and
autonomous. This capability can absolve commanders and their staffs
from menial tasks, enabling the application of creative strengths to more
critical tasks.
Another possible change may influence the Clausewitzian ideal for
intuition and coup d’oeil—“the quick recognition of a truth that the
mind would ordinarily miss or would perceive only after long study and
reflection.”49 Clausewitz observed “this type of knowledge cannot be
forcibly produced by an apparatus of scientific formulas and mechanics;
it can only be gained through a talent for judgment, and by the application
of accurate judgment to the observation of man and matter.”50 Natural
talent and judgment in his day were gained by exposure to actual war as
well as to critical study.
In the seventh military revolution, a commander’s intuitive grasp
of the battlespace will be augmented, but rarely displaced entirely, by
intelligence and decision support systems that are AI enabled. The
natural and experientially developed coup d’oeil of the human will be
replaced—or at least augmented by—a data-infused, automated, “cyber
d’oeil” that supports human decision-making at all levels of warfare.
This evolution will not happen overnight, and there will be instances of
“artificial stupidity” along the way as AI matures.51
Those who embrace Clausewitz’s description of the role of the
commander and intuition will question the algorithms’ ability to respond
to creativity and to override the rules.52 Or, probably more important,
they will consider how AI will help senior commanders create new rules,
especially in relation to new circumstances in the evolution of warfare.53
Clausewitz argued a military commander could gain talent
“through the medium of reflection, study and thought” without
experiential learning.54 Will deep learning programs now provide
that rapid recognition, that discernment of truth, and augment deep
study and reflection? While Clausewitz emphasized many attributes—
determination, courage, and presence of mind—the one he prized the
most for a commander was combat experience. Does a deep learning
program substitute for seasoning and experience?55
48      Work, quoted in Freedberg, “War without Fear.”
49      Clausewitz, On War, 102.
50      Carl von Clausewitz, On War, ed. Beatrice Heuser (Oxford: Oxford University Press,
2007), 97.
51      Sydney J. Freedberg Jr., “Artificial Stupidity: Learning To Trust Artificial Intelligence
(Sometimes),” Breaking Defense, July 5, 2017.
52      Clausewitz, On War, 136.
53      Echevarria, Clausewitz and Contemporary War, 119.
54      Clausewitz, On War, 146.
55      Clausewitz, On War, 122.
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Reason/Political Direction. At the strategic level, politics will remain the
womb in which war develops.56 Unmanned precision strike platforms
may lessen the human and domestic political costs of going to war,
and make it easier for leaders to go to war. As Chris Coker has noted,
political leaders may “become so intoxicated by the idea of precise,
risk-free warfare that we believe what we want to believe.”57 We can
expect decision-making to be perhaps more challenged by the blurring
modes of warfare and the speed of events. Cyber and hypersonic missile
attacks will compress decision-making time lines for both strategic and
operational leaders. In such situations, the necessity for preplanned
delegation and engagement authorities is clear.
Analysts have for several decades been aware that the role of human
decision-making will be increasingly challenged by advanced automation
and artificial intelligence.58 Years ago US Marine Corps General James
E. Cartwright “predicted that ‘the decision cycle of the future is not
going to be minutes. . . . The decision cycle of the future is going to be
microseconds.”59 This sheer speed, across the critical infrastructure of
both society and the armed forces, may be the most profound change
forced by advanced forms of cyberwarfare.
The instantaneous decision-making implied in high-intensity
operations, in cyberspace, and in the employment of missiles and
unmanned vehicles moving at velocities greater than the speed of light
have led to warnings about “hyperwar.”60 This need for speed raises
important questions: does this radically accelerated decision-making
take civilians and policy out of the conflict, and thus is political direction
simply delegated to machines, is it weakened or entirely eliminated in
the process? If so, would not the nature of war be changed, or just its
conduct, because both political direction and human guidance would
be weakened?
The potential for disinformation and cyberwarfare to stress
traditional forms of strategic control is growing higher, and war may
escalate more rapidly than in the past. Suspicions about the influence of
cyberintrusion into everyday operations will breed mistrust in our most
basic command systems. This doubt could also permeate civil society
if future adversaries attack banks, air traffic control systems, hospital
records, and civilian targets. Even if directed only at government targets,
the loss of accurate information could breed instability in times of crisis.61
Clausewitz provides an “intellectual armory” of analytical weapons,
especially his wondrously useful trinity, to examine the dynamics of
war.62 Looking at the foregoing discussion, the character of warfare
will clearly change, and these changes could significantly influence the
Clausewitzian elements that frame our understanding of war’s nature.
56      Clausewitz, On War, 149.
57      Christopher Coker, Humane Warfare (London: Routledge, 2001), 150.
58      Thomas K. Adams, “Future Warfare and the Decline of Human Decisionmaking,” Parameters
41, no. 4 (Winter 2011–12): 7–19.
59      Quoted in Peter W. Singer, “Tactical Generals: Leaders, Technology, and the Perils,” Brookings
Institution, July 7, 2009.
60      John R. Allen and Amir Husain, “On Hyperwar,” Proceedings 143, no. 7 (July 2017): 30–37.
61      David C. Gompert and Martin Libicki, “Cyber Warfare and Sino-American Crisis Instability,”
Survival 4, no. 56 (Summer 2014): 7–22.
62      Peter Paret, Clausewitz and the State: The Man, His Theories, and His Times (Princeton, NJ:
Princeton University Press, 1985), 5.
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But to benefit from Clausewitz’s trinity, we should appreciate its existence
in a state of tension not equilibrium.63

Strategic

Tactical
Reason/Direction

Speed for decisions may increase to
compress cycles.
Conflict initiation increases possible
with perceived low costs.
Cyber disinformation possibilities
greater with increased opportunities.
Political subordination may degrade if
self-learning robots act independently.

Tactical defensive systems
respond in critical time
periods, displacing human
decisions to initiate warfare.
Technology possibly makes
more rational decisions with
less“human” genius.

Chance/Genius

Inherent nature retained as machines
clash and unknowingly interact
with adversaries.
Miscalculation potential increased
for decision-makers unprepared for
high-speed decision-making.

Contingency factors
emanating from human
fatigue or fear will
be reduced.

Algorithms and machine
learning will reduce the
need for humans’ tactical
Clear intelligence possible with reduced
decision-making.
human biases.
Passion/Enmity

Passions exploited by cyberbots and
social media strategies suppress or
manipulate populations.

Civic engagement may
decrease if robotic forces are
winning or losing in battle.

Media shaped by AI becomes more
potent, frequent, and diverse.

Long wars become easier
to sustain if there are fewer
human casualties.

Postheroic warfare syndrome cases rise.

Table 2. Summary of How Autonomy Impacts the Nature of War
To sum up this discussion, autonomy will change the nature of
war in several ways. First, it could weaken the role of political direction
by forcing response delegation to lower echelons for faster forms of
attack. Autonomy can lessen the ability of governments to gain the
support and legitimacy of their populations, while making it easier for
foreign governments to manipulate their adversary’s populations. More
significantly, deep-learning forms of AI will augment the intuition and
judgment of experienced commanders. At the same time, automated
63      Rob Johnson, “The Changing Character of ‘Liberal’ War” (paper, Liberal Way of War
Conference, University of Reading, Reading, Berkshire, United Kingdom, July 2012).
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technologies could reduce popular support for professional military
institutions, which paradoxically could free governments to employ
force more readily since the political consequences are reduced. As with
the earlier ages, friction and uncertainty will endure.64 Possibly, the age
of autonomy will even introduce new forms of friction while reducing
human factors in tactical contexts.

The Unchanging Elements

We should not anticipate battles devoid of human contestants, with
swarms of robots directed by their own superior intelligence. As long
as humans are responsible for directing war, for writing code, and for
fielding and maintaining machines, warfare will remain an instrument of
policy and the province of warriors. Those warriors may have machine
augmentation, delegate decisions to cyberassistants, and operate more
remotely; but they will be directing the fight. The most significant
elements of war—violence, human factors, and chance—will certainly
remain. So, too, will fog and friction.65 Despite brilliant machines, we
can count on the continuity of friction and contingency. War’s essence as
politically directed violence will remain its most enduring aspect, even if
more machines are involved at every level. Both friction and “the flash
of the kingfisher” will remain fundamental to war.66

Conclusion

While we remain at least a decade or more away from deep-learning
AI becoming a reality, we should recognize its significant impact. As this
examination suggests, the nature and character of war will be changed.
The interaction of each factor or tendency of the paradoxical trinity
will be affected in some way. Numerous implications for the conduct
of war will emerge. We will neither anticipate nor control every one of
these implications as AI matures along an expected “thorny path.”67
We should be wary of hysteria or hype about AI: predictions about this
aspect of computer development have been predicted for decades.68 But
complacency about its impact is not warranted.
In the upcoming military revolution of autonomy, we will have to
consider new sources of combat power and assess how they impact each
level of war. The biggest impacts will be at the tactical level; however,
landpower may be the least impacted of the domains of warfare given its
intimate interactions with populations and combatants. Yet, landpower
is not immune from unmanned systems and autonomy; both the
opportunity and the threat they pose will only grow. Those who are
prepared to employ autonomy smartly will be at a competitive advantage
as this age unfolds.

64      Echevarria, Globalization and the Nature of War.
65      Barry D. Watts, Clausewitzian Friction and Future War, McNair Paper 68 (Washington, DC:
NDU Press, 2004), 78, 86; and T. X. Hammes, “The Future of Conflict,” in Charting a Course, Strategic
Choices for a New Administration, ed. Richard D. Hooker, Jr. (Washington, DC: NDU Press, 2016), 17.
66      T. E. Lawrence, Seven Pillars of Wisdom: A Triumph (New York: Anchor, 1991), 193.
67      M. L. Cummings, Artificial Intelligence and the Future of Warfare, Research Paper, (London:
Chatham House, 2017).
68      Rodney Brooks, “The Seven Deadly Sins of AI Prediction,” MIT Technology Review, October
6, 2017.
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Learning from Military Transformations

Lessons Unlearned: Army Transformation
and Low-Intensity Conflict
Pat Proctor
ABSTRACT: This article examines the US Army’s experiences
and lessons learned during military interventions in Bosnia and
Herzegovina and Kosovo. It explores why these lessons did not
affect the Army transformation, directed in the late-1990s by James
M. Dubik, John W. Hendrix, John N. Abrams, and Eric K. Shinseki.

M

ilitary interventions in the Balkans during the late 1990s
demonstrated the US Army was ill-prepared for low-intensity
conflicts.1 Likewise, a growing chorus of critics warned
the future portended not Gulf War-style, high-intensity conflicts but
an increasing number of low-intensity conflicts.2 Army transformers,
steeped in a culture that emphasized preparation to fight high-intensity
conflicts over all other activities, ignored these warnings and continued
the Army’s “transformation” toward an even more deployable, high-tech,
networked force built to fight two nearly simultaneous “major regional
contingencies” (high-intensity conflicts against conventional adversaries).
This transformation culminated in the creation of interim brigade
combat teams (BCTs). In the end, however, the two “major regional
contingencies” America would fight were not against conventional
adversaries but against insurgents in Afghanistan and Iraq. And, the US
Army was unprepared to fight them.
The Army of the early 1990s was still basking in the glow of
Operation Desert Storm, the stunningly successful liberation of Kuwait
from the Iraqi Army.3 The surprising results of the Persian Gulf War
seemed to validate the Army’s high-tech, post-Vietnam War approach to
rebuilding—supplanting the superior numbers of the Soviet Army with
superior American technology.4 The focus of Army transformers in the
wake of the Gulf War was how to fight similar future conflicts better
by exploiting information technology in what was commonly referred
to as a “revolution in military affairs” (RMA). Transformers predicted
that, in future wars, the Army would have “near ‘perfect,’ near-real-time

1      The term “low-intensity conflict” refers to operations ranging from humanitarian assistance
and disaster relief to counterinsurgency and counterguerrilla operations. This is an imperfect choice,
but I have chosen to avoid terms such as operations other than war, military operations other than
war, or stability and support operations—in vogue during the period this study considers. Of course,
“low-intensity conflict” comes with its own baggage, but other terms, such as “small wars” miss the
fact that such operations might be large yet still have a character quite distinct from that of highintensity conflicts.
2      The term “high-intensity conflict” describes combat against a conventional military force of
industrial-age or greater technological ability.
3      Keith L. Shimko, The Iraq Wars and America’s Military Revolution (New York: Cambridge
University Press, 2010), 3027–40, Kindle.
4      Shimko, Iraq Wars, 167–78.
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intelligence . . . sufficient lethality with precision strike systems, and
massing of lethal effects” to defeat any adversary.5
But the reviews for Desert Storm were not all glowing. Army
transformers were concerned about taking nearly half a year to buildup
sufficient logistics, equipment, and combat forces to eject Saddam
Hussein from Kuwait. And, if the ground war had continued much
longer than 100 hours, the Army might well have run out of critical
supplies such as fuel and spare parts.6 Transformers believed the Army
had to become more deployable and more sustainable.
Yet transformation would occur in the context of shrinking budgets
and a shrinking force. With the collapse of the Soviet Union, Congress
cashed in the “peace dividend”; defense spending fell and the Army
shrank from 2.1 million soldiers before Desert Storm to 1.4 million
soldiers by the end of the drawdown in the mid-1990s.7 The Army stood
down four of 16 divisions and eliminated one corps in Europe.8
Moreover, while the Army was shrinking, the demands upon it
were increasing dramatically. Between 1988 and 1992, the US military
participated in 12 separate United Nations peacekeeping or humanitarian
missions.9 By 1994, nearly 21,000 soldiers were operating in 70 different
countries.10 The National Defense University’s Project 2025 concluded
the future held more of the same “demographic pressures, religious and
ethnic passions, and environmental constraints [that would] continue
to encroach upon and at times threaten [US] interests.”11 The future
seemed to promise not high-intensity, Gulf War-style conflicts but a
growing number of low-intensity conflicts.
And more low-intensity conflicts did come. In the final days of
his presidency, George H. W. Bush sent American forces to Somalia
to assist a teetering humanitarian assistance mission led by the United
Nations. Under President Bill Clinton, the mission in Somalia expanded
until 1,200 Soldiers from the 10th Mountain Division and the 75th
Ranger Regiment were engaged in what General Anthony Zinni,
US Central Command (CENTCOM) commander, would later call
a “counterinsurgency operation, or . . . some form of war.”12 In the
cataclysmic, 17-hour battle (October 3–4, 1993) immortalized in the
book and movie Blackhawk Down, 84 American soldiers were wounded
and 18 were killed along with 500 or more Somalis. The US forces were
unceremoniously withdrawn five months later.13
5      Deputy Chief of Staff for Doctrine, Reader’s Guide: FM 100-5, 1986–1993 Comparison (Fort
Monroe, VA: Deputy Chief of Staff for Doctrine, Training and Doctrine Command [TRADOC],
[1993]), 1.
6      Shimko, Iraq Wars, 2994–98.
7      Allan R. Millett, Peter Maslowski, and William B. Feis, For the Common Defense: A Military
History of the United States from 1607 to 2012 (New York: Free Press, 2012), 11766–70, 11805–13,
12157–72, Kindle.
8         Millet, Maslowski, and Feis, Common Defense, 12157–72.
9         Millet, Maslowski, and Feis, Common Defense, 12124–34.
10      Gordon R. Sullivan and James M. Dubik, War in the Information Age (Carlisle Barracks, PA:
Strategic Studies Institute, US Army War College, 1994), 13.
   11      Institute for National Strategic Studies Project 2025 (Washington, DC: National Defense
University, 1992), 61–63.
12      “Ambush in Mogadishu,” Frontline, https://www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontline/shows
/ambush/interviews/zinni.html.
13        Shimko, Iraq Wars, 2888–901; Millett, Maslowski, and Feis, Common Defense, 12260–98.
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The disastrous outcome of the war in Somalia should have caused
the Army to question the limitations of the RMA-fueled transformation
in which it was engaged.14 Instead, the debate over the lessons of Somalia
became embroiled in political recriminations. Defense Secretary Les
Aspin Jr. was blamed for—and later resigned over—his failure to send
armor to Somalia. The Clinton administration was blamed for mission
creep. And Samuel Huntington led a chorus of national security experts
questioning the wisdom of “nation building.”15
Meanwhile, the Army continued to march headlong toward
ever more optimized, networked, high-precision capabilities. The
Department of Defense undertook a bottom-up review that predictably
concluded the US military needed to be prepared to fight two major
regional contingencies—large, high-intensity conflicts.16 To prepare for
these conflicts, the future Army began prototyping and experimentation
with Force XXI, the 4th Infantry Division at Fort Hood, Texas.17
Army Chief of Staff General Gordon R. Sullivan predicted
the future force would “be able to locate enemy forces quickly and
precisely,” distribute that information “among all committed forces,”
and “observe, decide, and act faster, more correctly and more precisely”
than the enemy.18 This force would also fix the Army’s deployability
problems by better “projecting and sustaining combat power.”19 The
concept paid lip service to the need to fight across the range of military
operations—against enemies ranging from “agrarian war lords” and
“industrial armies” to an “Information Age peer”—but was clearly
designed to dominate a high-intensity conflict environment.20 The
unspoken assumption was that an Army that excelled at high-intensity
conflict would have no problem operating in a low-intensity conflict.
Low-intensity conflict, on the other hand, was a neglected area of
US military thought in the early 1990s. The Army’s concept of lowintensity conflict—captured in Military Operations in Low-Intensity Conflict,
Field Manual (FM) 100-20, and Operations in a Low-Intensity Conflict, FM
7-98—had serious flaws, such as an epigraph stating “peacekeeping isn’t
a soldier’s job, but only a soldier can do it.”21
Army doctrine on low-intensity conflict also suffered from the
contemporary relegation of insurgency and counterinsurgency to
special operations forces (SOF). Restricted by Congress’s post-Vietnam
aversion to military interventions, the Reagan-era model for insurgency
14      Shimko, Iraq Wars, 3027–40.
15      Millett, Maslowski, and Feis, Common Defense, 12260–98.
16      John Sloan Brown, Kevlar Legions: The Transformation of the US Army, 1989–2005 (Washington,
DC: US Army Center of Military History, 2011), 1989–2005, Kindle.
17      John L. Romjue, Susa Canedy and Anne W. Chapman et al., Prepare the Army for War: A
Historical Overview of the Army Training and Doctrine Command, 1973–1998 (Fort Monroe, VA:
TRADOC, 1998), 31–32.
18      Sullivan and Dubik, War in the Information Age, 15.
19      See Headquarters, US Department of the Army (HQDA), Decisive Victory: America’s Power
Projection Army, white paper (Washington, DC: HQDA, October 1994), 8–9.
20      HQDA, Decisive Victory, 11; Sullivan and Dubik, War in the Information Age, 15; and Shimko,
Iraq Wars, 3504–3507.
21      John B. Hunt, “OOTW: A Concept in Flux,” Military Review 76, no. 5 (September–October
1996): 3–10; HQDA, Military Operations in Low-Intensity Conflict, Field Manual (FM) 100-20 (Washington,
DC: HQDA, 1990); and HQDA, Operations in a Low-Intensity Conflict, FM 7-98 (Washington, DC:
HQDA, 1992), 4-1–4-9. This quote has been attributed in various sources to former UN SecretaryGeneral Dag Hammarskjöld or military sociologist Charles Moskos.
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and counterinsurgency in places like Honduras and El Salvador was to
use small special forces elements. This SOF mission was codified by
the Goldwater-Nichols Department of Defense Reorganization Act of 1986.22 The
US Army abdicated responsibility for insurgency and counterinsurgency
to SOF through the manuals, which proclaimed the activities were
tasks best reserved for the elite units and that America’s proper role in
counterinsurgency was only to support a host nation.23 This philosophy
dangerously assumed a host nation existed and had the capability to
combat an insurgency.
Counterinsurgency receded even more from Army doctrine during
1993: counterinsurgency was not even listed with other operations that
occur in “conflict” environments, the ill-defined gray area between
war and peace.24 The dubious phrase “operations other than war” also
replaced “low-intensity conflict.”25
Justifying this diminution of low-intensity conflict in favor of a
laser focus on exploiting the RMA to prosecute high-intensity conflicts
better, Sullivan argued “we cannot optimize the force for a single threat.
We must instead build a force with the capability to win in the most
important contingencies, while retaining the versatility, flexibility, and
residual force to win across the range of uncertainty inherent in our
forecasts of the future.”26 Elsewhere, he wrote “nation-building is not
an Army issue, but the Army is prepared to support those agencies of
the government which are directly concerned with that task.”27 He also
declared, “The Army exists to fight and win the nation’s wars.”28 This perspective sheds much light on “operations other than war” replacing “lowintensity conflict” in Army doctrine. Rather than “nation-building,”
high-intensity conflicts were “the most important contingencies.”29
Low-intensity conflicts were an unwelcome but unavoidable tax on
Army resources.
In the aftermath of the Cold War, Yugoslavia shattered along
ethnic and religious lines into four separate countries.30 In and around
Bosnia and Herzegovina, militia forces and criminal gangs—armed
with everything from small arms to armored vehicles from the former
Yugoslav army—engaged in brutal acts of ethnic violence against each
other as well as murder and ethnic cleansing against civilian populations.
These actions killed as many as 250,000 people and rendered over 2
million more people refugees or internally displaced.31
As the fighting grew, so did concern in European capitals that the
fighting might spread to the neighboring Balkan states. In February
1992, in an effort to halt the fighting, the United Nations established
22      David Fitzgerald, Learning to Forget: US Army Counterinsurgency Doctrine and Practice from Vietnam
to Iraq (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 2013), 79–81.
23      FM 7-98, 3-2.
24      FM 100-5, 2-0–2-1.
25      Hunt, “OOTW.”
26      Gordon R. Sullivan and Andrew B. Twomey, “The Challenges of Peace,” Parameters 24, no.
3 (Autumn 1994): 4–17.
27      Sullivan and Twomey, “Challenges of Peace.”
28      HQDA, Decisive Victory, 2.
29      Sullivan and Twomey, “Challenges of Peace.”
30      Robert F. Baumann, George W. Gawrych, and Walter E. Kretchik, Armed Peacekeepers in Bosnia
(Fort Leavenworth, KS: Combat Studies Institute Press, 2004), 2–3.
31      Baumann, Gawrych, and Kretchik, Armed Peacekeepers, 1, 4.
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a multinational protection force that eventually assigned 38,000
troops, from 37 countries, across more than 7,000 bases in the former
Yugoslavia. But the weak mandate for the force, its lack of cohesion, and
the potpourri of caveats from the contributing nations rendered this
force impotent; it was largely a spectator to the violence rather than an
enforcer of the peace.32
No ethnic or religious group was innocent in the conflict; all engaged
in violence against civilians and ethnic cleansing. But the Bosnian Serbs
were guilty of some of the worst atrocities of the war, including the
murder of 7,000–8,000 Bosniaks at Srebrenica in full view of Dutch
peacekeepers, 100 of which were taken prisoner.33
In 1994, the United States and the North Atlantic Treaty
Organization (NATO) began to escalate military pressure gradually—
primarily through air strikes. In December 1995, the warring parties
signed the Dayton Accords, ending the fighting and delineating lines
between the warring parties in Bosnia and Herzegovina.34 A provision
of the Dayton Accords was an international Implementation Force
(IFOR) that would, among other things, establish and enforce a zone of
separation, protect the civilian populace, and create the conditions for
reestablishing civil governance.35
The NATO force had a much more robust mandate and many fewer
national caveats than the UN effort; with the additional effectiveness,
the Implementation Force could compel compliance from each faction.
V Corps Commander, and future commander of US Army Training
and Doctrine Command (TRADOC), Lieutenant General John N.
Abrams commanded US Army Europe (USAREUR) (Forward) in
Bosnia.36 The core of the US contingent, Task Force Eagle, was the
division headquarters for the 1st Armored Division with two armored
brigades, an aviation brigade, and attached enablers such as engineers,
field artillery, military intelligence, and military police. Altogether,
the United States contributed 17,500 troops to the 60,000 soldiers of
the IFOR.37
The US support to Bosnia and Herzegovina during Operation
Joint Endeavor looks eerily similar to the stability phase of Operation
Iraqi Freedom. The Balkan state was divided into three multinational
divisions. American forces assumed control of the northern region
and assumed varying degrees of authority over forces from countries
including Russia, Turkey, Poland, and Denmark.38 Prior to deployment,
US forces went through rigorous training, including a “mission readiness
exercise” at the Combat Maneuver Training Center in Hohenfels,
Germany.39 After arriving in Bosnia and Herzegovina, Task Force
32      Baumann, Gawrych, and Kretchik, Armed Peacekeepers, 27.
33      Baumann, Gawrych, and Kretchik, Armed Peacekeepers, 27–28, 50; and Millett, Maslowski, and
Feis, Common Defense, 12378–96.
34      Millett, Maslowski, and Feis, Common Defense, 12366–75, 12403; and Baumann, Gawrych, and
Kretchik, Armed Peacekeepers, 29–30.
35      US Army Europe (USAREUR), Military Operations: The US Army in Bosnia and Herzegovina,
Army in Europe (AE) Pamphlet 525-100 (Heidleberg, Germany: USAREUR, 2003), 16.
36      USAREUR, AE Pamphlet 525-100, 16-17.
37      Baumann, Gawrych, and Kretchik, Armed Peacekeepers, 37, 94, 120.
38      AE Pamphlet 525-100, 20–21; and Baumann, Gawrych, and Kretchik, Armed Peacekeepers, 94.
39      AE Pamphlet 525-100, 12–13.
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Eagle executed operations and logistics from forward operating bases.
Units tried to balance force protection with the need to interact with
the population, developing a tactic of four-vehicle convoy operations.
Intelligence personnel and linguists were always in short supply.40
Army leaders raised in the doctrine and tactics of high-intensity
conflict struggled to meet the intellectual challenge of operating in an
environment where mission success required dealing with civilians,
establishing civil governance, practicing the “art of street diplomacy,”
and exercising a nuanced application of force under strict rules of
engagement. Officers struggled to untangle a complex web of history
and family ties, as well as ethnic and religious conflicts, to weave together
a political, economic, and social solution. Young platoon leaders and
company commanders were called upon to balance intimidation and
negotiations, dismantle illegal militia checkpoints, and understand and
interpret their mandate from vague international accords drafted by
diplomats half a world away. And as soon as a unit finally understood its
area of operations and how to do all of these things, it rotated out to be
replaced by the next unit.41
Yet instead of addressing its unpreparedness to fight a low-intensity
conflict, the US Army focused on what Operation Joint Endeavor
revealed about continued problems with the deployability of the
Army. Moving more than 9,000 people and 20,000 short tons of US
equipment into Bosnia and Herzegovina had required nearly 400 trains
with more than 7,000 railcars; 1,400 sorties of cargo aircraft; 400 buses;
and 200 commercial truck convoys; as well as 42 military convoys. The
deployment was further complicated by flooding along the Sava River
on December 28, 1995.42
During that year a Congressional panel, on the roles and missions of
the Armed Forces, concluded that peace operations and operations other
than war ranked among the four most “significant security challenges
and opportunities in the years ahead.”43 The Joint Force’s response to
this commission report, Joint Vision 2010, was a defiant reaffirmation of
the RMA and the US military’s focus on high-intensity conflict.44 Joint
Vision 2010 was even more explicit than the Army XXI vision in arguing
that operations other than war were a lesser included military activity
for “forces optimized for wartime effectiveness.”45 But, more important,
Joint Vision 2010 posited an idea that became a focal point of the debate
over transformation well into the Iraq War: future adversaries would seek
“asymmetry” by using “information technology” to negate US military
advantages rather than duplicate them capability-for-capability.46
General Dennis J. Reimer assumed his duties as the 33rd Chief of
Staff of the Army in June 1995 and immediately endorsed the Army’s
high-intensity conflict focus. Reimer continued to build Force XXI
40      Baumann, Gawrych, and Kretchik, Armed Peacekeepers, 95–96.
41      Baumann, Gawrych, and Kretchik, Armed Peacekeepers, i–iii, 126–27.
42      AE Pamphlet 525-100, 17–20.
43      Commission on Roles and Missions of the Armed Forces, Directions for Defense: Report of the
Commission on Roles and Missions of the Armed Forces (Washington, DC: US Department of Defense,
1995), ES-4; and Millett and Maslowski, Common Defense, 12192–97.
44      Millett, Maslowski, and Feis, Common Defense, 12192–97.
45      US Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS), Joint Vision 2010 (Washington, DC: JCS, 1995), 17.
46      JCS, Joint Vision 2010, 10.
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and, in February 1996, began the Army After Next program, a series
of semiannual wargames augmented by continuous experimentation.47
Projecting to the year 2025, the Army After Next succeeded Force XXI
by achieving and maintaining “dominance” across every “domain” of
warfare—the “air-, land-, sea-, space-, and cyber-domains”—through
“knowledge and speed.”48
The fact that the human domain was conspicuously absent from the
concept was not lost on the growing chorus of transformation critics who
were beginning to question the Army’s approach. Commenting on the
insufficiency of current operations-other-than-war doctrine, Dr. John
W. Jandora, Special Operations Command, insisted “military planning
. . . must move beyond the Cold War mind-set and its preoccupation
with standing, conventional forces” to consider the social, economic,
and political aspects of the battlefield.49 Historian Jeffrey Record was
more direct in his criticism of transformation: “Our present strategy
portends an excessive readiness for the familiar and comfortable at the
expense of preparation for the more likely and less pleasant.”50
As the debate grew, urban operations became a focal point of
discussion. As early as 1995, scholars like Stephen Blank and Earl Tilford
began to point to the Russian debacle in Chechnya as an alarming
example of a modern military force humbled by guerilla forces fighting
in an urban environment, among a civilian population.51 But debate over
urban operations did not truly gain momentum until the Army After
Next project stumbled across the problem during a wargame at the US
Army War College.
A December 1998 report described the problem: every time the “red
team” (enemy) was faced with the technologically superior US force of
2025, it would “dive into cities.” The enemy chose this course “for both
operational and political ends.” The operational ends were to negate the
“advantages in speed and mobility” and “diminish the effect of a US
information advantage because forces are more difficult to locate, target,
and assess.” The political ends were to embroil the local population in
the conflict. The wargame report noted “urban operations will require a
much higher degree of integration with local societies than has been the
US experience heretofore.”52
This tactic was asymmetry rearing its head in a way that Joint Vision
2010 had not anticipated—the enemy forcing the Army to fight a lowintensity conflict. Major General Robert Scales, commandant of the US
Army War College, began to wrestle with this problem the following year.
47       Dennis J. Reimer, “Where We’ve Been—Where We’re Headed: Maintaining a Solid
Framework While Building for the Future,” Army, October 1995, reprinted in Soldiers Are Our
Credentials: The Collected Works and Selected Papers of the Thirty-third Chief of Staff, United States Army, ed.
James Jay Carafano (Washington, DC: Center for Military History [CMH], 2000), 3; and Chapman
et al., Prepare the Army, 52.
48       TRADOC, Knowledge and Speed: Battle Force and the US Army of 2025 (Fort Monroe, VA:
TRADOC, 1998), 8–10.
49      John W. Jandora, “Threat Parameters for Operations Other Than War,” Parameters 25, no. 1
(Spring 1995): 55–67.
50        Jeffrey Record, “Ready for What and Modernized against Whom? A Strategic Perspective on
Readiness and Modernization” (paper presented, annual strategy conference, US Army War College,
Strategic Studies Institute, Carlisle Barracks, PA, 1995), v.
51      Stephen J. Blank and Earl H. Tilford Jr., Russia’s Invasion of Chechnya: A Preliminary Assessment
(Carlisle Barracks, PA: Strategic Studies Institute, 1995), 12.
52      TRADOC, Knowledge and Speed, 19.
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Scales acknowledged cities presented a challenge to the Army because of
the “millions of people that house [the enemy’s] political, cultural, and
financial centers of gravity.” But his solution—sitting outside the city
and waiting for the enemy to quit—missed the most important facet of
this asymmetry: control of these “millions of people” and the “political,
cultural, and financial centers of gravity” they represented was essential
to the political ends that prompted US military intervention.53
Other Army transformers likewise tried to dismiss the problem of
urban operations. Army After Next experimenters Robert Hahn and
Bonnie Jezior prescribed a dizzying array of high-tech salves—from jet
packs to robots—for the urban operations problem.54 For these analysts,
cities were simply complicated terrain that obstructed movement and
obscured vision rather than complex, human environments essential to
the political purpose of future wars.
Lester Grau and Jacob Kipp, at the Command and Staff College,
would not let Army transformers wish away the problem of urban
operations: “Urban combat is increasingly likely, since high-precision
weapons threaten operational and tactical maneuver in open terrain.”
But their analysis continued to the heart of the “asymmetry” produced
by urban operations: enemies would choose to fight in cities because they
could “mobilize the city’s resources and population to their purposes.”
For Grau and Kipp the inescapable quality of a city that made it a difficult
and unavoidable military problem was the population of the city as the
political objective of war. In light of this central fact, they insisted, both
the Russian approach in Grozny—destroy the city—and the approach
suggested by Scales—avoid the city—suffered from “an utter disconnect
between the political objective. . . . and the military means.”55
The problem of urban operations was sufficiently dire to prompt
General John Abrams, commander, TRADOC, to commission
a study. The results, from the Combined Arms Center did not offer
Army transformers any solace. Roger Spiller echoed Grau’s and Kipp’s
argument that the essential property of a city was its nature as a “human
environment” and used historical examples to show how a city becomes
an even more complex problem as it begins to collapse under the stresses
of war. He quipped that Army transformers had taken to calling anything
they did not understand “asymmetry.” He added, “That asymmetric
warfare would be associated with urban warfare is significant.” He urged
the Army to stop the transformation until it could come to grips with
the problem of urban operations.56
Bosnia and Herzegovina revealed the depths of the Army’s
unpreparedness to fight in “human environment[s].”57 Despite promises
before the deployment that Operation Joint Endeavor would only last a
year, Army forces conducting operations other than war in the Balkans
53      Robert H. Scales Jr., Future Warfare: Anthology (Carlisle Barracks, PA: Strategic Studies
Institute, US Army War College, 200), 211.
54      Robert F. Hahn II and Bonnie Jezior, “Urban Warfare and the Urban Warfighter of 2025,”
Parameters 29, no. 2 (Summer 1999): 74–86.
55      Lester W. Grau and Jacob W. Kipp, “Urban Combat: Confronting the Specter,” Military
Review 89, no. 3 (July–August 1999): 9–17.
56      Roger J. Spiller, Sharp Corners: Urban Operations at Century’s End (Fort Leavenworth: US Army
Command and General Staff College, 2000).
57      Spiller, Sharp Corners.
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seemed to have no idea how to produce a durable political solution to
the conflict, and Bosnians of all factions feared the departure of international forces might lead to renewed fighting.58 The 1st Infantry Division
replaced the 1st Armored Division in November 1996, the mandate for
IFOR was extended, and the IFOR became the Stabilization Force.59 In
1997, General Eric K. Shinseki assumed command of the Stabilization
Force and the 1st Armored Division again assumed Task Force Eagle.60
They were followed by the 1st Cavalry Division and the 10th Mountain
Division before returning for a third rotation.61 The mission continued
until 2004, well into the Iraq War.62
Reflecting on his experience as a battalion commander in Bosnia and
Herzegovina, Colonel Tony Cucolo, struck at the heart of the problem.
He wrote the “prevailing attitude among some senior leaders” was that
solving political problems in Bosnia and Herzegovina “was ‘out of [the
Army’s] lane.’ ”63 Rather than seeking a political solution, the Army’s
“measures of effectiveness,” to borrow a term from operations-otherthan-war doctrine, were avoiding US casualties, preventing wide-scale
ethnoreligious violence, and keeping the operation off of televisions
back in the United States. By these measures, Operation Joint Endeavor
was an overwhelming success.64
Brigadier General James Dubik confronted this problem in an
unpublished thought piece that he wrote in March 1999 while serving as
the deputy commander of operations for Task Force Eagle. Discussing
how to “reduce the time our military forces would have to be involved
or the size of the military force required after initial intervention” in
low-intensity conflicts, Dubik suggested the initial entry force in such
operations be followed by a hypothetical “national judicial force” that
would wrest the nonmilitary, illegal levers of power from the leaders that
the United States wished to supplant.65 It is telling that Dubik’s solution
to the problem was that some force other than the US Army should
arrive and assume the duty of navigating the political dimensions of the
low-intensity conflict. This idea would reemerge a few years later, when
he was charged with a critical element of Army transformation.
Professional Army critic Ralph Peters disagreed, insisting that
navigating the political dimension of low-intensity conflict was the Army’s
job—a job it refused to prepare to do: “Our military is determined to be
unprepared for missions it does not want, as if the lack of preparedness
might prevent our going. We are like children who refuse to get dressed
for school.” Nonetheless, “when the President is out of options and key
58      Baumann, Gawrych, and Kretchik, Armed Peacekeepers, 121, 123.
59      AE Pamphlet 525-100, 21–22.
60      Baumann, Gawrych, and Kretchik, Armed Peacekeepers, 188, 204.
61      AE Pamphlet 525-100, 27.
62       Baumann, Gawrych, and Kretchik, Armed Peacekeepers, iii; and Jim Garamone, “US
Peacekeepers Finish Bosnia Mission, Case Colors,” DoD, December 1, 2004, http://archive.defense
.gov/news/newsarticle.aspx?id=24700.
63      Tony Cucolo, “Grunt Diplomacy: In the Beginning There Were Only Soldiers,” Parameters
29, no. 1 (Spring 1999): 110–26.
64      TRADOC, Multiservice Procedures for Humanitarian Assistance Operations, FM 100-23-1 (Fort
Monroe, VA: TRADOC, 1994), 4-5–4-6.
65      James Dubik to LTG Thomas Burnett, thought paper, “Thought Paper-Similarities. Haiti and
Bosnia,” March 12, 1999, James M Dubik Papers, Bosnia and Herzegovina, folder 5—unpublished
thought papers, box 29—Task Force Eagle and Multinational Division North Operation Joint Forge,
B-H 7 Jan 1999–circa 1999, Army Heritage and Education Center (AHEC), Carlisle, PA.

TOC

42

Parameters 47(4) Winter 2017–18

interest groups or foreign leaders are clamoring for American action, we
are going to go to school.” Peters added, “The military must be ready
for reality, not for its fantasy war.”66
While the debate between critics and transformers continued, events
developed in Serbia that dramatically impacted transformation and shortcircuited the debate. In March 1999, NATO began a sustained bombing
campaign aimed at ending Serbian President Slobodan Milosevic’s
ethnic cleansing of Albanians in Kosovo. But, as the campaign wore on,
it became clear that bombing was not going to be sufficient. The Serbs
had adopted precisely the tactics transformation’s critics had envisioned;
among other tactics, the Serbian Army was hiding in urban centers
among the civilian population.67
Yet it was not this asymmetry, but rather deploying the Army
to the conflict, that changed the course of Army transformation. To
counter Serbian tactics, the US Army deployed AH-64 Apache attack
helicopters, along with associated logistics and force protection support,
to a base in Albania from which to launch more effective attacks against
Serbian armor. The deployment soon devolved into a debacle. Facilities
in and around the airfield were insufficient for the massive logistic
requirements of the aviation unit. Two Army aviators were killed and
their helicopters destroyed in a training accident while preparing for
the specific requirements of the operation. By the time the aviation unit
was in place and ready to operate, the war was over—Operation Allied
Force had ended and Slobodan Milosevic had capitulated.68 Things got
worse when a succeeding American armored force, Task Force Falcon,
deployed into Kosovo to execute stability operations as part of Operation
Joint Guardian. Streets were clogged with refugees and bridges could not
support 70-ton M1 Abrams tanks; the deployment ground to a crawl.69
Critics used the episode to argue that the Army was too heavy and too
slow, rapidly becoming irrelevant to modern warfare.70 This event had an
especially large impact on Army transformation since the operation was
overseen by Lieutenant General John Hendrix, commanding general,
V Corps, US Army Europe and Seventh Army, who later became the
commander of US Army Forces Command, and because on June 22,
1999, only weeks after this fiasco, Shinseki became the 34th chief of
staff of the Army.71
From the beginning of his tenure, Shinseki had a very clear vision
for the future of Army transformation.72 He would create a whole new

66      Ralph Peters, “Heavy Peace,” Parameters 29, no. 1 (Spring 1999): 71–79.
67      Millett, Maslowski, and Feis, Common Defense, 12417–441.
68      R. Cody Phillips, Operation Joint Guardian: The US Army in Kosovo (Washington, DC: CMH,
2007), 14–17.
69      Phillips, Operation Joint Guardian, 14–30.
70      Hunter Keeter, “Cody: Apache Units Need Equipment, Training,” Defense Daily, July 2, 1999,
1; “Kosovo Fallout: Army Readiness under Intense Scrutiny,” Armed Forces Newswire Service, July
2, 1999; “Army Says Apaches Were Ready for Action in Kosovo,” Helicopter News 25, no. 13 (July
16, 1999); Shimko, Iraq Wars, 3448–62; and “The NATO Capability Gap,” Strategic Survey 100, no. 1
(1999): 15–21, doi:10.1080/04597239908461105.
71      Phillips, Operation Joint Guardian, 14–30; and Eric Shinseki, “The Army-Intent of the Chief
of Staff,” Joint Force Quarterly, 22 (Summer 1999): 113–14.
72      Brown, Kevlar Legions, 4385–86.
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organization, the Interim Force.73 The first purpose of the Interim Force
was to provide an organization for testing the tactics and structure of
an eventual Objective Force. But the force also had another purpose: to
cure the Army’s deployability woes.74 The Interim Force—equipped with
medium-weight, 20-ton armored vehicles—would fill the gap between
heavy forces, which were lethal, mobile, and survivable, but took months
to get to a theater of operations, and light forces, which were rapidly
deployable but not survivable or self-sustaining beyond a few days. The
Interim Force would have the deployability of light forces and be able
to leverage the technology from the RMA to provide the lethality and
staying power of heavy forces. Moreover, this transformation was not
going to happen in 2025. Shinseki wanted the first interim BCTs fielded
in three years.75
To head the actual training, manning, and equipping of the
teams, Shinseki chose Dubik. The first two brigades chosen for the
transformation were at Fort Lewis, Washington. One armor brigade
and one light infantry brigade were selected so the new doctrine could
benefit from the best practices of each type of force. Hendrix and
Abrams directly supervised Dubik’s efforts.76
In a massive bureaucracy like the Army, adopting a new combat
system—let alone an entirely new type of unit—usually takes a decade
or more. In that respect, the creation of the interim BCTs in only three
years was a masterpiece of strategic leadership worthy of its own study.77
But on a more fundamental level, the effort must be judged a failure. The
brigades did successfully bridge the deployability gap between light and
heavy forces; but they failed to bridge the more profound capability gap:
a lack of competency in low-intensity conflict.
The Interim Force was unequivocally designed for high-intensity
conflict. Even with the benefit of hindsight, when asked directly if the
interim BCTs were intended to address shortfalls in executing operations
other than war, Shinseki still insists they were intended to dominate
“conventional” operations.78 Dubik, as well as the documentary evidence
from the time confirms this stance. The organizational and operational
concept, which served as the blueprint for developing the interim BCTs,
repeatedly claimed the units would be a “full spectrum, combat force.” 79
But the concept also acknowledged the interim BCT was “designed
and optimized primarily for employment in small scale contingency
operations” (smaller high-intensity conflicts).80 These teams could only
succeed in “stability and support operations” (low-intensity conflicts)
with significant “augmentations.” Moreover, even with augmentation,
73      John Sloan Brown (former director, General Eric K. Shinseki’s Special Staff Study Group
and former chief, Center for Military History), interview with author, December 15, 2016; and
Brown, Kevlar Legions, 4462–83.
74      James M. Dubik, The Army’s “Twofer”: The Dual Role of the Interim Force, Land Warfare Paper
39 (Arlington, VA: Association of the US Army, 2001).
75      Eric K. Shinseki, “Address to the Eisenhower Luncheon” (speech, 45th Annual Meeting of
the Association of the United States Army, 12 October 1999).
76      James M. Dubik (former deputy commanding general for transformation, TRADOC),
interview with author, November 17, 2016.
77      Harold Kennedy, “Army Approaches Decision on Interim Combat Vehicle,” National Defense,
September 1, 2000.
78      Eric K. Shinseki (former chief of staff, US Army), interview with author, October 21, 2016.
79      Dubik, interview.
80      HQDA, Operations, FM 3-0 (Washington, DC: HQDA, 2001), 1-14–1-17.
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they were only capable of serving in stability and support operations
“as an initial entry force and/or as a guarantor to provide security for
stability forces.”81 This concept was the reemergence of Dubik’s national
judicial force, a hypothetical “other” force that would arrive to do the
dirty work of navigating the political dimension of low-intensity conflict
so that the Army would not have to do so.82
The concept paid little attention to concerns over urban operations
and asymmetry, repeatedly insisting the design to dominate in “urban and
complex terrain” and acknowledging the future operating environment
would entail “asymmetry.”83 But the conflation of “urban and complex
terrain” is telling. The organizational and operational concept never
connected urban operations to dealing with a population or the loss
of information dominance. Moreover, “urban and complex terrain”
was simply terrain that was complicated, an obstacle to movement
and observation that would be overcome by superior mobility and
networks.84 Likewise, asymmetry was stripped of its messy association
with urban operations, guerilla warfare, and civilian populations.
Instead it was defined in terms of enemy technologies that could deny
access to a theater of operations or produce mass US casualties.85 The
interim BCT was a giant leap toward greater deployability and lethality,
but it did not solve the problem of low-intensity conflict, particularly the
political dimension, which transformation’s critics identified as the true
asymmetry of urban operations.
In fact, the Army never solved the problems of low-intensity
conflict or its political dimension. Thus, when the twin towers fell on
September 11, 2001, the stage was set for a slow-motion military disaster.
The apparent “cheap win” in Afghanistan through special operations
forces and airpower further validated transformers’ convictions that
technology could supplant numbers.86 The Army that invaded Iraq in
March 2003 was tragically ill-prepared for the character of warfare that
it ultimately faced. While the depleted Iraqi Army rapidly melted before
the advance of the vastly superior American Army, it did not disappear.
Instead, the Iraqi soldiers hid among the population, evading America’s
high-tech surveillance and precision strike capabilities. Once Saddam’s
regime was toppled, the Iraqi Army reemerged, not as a conventional
military threat but as an insurgency that severely challenged America’s
halting efforts to establish a new Iraqi government. Other adversaries

81      TRADOC, “The Brigade Combat Team, Organizational and Operational Concept,” January
6, 2000, Fort Monroe, VA, 1-13, James M Dubik Papers, Box 2—Official Correspondence Email
Traffic Received from 20 to 5 January 2000, Folder 7—Official Correspondence-Email Traffic
Received in January 2000 (part 19 of 20), AHEC.
82      Dubik, “Thought Paper-Similarities.”
83      TRADOC, “Brigade Combat Team,” 1-13; and TRADOC, “Chapter 2 Assessment of
Operational Environment,” Fort Monroe, VA, November 2, 1999, 1-14, James M Dubik Papers, Box
2—Official Correspondence Email Traffic Received from 20 to 5 January 2000, Folder 6—Official
Correspondence-Email Traffic Received in January 2000 (part 18 of 20), AHEC.
84      TRADOC, “Brigade Combat Team,” 1-13.
85      TRADOC, “Assessment of Operational Environment,” 1-14.
86      Millett, Maslowski, and Feis, Common Defense, 12781–84.
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also emerged, including Shia militias, Sunni extremists, and foreign
terrorist groups.87
America continues to pay the price for its Army’s initial unpreparedness for the low-intensity conflict in Iraq. The Army also remains
engaged in other low-intensity conflicts in Syria and Afghanistan. The
Army has resumed its headlong march toward ever-greater capability
to fight high-intensity conflicts. Since the end of the Vietnam War, the
Army has been asked to fight less than 30 total days of high-intensity
conflict. In this same period, it has been asked to fight dozens of lowintensity conflicts, many running years in duration. It is time that the
Army reshaped itself not only to fight and win the nation’s battles but
to fight and win the nation’s wars—including the messy postconflict
stability phase of future wars.

87      Michael R. Gordon and Bernard E. Trainor, Cobra II: The Inside Story of the Invasion and
Occupation of Iraq (New York: Pantheon Books, 2006); Thomas E. Ricks, Fiasco: The American Military
Adventure in Iraq (New York: Penguin Books, 2006); Dexter Filkins, The Forever War (New York:
Random House, 2008); Bob Woodward, State of Denial: Bush at War, Part III (New York: Simon &
Schuster, 2006); James A. Baker III et. al., Iraq Study Group Report: The Way Forward—A New Approach
(Washington, D.C.: United States Institute of Peace, 2006); and Michael R. Gordon and Bernard E.
Trainor, The Endgame: The Inside Story of the Struggle for Iraq, from George W. Bush to Barack Obama (New
York: Pantheon, 2012).
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ABSTRACT: This article suggests adding a “craftsman” at lower
ranks to steer private-sector projects through the Third Offset
Strategy. This strategy was established by experienced leadership at
the Pentagon to increase military acquisitions of automation and
artificial intelligence technology.

W

hen President Barack Obama’s administration implemented
its transition of executive authority, there was an extra
measure of drama: What would happen, after the change
election of 2016, to Defense Secretary Ashton Carter’s legacy on defense
innovation, namely, his signature Third Offset initiative? The vision had
been to reorient American defense policy toward filling the ends-means
gap created by two ill-fated wars in the Middle East, the global financial
crisis of 2008, and congressionally mandated defense budget cuts known
as the Sequester.
To defend the country’s extended interests, while containing
operational burdens on American servicemembers, the secretary
reached for, but ultimately failed to grasp, the triumphal legacy of
two formative events in twentieth-century defense policy: the advent
of nuclear weapons and the revolution in military affairs (RMA).
Drawing upon technologies for automation and artificial intelligence
(AI), the Third Offset was supposed to raise the capability of smaller
units in stabilization and counterinsurgency operations, while driving
advances in conventional forces to deter regional competitors and while
maintaining politically feasible budget targets.1
Sixty years earlier, facing long conventional odds in Europe,
nuclear weapons had evened the game.2 The nuclear arsenal, capable of
destroying first tens then hundreds of cities in the Soviet Union within
hours, compensated, or offset, NATO’s conventional deficit in the Fulda
Gap for defending Western Europe against the Red Army.3 Once the
Soviets invested in their own arsenal, however, the effectiveness of the
First Offset was called into question: Why would the United States launch
nuclear weapons against the Soviet army in Germany when Moscow
1      Theodore R. Johnson, “Will the Department of Defense Invest in People or Technology?,”
Atlantic, November 29, 2016.
2      The classic treatment from political psychology is Robert Jervis, The Meaning of the Nuclear
Revolution: Statecraft and the Prospect of Armageddon (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1989). For
an analysis along the lines of constructivism, at the nexus of ideas and foreign policy, see Campbell
Craig, Glimmer of a New Leviathan: Total War in the Realism of Niebuhr, Morgenthau, and Waltz (New York:
Columbia University Press, 2007).
3      Robert R. Bowie and Richard H. Immerman, Waging Peace: How Eisenhower Shaped an Enduring
Cold War Strategy (New York: Oxford University Press, 1998); and Neil Sheehan, A Fiery Peace in a Cold
War: Bernard Schriever and the Ultimate Weapon (New York: Random House, 2009).
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could respond with a massive nuclear attack against the United States?4
To provide the American president with better options, the Pentagon,
beginning during Jimmy Carter’s administration, initiated what would
become the Second Offset—a digital revolution in military affairs.
The Second Offset exploited advances in computer processing and
aerospace technology to build a nonnuclear counterpunch against a Soviet invasion of Europe—for example, in the early years before precision guided munitions were fully developed, the US Army formulated
AirLand Battle doctrine, which aimed to cripple a Soviet-armored
offensive by reaching over the front lines and pummeling Russian
forces at their staging areas.5 Within a decade, this scheme leveraged
novel technologies for precision-guided munitions, standoff weapons,
electronic countermeasures, and remote sensing for intelligence,
surveillance, and reconnaissance. The Cold War ended before it was
necessary to employ the Second Offset in a major war, but Iraqi dictator
Saddam Hussein was likely surprised at how efficiently post-RMA allied
forces destroyed his regular army and elite Republican Guard, built
around massive buys of Soviet equipment.6
Success of the Second Offset, designed as it was for dismembering
industrial-age conventional armies, did not bring about the end of
history. Rather, it inspired US adversaries to devise ways around the
RMA, to plan operations such as the terrorist attacks on September 11,
2001, or unorthodox campaigns like the Iraqi insurgency of 2005–06
that would damage US interests without providing a convenient target
set for modern air power. While the Pentagon and the Army have
adapted in many ways to complexity after 9/11, violent nonstate actors
are still evolving.7 The Islamic State presented a multidimensional threat
in Iraq and Syria, with terrorist tentacles lashing out at societies in the
United States and Europe. Moreover, major powers such as Russia,
China, and Iran have demonstrated ingenuity in shaping so-called grayzone conflicts according to their strategic interest.
Shortly after ascending to the Obama cabinet, with barely two
years remaining to transform defense policy, Secretary Carter put his
imprimatur, and precious political capital, behind the Third Offset.
There was likely no one better suited for this challenge. During his
graduate days, Carter studied physics under Stanford’s Sidney D. Drell,
who introduced Carter to the technical and public policy challenges of
nuclear arms control. One of the future secretary’s earliest contributions,
a report for Congress’s Office of Technology Assessment, discussed the
perils of transformative missile defense, betting a significant chunk of
4      Lawrence Freedman, The Evolution of Nuclear Strategy (London: Macmillan, 1981), 313–24; and
Bruce M. Russett, “The Calculus of Deterrence,” Journal of Conflict Resolution 7, no. 2 (June 1963):
97–109, doi:10.1177/002200276300700201.
5      Stephen Biddle, Military Power: Explaining Victory and Defeat in Modern Battle (Princeton, NJ:
Princeton University Press, 2004); James W. Pardew Jr., “The Iraqi Army’s Defeat in Kuwait,”
Parameters 21, no. 4 (Winter 1991–92): 17–23; and John L. Romjue, From Active Defense to AirLand
Battle: The Development of Army Doctrine, 1973–1982 (Fort Monroe, VA: US Army Training and
Doctrine Command, 1984).
6       Daryl G. Press, “The Myth of Air Power in the Persian Gulf War and the Future of Warfare,”
International Security 26, no. 2 (Fall 2001): 5–44, doi:10.1162/016228801753191123; Stephen Biddle,
“Victory Misunderstood: What the Gulf War Tells Us about the Future of Conflict,” International
Security 21, no. 2 (Fall 1996): 139–79, doi:10.1162/isec.21.2.139; and Pardew, “Iraqi Army’s Defeat.”
7      Fred M. Kaplan, The Insurgents: David Petraeus and the Plot to Change the American Way of War (New
York: Simon & Schuster, 2013); and Greg Jaffe and David Cloud, The Fourth Star: Four Generals and the
Epic Struggle for the Future of the United States Army (New York: Crown Publishers, 2009).
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the defense budget on a grand scheme to knock Soviet missiles out of
the sky before they could reach the United States.
Further along his path to cabinet rank, Carter researched cooperative
defense at Harvard’s Kennedy School and subsequently served as the
Pentagon’s “chief technology officer,” the undersecretary for Acquisition,
Technology, and Logistics (AT&L). During the short hiatus between his
service as deputy secretary of defense (Pentagon Number Two) and his
appointment to succeed Secretary Chuck Hagel, Carter published an
article in Foreign Affair entitled “Running the Pentagon Right.”8 The
article laid out his vision for rapid defense acquisition to meet urgent
and fluid survival requirements of American service personnel, now
struggling on unconventional battlefields across the globe.
Despite this extraordinary level of preparation, plus empathy in
the bureaucracy and Congress for the enormity of the innovationchallenge at the Pentagon, several signs soon spelled trouble for military
automation and the AI-based Third Offset. Under ordinary bureaucratic
conditions, any gravity defying, rapid offset would need impressive
success stories to survive the opposition’s control in Congress and the
loss of the White House. For the Third Offset, superior performance
in defense acquisition did not materialize before the 2016 election.
Republicans on the House and Senate Armed Services Committees
fretted over relatively miniscule investments, well under $100 million,
in Defense Innovation Unit-Experimental (DIUx) initiatives. This
progress occurred despite the secretary of defense personally christening
the first office in the Silicon Valley, far from the Washington lobby but
at the epicenter of transformational innovation nurtured in small- and
medium-sized enterprises.9
Before its first annual review, DIUx was under new management, and
Congress probed modest requests to multiply similar defense innovation
hubs in Boston, MA; Austin, TX; and beyond even as it criticized
the geographical tether to Silicon Valley.10 The National Defense
Authorization Act (NDAA) for Fiscal Year 2017, at one point in the
mark-up stage, denied DIUx 20 percent of its authorization (75 percent
of its research and development funds) until Carter detailed results from
initial taxpayer contributions and a long-term plan for the organization.11
In addition, Congress coupled the power of the purse with its authority
to reorganize the Defense Department. Within two years, NDAA 2017
abolished the undersecretary position for Acquisition, Technology,
and Logistics, vesting defense technology development duties, to the
dismay of the incumbent undersecretary, in a new, coordinate office for
Research and Engineering.12
8      Ashton B. Carter, “Running the Pentagon Right,” Foreign Affairs 93, no. 1 (January/February
2014): 101–12.
9      Aaron Mehta, “Leadership, Structural Changes for DoD Silicon Valley Office,” Defense News,
May 11, 2016; and Patrick Tucker, “As Pentagon Dawdles, Silicon Valley Sells Its Newest Tech
Abroad,” Defense One, April 22, 2016.
10        Sydney J. Freedberg Jr. and Colin Clark, “DIUx: Will Carter’s Innovation Unit Survive
Trump?,” Breaking Defense, November 16, 2016.
11      Fred Kaplan, “The Pentagon’s Innovation Experiment,” MIT Technology Review (January/
February 2017); and Scott Maucione, “Lawmakers Demand Answers on DIUx Plan,” Federal News
Radio, December 6, 2016.
12      Sydney J. Freedberg Jr., “Pentagon Wrestles with How to Break Up ATL,” Breaking Defense,
April 18, 2017.

TOC

50

Parameters 47(4) Winter 2017–18

Lacking a single, fixed adversary, over the long haul, the US defense
establishment has little choice but to conceive the Third Offset, beyond
any suite of technologies, as a transformation in the process of harnessing
innovation to meet new enemies wherever and whenever they arise. Unlike previous initiatives, success of the Third Offset cannot be scheduled
in clear milestones for adopting specific equipment such as nucleartipped missiles, precision navigation, stealth, or today’s automation. The
Third Offset, then, diverges from its two historical precedents.
For the historical cases, acquisition success can be attributed to a deft,
top-down approach in which efforts of thousands of talented specialists
were orchestrated from on high by legendary defense establishment
figures such as Leslie Richard Groves, during the Manhattan Project,
and William J. Perry during the RMA. By contrast, the present offset
calls for less of a virtuoso conductor—not a singular fleet admiral
directing from the flagship—and greater cultivation of a rough-andready network of riverboat captains. In order to see why this is so, it
helps to understand the nature of each of the prior offset challenges
and why top-down strategy worked as well as it did as recently as rapid
acquisition of mine-resistant, ambush-protected (MRAP) vehicles at the
end of the Iraq War.
Somewhere between fielding MRAPs and initiating DIUx,
the nature of the technology acquisition challenge confronting the
Pentagon changed. From directors perched at the Pentagon to intrepid
couriers who can navigate labyrinthine byways connecting innovation
at commercial enterprises with future military operations—the agent,
or agents, who will deliver solutions over the next epoch changed as
well. While the type of small and medium-sized suppliers needed are
coming into view, it may, unfortunately, be a while before a new breed
of riverboat pilots for the Pentagon take to their craft. Beyond patent
skepticism in Congress, bureaucratic inertia, another political concern,
poses the biggest obstacle to technological advance via the Third Offset.

Top-Down Success: Riding the Post-World War II Model

The top-down approach to the Third Offset is difficult to reform
in part because it can claim major success during America’s superpower
days in the last half of the twentieth century. Careful orchestration from
national leadership and judicious use of bureaucratic states of exception
attracted talented American technologists. Elite laboratories, or skunk
works, supplied novel ideas and experimentation at moments when
nuclear warheads, ballistic missiles, and space-enabled communication
and control networks were needed to revolutionize US defense
capabilities against a relatively well-described adversary.
The approach actually dated from America’s desperate attempt to
catch Germany after entering into World War II late and following
Japan’s abject demonstration of US unpreparedness at Pearl Harbor.
Vannevar Bush, with no government experience—indeed, a certain
disdain for New Deal bureaucracy and regular order—shot through the
underbrush of Washington offices to convince first President Franklin
D. Roosevelt, and eventually key Congressional committees, to fund the
fabled Office of Scientific Research and Development. Assembling the
right talent from universities and tech-savvy industries skirted agency
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red tape and delivered novel wartime solutions—improvements in radar
and proximity fuses—before the enemy could respond, clearly saving
American lives.13
Ironically, the electrical engineer Vannevar Bush did not immediately
sense the world-altering potential of the Manhattan Project. He feared
that the sprawling constellation of atomic labs was scaling too quickly
and that the physicists would not deliver a practical weapon. The
Manhattan Project, though, turned out to be the leading edge of an
historic phenomenon that, while remaining culturally consistent with
the American way of war, sharply altered the relationship between
science and global power. For a number of critical technologies—
nuclear, aerospace, and computing—the time lag between scientific
discovery and military application essentially collapsed.14 Although the
ascendancy of Bush was short-lived, the central message of his famous
essay Science: The Endless Frontier endured.15
Following its mobilization and outright defeat of the Axis powers in
World War II, the US government would commit unprecedented public
investment toward advancing—and steering—science and engineering.
For the nuclear and space age, this support would elevate and shape
the role of physicists in national security. J. Robert Oppenheimer,
Hans Bethe, Herbert York, and Edward Teller among other eminent
names linked the country’s first rank physics departments with strategic
challenges of the day. The younger range of this intriguing list included
Sidney Drell, who in the 1980s directed Stanford’s Linear Accelerator
Center (SLAC) and the university’s Center for International Security and
Arms Control. This combination of interests and responsibilities, made
prevalent by the First Offset, placed Drell in a position to engage fellow
physicist and Russian hero-dissident Andrey Sakharov in what became
riveting public correspondence on the consequences of nuclear war and
the potential for stalled arms control negotiations in the early 1980s.16
Drell personifies a link between the First Offset and today’s offset
strategy. At Stanford, Drell introduced the future secretary of defense,
as a young physics postdoctoral student, to questions of nuclear strategy
that inherently combined scientific and political considerations. From
the press record and Ash Carter’s writings over three decades later, it
is still difficult to gauge how much the psychological foundation set at
Stanford matters for leadership decisions after so many years. Secretary
Carter was effusive with praise and gratitude nearly everywhere he
visited, including Stanford and Silicon Valley.17
13      G. Pascal Zachary, Endless Frontier: Vannevar Bush, Engineer of the American Century (Cambridge,
MA: MIT Press, 1999).
14       This was Robert Gilpin’s premise in France in the Age of the Scientific State (Princeton, NJ:
Princeton University Press, 1968).
15      Vannevar Bush, Science: The Endless Frontier (Washington, DC: Office of Scientific Research
and Development, July 1945).
16      Herbert F. York, Arms Control: Readings from Scientific American (San Francisco, CA: W. H.
Freeman, 1973); and Philip Taubman, “The Friendships of Sid Drell,” Stanford Magazine (March/
April 2017), 40–41.
17      Jessi Hempel, “DOD Head Ashton Carter Enlists Silicon Valley to Transform the Military,”
Wired, November 18, 2015; and Ashton Carter, “Rewiring the Pentagon: Charting a New Path
on Innovation and Cybersecurity” (speech, Drell Lecture, Stanford University, Palo Alto, CA,
April 23, 2015), https://www.defense.gov/News/Speeches/Speech-View/Article/606666/drell
-lecture-rewiring-the-pentagon-charting-a-new-path-on-innovation-and-cyber/.
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Nevertheless, the literature on presidential personality types and the
oft-studied connection between formative experiences and subsequent
big decisions make it reasonable to guess that some of the context and
feel of the nuclear offset—including its repercussions through the
1980s—passed to the current strategy.18 Such conveyance would have
been accomplished in part according to an extraordinary history of how
the original community of national security physicists recruited the
next generation.
Biographers and researchers weighing psychological factors behind
the Third Offset have a second critical juncture to study. Professor
Carter entered the executive branch for the first time in 1993 as assistant
secretary of defense for international security policy. He soon had the
opportunity to work for, and develop a close relationship with, William
Perry, another mentor with Stanford ties, when Perry, who had been
deputy secretary of defense, became President Bill Clinton’s second
secretary of defense (1994–97). Perry’s background was closer to the old
Vannevar Bush mold—in engineering and technology management. As
undersecretary of defense for research and engineering during Jimmy
Carter’s administration, Perry had been at the forefront, implementing
Secretary Harold Brown’s initial commitment to the second, conventional, offset in response to nuclear stalemate in Europe.19
Returning to government, now at the very highest levels of the
Pentagon, Perry wanted to ensure that technological accomplishments
of the revolution in military affairs—remote sensing, precision
guidance, space communications, and stealth, among others—would
continue to advance after the Cold War. The American people and
their representatives in Congress demanded a peace dividend—indeed,
defense spending as a percentage of gross domestic product dipped, at
one point, below pre-Pearl Harbor levels—but in the vacuum created
by the collapse of Soviet power, pockets of chaos marked by ethnic
slaughter and economic misery set off alarm bells and redoubled calls
for American engagement.20
The Pentagon’s solution for escaping this strategic vice—dwindling
budgetary support and domestic political will coupled with rising global
demand for lethal operations “other than war”—was twofold: buy time
by crafting military advice for the president that, in its totality of public
and private channels, dampened White House enthusiasm for using the
RMA to burnish US hegemony and pacify emerging hotspots around the
world. Second, for those missions entering the Pentagon lists—and they
were several covering Somalia, Haiti, Bosnia, Kosovo, Afghanistan, and
Iraq—apply the RMA to limit costs, especially in terms of the number
of troops deployed and the number of casualties taken.21
18      James David Barber, The Presidential Character: Predicting Performance in the White House
(Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice Hall, 1972); and Fred I. Greenstein, The Presidential Difference:
Leadership Style from FDR to Clinton (NY: Free Press, 2000).
19        William J. Perry, My Journey at the Nuclear Brink (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 2015),
33–44; and Andrew F. Krepinevich, “Cavalry to Computer: The Pattern of Military Revolutions,”
National Interest, no. 37 (Fall 1994): 30–42.
20      Robert D. Kaplan, “The Coming Anarchy,” Atlantic (February 1994), captured the early
1990s Zeitgeist. For the Clinton administration’s management of the strategic conundrum, see
Derek Chollet and James Goldgeier, America between the Wars: From 11/9 to 9/11 (New York: Public
Affairs, 2008).
21      Gideon Rose, “The Exit Strategy Delusion,” Foreign Affairs 77, no. 1 (January/February
1998): 56–67.
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In order to deliver the Second Offset, it was less a question of
unmasking nature or prodding the leap from physics breakthrough to
weaponization and more a challenge of adapting existing technology
for defense functions. This meant getting the most out of defense
contractors to reduce cost overruns and program delays, even as the
programs themselves became exponentially more complex and market
competition at the prime contractor level less meaningful.22 Precious
few organizations—Boeing or Lockheed at the end of industry
consolidation—understood how to integrate subsystems successfully
and profitably under government regulations for accountability. The
armed services, putative customers for these behemoth high-tech
programs, needed to prepare themselves, and they had to keep political
leadership at the Pentagon on board. Support for each major platform
incorporating smart technology was negotiated with Congress over
several budget cycles. At the same time, weapons and their platforms,
old and new, required a wave of upgrades, sensors, and computers that
had never before been acquired.
During the Second Offset, the armed forces learned by doing, as
they took day-to-day responsibility for holding the primes and the nest
of subcontractors accountable for ambitious promises, without causing
too much disruption that would bankrupt corporations now too large
or too specialized to fail. Finally, revolutionary characteristics of these
systems meant the services would not be able to employ them or to reduce
the costs of force projection without devising new training, tactics, and
procedures, implying a novel, intricate, and more enduring relationship
between military operators and civilian defense contractors.23
The second Pentagon offset that William Perry at one point led
and Ash Carter, during his inaugural service in high office, had the
opportunity to study had its own version of top-down orchestration.
All the moving pieces among the defense contractors had to fit together
through system integration, and the systems themselves had to align
with the special operational test beds prepared for them in the armed
services. In order to bring this plan to fruition, leaders at the Pentagon
needed to develop a sixth sense, knowing which instruments in the
grand enterprise were out of tune—knowing when and how deeply to
intervene in the process—and finally, once at the nub of the problem,
knowing how radically to accept risk and impose states of exception upon
meticulously designed bureaucratic protocols before the overarching
symphony would get back on track.
Second Offset leadership shared essentials with Eliot Cohen’s
Supreme Command: prudential, probing, curious, and, it must be said,
brashly hierarchical.24 As evidenced in Cohen’s Anglo-American case
studies of wartime leadership, Lincoln and Churchill, the ones most
22      David S. Sorenson, The Politics of Strategic Aircraft Modernization (Westport, CT: Praeger,
1995), 157–210.
23      Steven J. Zamparelli, “Contractors on the Battlefield; What Have We Signed Up For?”
(research report, Air War College, Air University, Maxwell Air Force Base, AL, March 1999). This
was precursor to general expansion of contractor services coincident with U.S. military operations
in Iraq and Afghanistan. Deborah D. Avant, The Market for Force: The Consequences of Privatizing Security
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2005); and Eugene Gholz and Harvey M. Sapolsky,
“Restructuring the U.S. Defense Industry,” International Security 24, no. 3 (Winter 1999/2000): 5–51,
doi:10.1162/016228899560220.
24      Eliot A. Cohen, Supreme Command: Soldiers, Statesmen, and Leadership in Wartime (New York:
Free Press, 2002).
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familiar to his readers, it was fine, even auspicious, if tension, tinged
with frustration and fear, reared up among military professionals toward
civilian authority. Truly constructive “unequal dialogue” could not
occur without friction, and unambiguous civilian control was critical
to transforming the military organization, so it could adapt and survive
against an evolving threat.25
Interpreted in light of civilian leadership developments over
two historic offsets, Secretary Carter’s prime empirical example for
demonstrating how to run the Pentagon right takes on starkly contrasting
significance from what he intended. The tale of how the Defense
Department acquired and fielded the mine-resistant, ambush-protected
vehicle to save American lives from improvised explosive devices in
the latter stages of the Iraq War was presented in Foreign Affairs as if it
were proof of concept for other urgently needed technologies. During
Secretary Carter’s subsequent tenure, even if it were truncated to a mere
twenty-four months, the Third Offset was supposed to succeed along
lines laid by the MRAP program to guide the Pentagon from the top. It
turns out, however, that the MRAP life cycle, rather than the dawn of a
new acquisition strategy for automation and AI, should be viewed as a
reiteration of technique perfected during the Second Offset.
True, the core challenge with MRAP was not about digital hardware,
software development, or systems integration as had so often arisen
during the RMA. The trouble was how to build a functional solution
and get it out to the battlefield in time. Yet, just how the civilian Office
of the Secretary of Defense accomplished the feat of speed recalled
the orchestral (albeit drawn out) masterpieces of Second-Offset
productions—RMA technologies that enabled AirLand Battle, netcentric warfare, even prompt global strike.
Now, unlike much of the Second Offset, the beating heart of the
MRAP gambit was, at least at first, a relatively small defense contractor,
Force Protection International (FPI), which was independent from
the great defense mergers of the 1990s. FPI was just large enough,
in other words, to produce an armored vehicle that would thrive in a
combat environment but small and agile enough to react instinctively
toward raw, informal demand signals issued from the very top levels
of the Pentagon. Being sufficiently small, FPI did well to profit and to
innovate without scaling so fast to capture rapidly expanding demand.
This success, in turn, attracted competing suppliers toward entering the
market. Only a few years after the first contract for Cougar MRAPs,
defense mergers and regular orders rapidly caught up to FPI.26
Carter’s top-down account of the MRAP success described how
undersecretaries for acquisition across two administrations exercised
supreme command over the bureaucracy. In the mold of the Second
Offset—with authoritative urgency, insight at the nexus between political
balancing and military organization, and uncanny judgment—they
25      Indeed, one way of comprehending the offsets is a peacetime version of Cohen’s supreme
command: civilian directed states of exception to whip a hidebound military into condition, so it
may respond and defeat an emergent challenge.
26      Seth T. Blakeman, Anthony R. Gibbs, and Jeyanthan Jeyasingam, “Study of the Mine
Resistant Ambush Protected (MRAP) Vehicle Program as a Model for Rapid Defense Acquisitions”
(master of business administration professional report, Naval Postgraduate School, Monterey, CA,
December 2008), 6–11.
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reached past ordinary checks-and-balances to pave the way for MRAP’s
rapid construction and fielding. In doing so, they dramatically accelerated
the pace of acquisition in order to save lives in Iraq. Pentagon leadership
also accepted calculated risk that relatively high level government officials
could allocate sufficient time and accumulate program-specific expertise
in order to hold FPI and other MRAP contractors accountable.
Finally, the locus of defense acquisition for the high-priority, fasttrack MRAP vehicle shifted from the armed services to the civilian Office
of the Secretary of Defense. Accordingly, like an experimental drug
for terminal patients, MRAPs entered the battlefield without standard
testing and laborious training, tactics, and procedures. Over the long
run cropped up certain inefficiencies. As operations evolved, employing
MRAPs presented a steep learning curve for each new unit, and rather
quickly—in terms of the life cycle of a major defense program—service
demand for fast-track MRAPs fell off, raising a question about Secretary
Carter’s inaugural message: Was MRAP so clearly a positive model for
rapid acquisition during the imminent automation and AI offset?27

The Pentagon’s Missing Cadre

Interpreted through the lens of the Second Offset, the MRAP
case qualifies as a success story of applying top-down modes for rapid
acquisition the way the secretary of defense’s office directed digital
integration to revolutionize military operations during the 1980s and
1990s; however, Secretary Carter’s exemplar has not borne fruitful
lessons for the contemporary offset. Unlike the first two quantum leaps
in defense acquisition—nuclear weapons and the RMA—this Third
Offset is less about obtaining specific AI technology and more about the
architecture by which technological innovation is cultivated, harvested,
and sustained for the services, who now face rapidly evolving “pacing
competitors” and unconventional foes.28
Initial speeches by the Pentagon’s “big three”—Secretary Carter,
Deputy Secretary Robert O. Work, and Undersecretary for Acquisition,
Technology, and Logistics Frank Kendall—along with Carter’s high
profile visit to Stanford in April 2015, amplified a bold vision from
top civilian leadership: today, much relevant innovation for cuttingedge military operations happens in the private sector, at small and
medium-sized companies steeped in the start-up culture made famous
by Silicon Valley.29

27      Jen Judson, “30 Years: MRAP—Rapid Acquisition Success,” Defense News, October 25, 2016;
Richard H. Van Atta, R. Royce Kneece Jr., and Michael J. Lippitz, Assessment of Accelerated Acquisition
of Defense Programs, P-8161 (Alexandria, VA: Institute for Defense Analyses, September 2016), 18–25;
and Alex Rogers, “The MRAP: Brilliant Buy, or Billions Wasted?,” Time, October 2, 2012.
28      Cheryl Pellerin, “Deputy Secretary: Third Offset Strategy Bolsters America’s Military
Deterrence,” U.S. Department of Defense, October 31, 2016, https://www.defense.gov/News/Article
/Article/991434/deputy-secretary-third-offset-strategy-bolsters-americas-military-deterrence/.
29      Ashton Carter, “Remarks by Secretary Carter at the Drell Lecture, Cemex Auditorium,
Stanford Graduate School of Business, Stanford, California,” U.S. Department of Defense, April
23, 2015, https://www.defense.gov/News/Transcripts/Transcript-View/Article/607043/remarks
-by-secretary-carter-at-the-drell-lecture-cemex-auditorium-stanford-grad/. For Beltway analysis
and reaction to this claim, see “Implementing Innovation Series: Defense Innovation in a ChangeResistant Ecosystem,” Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS), webcast of a
discussion on Jeffrey P. Bialos, Christine E. Fisher, and Stuart L. Koehl, Against the Odds: Driving
Defense Innovation in a Change-Resistant Ecosystem (Washington, DC: Center for Transatlantic Relations,
2017), held on May 19, 2017, https://www.csis.org/events/implementing-innovation-series-defense
-innovation-change-resistant-ecosystem.
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This culture, specifically its propensity for innovation, has been,
despite repeated attempts around the globe, devilishly difficult to replicate,
especially in the private sector.30 Given extraordinary performance
requirements, enmeshed in a thicket of regulations characteristic of
the monopsony of military procurement, transplanting Silicon Valley’s
ingenuity into government programs is more challenging. For defense
officials to raise investment unicorns in the military sector, they have
to work like successful venture capitalists who somehow manage to
read subtle indicators of both future supply and consumer demand.31
Which obscure suppliers are on the cusp of introducing novel capability
at an affordable price? Which capabilities solve an emergent problem
for the military client? Which innovations match a complex and rapidly
evolving demand signal?
The triumph of neoliberalism and global capital over planned
economies at the end of the twentieth century reinforced the expectation,
especially in America’s leading innovation economy, that governments
are poor judges of up-and-coming suppliers. Conventional wisdom, in
business literature as well as political economy, waves officials off the
temptation to pick industry winners and instead advises governments
to less obtrusively, or transparently, set the conditions for productive
innovation.32 Part of the reason central authority has such trouble picking
winners is that it has no way of replicating the complex demand signals
of the free market. Even if a supplier’s technology works, customer
demand is not guaranteed.
Shifting, as Secretary Carter attempted, from free-market expansion
to regulated, often classified, production for military use adds another
layer of complexity to the problem of replicating natural innovation.
Senior officials at the Pentagon are not well-positioned to camp out
in the private sector, and when they have the opportunity, they find
themselves tongue-tied by a classification apparatus designed to prevent
information on American vulnerabilities from seeping into the hands of
potential adversaries.
Without a serviceable problem definition, innovative businesses,
especially recently arrived start-ups, cannot move forward with novel
design or production.33 Innovator-suppliers who persist through the
military’s large-scale procurement system begin to think and act less like
swaggering Valley start-ups and more like the stereotypical, button-down
suspects—fastidiously preserving their reputed competency within a
Byzantine defense acquisition processes counter to the freewheeling
innovation coveted by the Third Offset.
30      Mark Zachary Taylor, The Politics of Innovation: Why Some Countries Are Better than Others at
Science and Technology (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2016); and Josh Lerner, Boulevard of Broken
Dreams: Why Public Efforts to Boost Entrepreneurship and Venture Capital Have Failed and What to Do About
It (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2009).
31      Here, “unicorn” refers to the rare start-up that achieves a high valuation very early, before
compiling a sales record. The Third Offset wants to adopt unicorns from outside the regular process
of defense acquisition. Unfortunately, the defense establishment has nothing in the organization to
find unicorns before America’s agile competitors, such as nonstate actors.
32      Taylor, Politics of Innovation; William Easterly, The Tyranny of Experts: Economists, Dictators, and
the Forgotten Rights of the Poor (New York: Basic Books, 2013); Peter Evans, Embedded Autonomy: States
and Industrial Transformation (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1995); and Michael E. Porter,
The Competitive Advantage of Nations (New York: Free Press, 1990).
33      CSIS, webcast; Brian Fung, “The Huge Issue That’s Keeping Silicon Valley and the Pentagon
Apart,” Washington Post, June 10, 2016; and Tucker, “Pentagon Dawdles.”
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Governments without deep pockets who wish to emulate US
productivity in the private sector have tackled communication gaps
between novel suppliers and fluid demand with custom networks. In
the case of Mexico’s federal system, for example, an alphabet soup of
centralized government-sponsored organizations cooperates with local
governments, linking small suppliers to large foreign and domestic
corporations, universities, and investors in a loosely coordinated effort
to cultivate Mexican expansion into the innovative aerospace sector.34
The most salient success story in Josh Lerner’s Boulevard of Broken
Dreams comes from Israel, which following the US-led digital revolution
in consumer electronics and military affairs, transformed its economy
and its defense industry into an accomplished small-cap exporter of
high-tech goods and services. Lerner attributed Israel’s startling success
to government sponsored networks knitting civilian and military sectors
together, translating demand signals from the grassroots, and buffering
Israeli ministries from direct investments.35
In the much larger United States, could the Pentagon scale
Israeli-style networks between government agencies and venture
capitalists, investors and entrepreneurs, as well as emergent suppliers
and customers in the armed services? The story of defense- and privatesector synergy while building the internet indicates it should be possible.36
According to Linda Weiss in America Inc.?, the US military was present
at the creation to provide demand and initial funding for specialized
computer networks. At a later stage, smaller companies, who closely
resemble agile suppliers sought in today’s Third Offset, saw applications
for the novel defense infrastructure. These companies led second-stage
innovation, investing for commercial sales, and creating off-the-shelf
applications, which during the Second Offset, “spun back around” to
an innovative military for purchase and adaptation.
Universities, as part of the Vannevar Bush legacy after World War
II, funded applied research during the Cold War in part through federal
defense contracts.37 By the 1980s, many of the same tier I research
institutions in higher education were also taking up the slack in basic
research occasioned by sharp reductions in private sector support. At
the birth of the internet, then, university activities attracted the interest
of both defense offices and industry clusters for development, testing,
and technology acquisition. Academic research groups built working
relationships on both sides of the military-civilian divide, forming the
substrate through which the technology “spin-around” proceeded.
Simply replicating such change, however, will not reduce the
obstacles bedeviling the Third Offset. Spin-around may have functioned
well in the case of the internet during the Second Offset, and there is
reason to believe that spin-around in such areas as robotics, artificial
34      Mónica Casalet, “Meeting Growth Challenges of Mexico Aerospace: The Querétero
Cluster,” Space & Defense 9, no. 1 (Spring 2016): 39–53. For more on the role of social networks in
science and technology innovation, see Taylor, “How Nations Succeed—Networks, Clusters, and
Standards,” chap. 6 in Politics of Innovation.
35      Lerner, Boulevard of Broken Dreams, 155–57.
36      Spin-around and the development of the Internet are recounted in Linda Weiss, America
Inc.? Innovation and Enterprise in the National Security State (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 2014).
37      Jonathan Cole, The Great American University: Its Rise to Preeminence; Its Indispensable National Role;
Why It Must Be Protected (New York: PublicAffairs, 2009).
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intelligence, and neuro warfare could eventually enhance America’s
position. Unfortunately, Secretary Carter’s vision made clear that
macrolevel innovation over generations will not suffice for equipping US
servicemen and servicewomen at the fraying edges of the American-led
liberal order.38
Though it may be crucial over the long haul, spin-around does not
happen quickly enough to address fluid challenges under globalization:
adversaries demonstrate a knack for quickly devising asymmetric
responses to conventional US task forces, blunting their effectiveness
without provoking the United States into full mobilization. If Third
Offset technology is to keep pace, Pentagon reformers will have to find a
way to accelerate spin-on, the current process by which the armed services
obtain relevant innovation from small to midsize firms in the private
sector and deliver it to forces in the field.
A new system—what Acquisition Undersecretary Kendall called
a new architecture—for discovering and extracting ideas circulating
in the venture capital world will have to fill the gap between military
operators’ specialized needs and equally complex consumers’ demands.
To succeed at rapidly delivering private sector innovation, which today
includes global innovation, Third Offset architecture requires a unique
cadre, a human link, still missing from the organization Secretary Carter
prepared for the transition to a new administration.
National commitment to a Third Offset fueled by the private
sector creates an unprecedented call for a type of acquisition officer
at lower levels of the hierarchy, the intrepid riverboat captain. This
metaphor is apt in the sense that nineteenth-century pilots understood
themselves to be part of a larger profession: they acquired expertise
in principles of navigation and system management; they recognized
themselves as part of a corporate body infused with a certain esprit; and
they accepted a burden of social responsibility.39 Without their quasi
profession delivering staples and occasional luxuries along the young
country’s riverine circulatory system, disparate regions of the sprawling
democracy would not have flourished as one nation.
In Samuel Huntington’s treatise on the soldier and the state,
professionalism was handmaiden to autonomy for the officer corps,
allowing consummate professionals to apply their skill on behalf of
civilian authorities who inevitably viewed the world from a contrasting
perspective. Indeed, certain independence of action was crucial to the
effectiveness of river pilots in serving the successful political economy
of patrons living not on the highway but at both ends of their journey.
River pilots were the human link communicating supply with demand,
the medium of exchange that permitted mutually beneficial trade across
disparate cultures.
Unlike Huntington’s archetype, though, the best riverboat captains,
as much as scientific managers, were also craftsmen.40 Huntington
shied away from this metaphor. After all, craftsmen were inscrutable,
their successes unaccountable. The source of their genius could not be
38     Gideon Rose, “Out of Order? What’s Inside,” Foreign Affairs 96, no. 1 (January/February 2017).
39      Samuel P. Huntington, The Soldier and the State: The Theory and Politics of Civil-Military Relations
(Cambridge, MA: Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, 1957).
40      Huntington, Soldier and the State, 28.
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intellectualized or codified in any text. No formal school could hone
their talent. Most important, the fruits of their labor could not be
harvested efficiently under imposition of far-reaching agencies from a
highly-organized state. Bureaucracies enabled professionals but trapped,
and eventually suffocated, artisans.
Even so, without an administrative bureaucracy to enforce
standard procedure on the river, the boat captain substituted flexible,
customizable guidance of professionalism, and where this could not
apply, he indulged freewheeling characteristics of the craftsman. The
river offers a rich metaphor for policy in the era of the Third Offset
as a symbol for freedom, adventure, and enterprise. The byways of
contemporary innovation hide obstacles to the uninitiated, but the flow
of ideas nevertheless binds great cities of contrasting cultures. Intrepid
pilots who know the river travel between civilizations. Cultural barriers
to communication that regularly stymie professionals or virtuosos in
other walks of life become permeable before the unique skill set and life
experiences of riverboat captains.
A similar communication among cultures and economies is
critical to success of the Pentagon’s Third Offset, which is reliant upon
continuous delivery of relevant, private-sector innovation the armed
services can adopt. A fatal flaw in the last administration’s defense
policy, which undercut acquisition reforms on a scale unseen since the
Goldwater-Nichols Department of Defense Reorganization Act of
1986, is the missing cadre. The Third Offset is, tragically, a technology
supply policy through terra incognita for the Pentagon. As of this
writing, none of several organizations within the executive branch or
mandated by Congress to supplement defense acquisitions can play the
crucial mediating role in rapidly delivering science and technology from
the private sector to the services’ entrepôts in such a manner that the
innovations can be manufactured for battlefield advantage.
Individuals and specialized organizations within the Department
of Defense have been chartered to explore, mine, and bring home novel
solutions wherever they may find them. The undersecretary of defense
for Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics taps semi-independent, direct
reporting agencies such as the Defense Advanced Research Projects
Agency and the Rapid Innovation Fund (that cooperates with small
business innovators). Below the undersecretary, an assistant secretary of
defense for Research and Engineering controls a phalanx of offices for
attracting, finding, and testing promising projects. When the identified
technology has the potential to reduce risk or to save defense dollars on
a high priority mission, the assistant secretary may form bureaucratic
alliances with the rest of AT&L. The Defense Threat Reduction Agency,
for example, focuses on matters related to weapons of mass destruction,
and belongs to a neighboring assistant secretary within AT&L. In fact,
with a research and development budget of $25 billion, research and
engineering under AT&L wields sufficient convening power to forge
cooperation across the Department of Defense, federal departments such
as Homeland Security, and at least in principle, research departments in
private industry.41
41      See also Alan Shaffer, “Communities of Interest: Collaborating on Technology Challenges,”
Defense AT&L 44, no. 2 (March–April 2015): 32–37.
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The trouble with all these organizational fixes is, despite the flow
of ideas, the topmost level of Pentagon bureaucracy tightly steers the
rudder. The results of such programs consistently align with Secretary
Carter’s essay on “Running the Pentagon Right.” If the secretary of
defense wants something for troops in the field, organizational reform
at the tactical level provides remarkable facility for reaching down and
across agencies to find the right prototype technology. As long as the
solution is already knocking around the acquisition system—similarly to
the MRAP at a nondescript, small-scale contractor—senior leaders can
pull hard, through (or around) regular development and testing phases,
to make an express delivery. These emergency overrides, though, despite
the commanding, virtuoso performance from top civilians, cannot
anoint a technical solution conceived outside the beltway family; the
prototypes far upriver remain out of sight, and out of reach, no matter
how sophisticated or lavish the offices in Washington.
The missing element of the Third Offset strategy is a midlevel
cadre that can navigate the currents and lock through the dams that
exist between innovative science and technology, sprouting in garages,
makeshift offices, and university campuses far from the nation’s capital,
and the military acquisition system. Unfortunately, bureaucratic slack that
would grant autonomy for such middle managers can barely be located
in the current budget environment. When dollars are tight and stakes
are high, senior decision makers instinctively grasp for greater control.
Centralizing authority and consolidating lines of communication create
narrow channels for the sake of efficiency.42 In the case of the Third
Offset, this natural inclination to institutionalize the revolution, or
manufacture a constant state of exception, is misguided: while top-down
virtuosity reliably rallies bureaucracy around the leader’s priorities, it
simultaneously stifles creativity and improvisation among midlevel
agents who must respond and conform to the leader’s call.43 The
Pentagon’s highly structured efforts at community-building maintain
accountability at the price of groupthink, establish the lockage priority,
and ultimately limit the flow of private-sector innovations that are vital
to success of the Third Offset.
When thick institutions must accommodate multiple cultures and
process a steady influx of novel information from divergent professions,
the most productive principal to agent relations often balance competing
considerations.44 The military agents of science and technology, our
riverboat captains, work best if they enjoy unusually high autonomy.
Freed from a suffocating web of monitoring and punishment—classic
instruments of fine control from a distant principal—the pilots venture
into the hinterland. They navigate time and space to acquire the language
of local innovators so that the Third Offset finally has a way to translate
42      Alex Mintz and Karl DeRouen, Understanding Foreign Policy Decision Making (Cambridge:
Cambridge University Press, 2010), 25–30.
43      Aaron Mehta, “Pentagon Budget Maintains Support for Tech Innovation,” Defense News,
May 25, 2017; Freedberg and Clark, “DIUx”; Aaron Mehta, “DIUx Offers $36 Million in FY16
Contracts,” Defense News, October 14, 2016; and Sydney J. Freedberg Jr., “DIUX Lite: Carter
Announces New Innovation Unit in Austin,” Breaking Defense, September 14, 2016.
44       Huntington, Soldier and the State; Peter D. Feaver, Armed Servants: Agency, Oversight, and CivilMilitary Relations (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2003); and Damon Coletta, “PrincipalAgent Theory in Complex Operations,” Small Wars & Insurgencies 24, no. 2 (2013): 306–21,
doi:10.1080/09592318.2013.778016.
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its unique, mostly classified demand signal into a problem definition that
is intelligible and actionable for private-sector business models.
Riverboat captains, even if captains by courtesy, are simultaneously
recognized in the admirals’ navy. When they return to home port
with exotic cargo—innovative designs that could disrupt routines in
Washington—they easily move through the Pentagon and relate to the
services’ highest ranks. Due to the captains’ high professionalism in the
Huntingtonian sense—mission critical expertise, widely recognized esprit
de corps, and deep-seated commitment to social responsibility—four-star
combatant commanders and civilian mandarins at the Pentagon may
welcome their reports without dreading their own bureaucratic future,
for there is little threat that the crew of a Third Offset venture would
stage a mutiny.45
Balanced principal-agent relations, recommended persuasively
by Huntington for military advice to civilian government during the
height of Cold War tensions, could now be replicated within the defense
bureaucracy to address a contemporary crisis in the Pentagon’s Third
Offset strategy.46 Conceding customary leverage—access, monitoring,
rewards, and punishments—to grant autonomy at lower ranks does
leave defense policy at the principal’s level open to being led by the
nose. For a similar reason, Huntington dedicated tracts of his great
work to redefining military professionalism for American statecraft, so
experts, such as those discovering and delivering commercial science
and technology, could ply their trade without substituting personal
preferences for democratically sanctioned authority.
Much authority now rests with civilian and military admirals
in charge of the leviathan that is the defense acquisition process.
They run the Pentagon right for many years and ascend the ranks by
administrating a tight ship. They hold their directorates accountable,
embracing their crew tightly and submitting them to the discipline of
regular order. When they do, though, they crowd out any possibility
for Huntington’s brilliant insight into these situations. As a result, the
cadre is almost entirely beached, caught in unending command churn
of furnishing capabilities, requirements, and resources. In the dominant
ethos of defense acquisition, mere captains do not judge risk; they avoid
it. Highly constrained agents of today’s Third Offset weed first-time
innovators out of technology development contracts. Our captains dare
not venture. They never invite start-up entrepreneurs on commercially
competitive terms, in the very language that nurtures much of twentyfirst century innovation, nor do they provide navigational guidance to
ferry revolutionary commerce from the hinterland of small and mediumsized enterprises to the mooring ring of Pentagon acquisition.47
45      Kaplan, Insurgents.
46      Huntington, Soldier and the State.
47      DIUx and the Pentagon responded to the shortfall by recruiting reservists as new riverboat
captains. It remains to be seen whether short-term, temporary duty is sufficient to bridge the culture
gap between the military services and tech start-ups producing innovation relevant to the Third
Offset. The reservists, to reach outside customary bureaucracy, may need assistance from active duty
science and technology cadres or directorates combining requisite autonomy and access to commands
that influence regular order in defense acquisition. Compare reporting by Mehta, “DIUx Offers $36
Million”; Scott Maucione, “DIUx Still Chugging Along in the Trump Administration,” Federal News
Radio, April 20, 2017; Freedberg, “DIUx Lite”; and Aaron Mehta, “DIUx Expects to Transition
Programs in Next Two Months,” Defense News, April 25, 2017.
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The range of challenges facing American servicemembers
continues to expand, becoming more complex as acquisition budgets
flatline. Running the Pentagon to make the latest offset right will
require judicious, rather than directed, relations with trusted agents of
those anxious chiefs in Washington. Many intrepid riverboat captains,
endowed with hard-won skills and freedom to navigate frontiers where
modern innovation thrives, are needed.
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ABSTRACT: This article identifies how the United States can apply
security assistance to support regional security in the South China
Sea in order to counter China’s assertive expansion strategy.

A

s China continues to emerge as a global leader, its ambitions
to redefine the global order and challenge existing geopolitical
power dynamics will ensure that, whether or not President
Donald Trump and his administration so choose, the focal point of
US foreign policy will continue its migration east. And—given the
complexities of the history, overlapping cultural and ideological claims,
economic dimensions, and geography—the South China Sea is likely to
be the proving ground that brings the Trump administration some of its
most vexing, and consequential, foreign policy tests.
A successful approach to China must carefully balance national
security, economic, cultural, and ethical policy priorities of the United
States, which include but are not limited to those at stake in the South
China Sea. Yet, there is no question a more assertive military and
defense posture in the South China Sea is sorely needed, particularly as
a complement to sustained diplomacy.
The Obama administration began dipping its toes in these fraught
waters as part of its “Rebalance” strategy; the Trump administration
has an opportunity to expand US military engagement in the region
to generate far more consequential outcomes by strengthening regional
coalitions and deterring China’s frequent provocations. Key to a more
effective regional military engagement will be a more sophisticated and
robust approach to security assistance.

Regional Significance

While other challenges such as North Korea’s nuclearization or the
Islamic State’s metastasis may pose a more immediate and direct threat
to US security, the emergence of China—the world’s most populous
nation and second-largest economy—as a world power will be far more
consequential for the long-term economic and security prospects of the
United States. The critical question during this emergence is whether
China will responsibly contribute to the existing international order or
aggressively seek to subvert it. The South China Sea has emerged as the
arena in which that question is most consistently and tangibly tested.
China’s activities in the South China Sea can directly impact US
interests in the region and serve as proxy for broader global concerns.
These activities undermine the international order and the legal
architecture, which serves as an organizing construct and stabilizing
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force in support of international trade, law enforcement, conflict
resolution, and diplomacy. This strategy is by no means limited to the
South China Sea, but it does reach its fullest expression there.
Territorial encroachments could enable China to impose conditions
on economic activity in the South China Sea, through which over $5
trillion in trade transits each year. We have already seen China press
such advantages to enact economic punishments on its neighbors.1
China’s action to militarize contested features within the region extends
their defensive perimeter several hundred miles beyond their borders,
an enviable advantage in any potential military conflict. While US
strategy should not be driven solely by military considerations, given the
aggressive actions and rhetoric China has directed toward Japan, Taiwan,
and other nations, ignoring such considerations would be foolish.
China’s diplomatic, economic, and military actions in the South
China Sea have a dual impact. They directly affect US interests in the
region, and they serve as proxies for China’s broader efforts to challenge
and to undermine the accepted and stable international frameworks
around the globe. Regardless of the strategic value to the United States
per se, China’s pursuits matter greatly to America’s key allies and partners
in the region. For that reason alone, China’s actions in the South China
Sea ought to be a priority for the United States, lest America risk further
slippage in its regional standing as a great power, security guarantor, and
valuable trading partner.
For allies in the region, such as Thailand and the Philippines, as
well as key emerging partners, such as Indonesia and Vietnam, the
South China Sea presents nearly existential crises. It is a place where
the Chinese military and coast guard—as well as civilian “blue-hulled”
paramilitary units in the Chinese maritime militia—harass the region’s
citizens, disrupt maritime economic activity, and press territorial claims
they view with historic justification. For other key allies and partners
outside the immediate region—such as Japan, Australia, and India—the
region matters as a potential platform for Chinese aggression as well as
the commercial risks of closed or constrained trade routes. If the United
States is unable to exert leadership on the priority concerns voiced by
these key regional actors, the actors’ willingness to support American
priorities will diminish.
China’s encroachments are thus an assault on US leadership across
Asia, succeeding in not only undermining America’s relationships
with key allies and partners but also turning these parties against each
other. Recent moves by Vietnam and the Philippines to strengthen
their bilateral ties with China, as well as renewed sparring between the
two, indicate this pattern. As a result, America’s global network of likeminded partners, which the recently released National Defense Strategy
calls “crucial to our strategy, providing a durable, asymmetric strategic
advantage that no competitor or rival can match,” is eroding.2

1      AFP, “China Blocked Exports of Rare Earth Metals to Japan, Traders Claim,” Telegraph,
September 24, 2010.
2      US Department of Defense (DoD), The National Defense Strategy of the United States of America:
2018 (Washington, DC: DoD, 2018).
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Strategic Gaps

Successive administrations have sought to assert US leadership in
Asia and to respond to China’s destabilizing actions through a holistic
set of policies that extend far beyond the security realm. Perhaps the
most consequential long-term policies within the Asia-Pacific region are
economic, and how the Trump administration positions the United States
after withdrawing from the Trans-Pacific Partnership and maneuvers
around China’s ambitions for a regional trading arrangement will be
a crucial determinant. Nimble diplomacy is also critical to a successful
strategy. Broad and sustained efforts, such as seeking resolutions for the
region’s many territorial disputes, as well as narrower concern toward
such pursuits as a constructive course with Philippine President Rodrigo
Duterte, offer important avenues for influencing regional actors.
Such initiatives, however, are not sufficient for the United States to
remain a critical guarantor of security or the premier security partner
in the region. Ultimately, a strong regional security coalition bound by
common objectives and committed to common action is required to
prevent Chinese coercion from dissolving the rules-based order that
prevents an every-country-for-itself approach to territorial disputes,
which could potentially end in broad military conflict. In the near term,
therefore, America’s security policy in the Asia-Pacific region must play
a robust supporting role, even if it does not occupy center stage.
The Obama administration undertook a significant rebalance in
the military realm, investing in a multifaceted approach to promote
partnerships in the area, deter Chinese aggression, and maintain
American leadership. These investments were weighted toward efforts
largely too esoteric for, or invisible to, regional citizenries and even, to
some degree, their governments. The Defense Department, for example,
reshaped its long-term development and acquisition strategy, led by the
Third Offset, to focus on high-end military capabilities that maintain
US superiority over near-peer adversaries. This strategy also seeks to
counter anti-access/area-denial (A2/AD) strategies used by China and
others. The US military has also focused on developing new operational
concepts such as the Joint Concept for Access and Maneuver in the
Global Commons and other efforts of the Strategic Capabilities Office,
often praised by Secretary of Defense Ashton B. Carter.
While critical to America’s ability to win future wars, these efforts
do little to visibly demonstrate America’s presence or leadership in
the region. Moreover, when states such as China rapidly change the
political and geographical landscape by reclaiming features and taking
other actions in the South China Sea, long-term, less visible military
capabilities will arrive too late. Indeed, the mismatch between American
and Chinese strategies has challenged the United States and its regional
partners to manage the situation daily. As Dr. Ross Babbage notes in a
recent report, “Beijing has employed a very sophisticated strategy and
operational concept that could be implemented without challenging US
alliance commitments or directly confronting U.S. or allied forces.”3 His
diagnosis is scathing:
3      Ross Babbage, Countering China’s Adventurism in the South China Sea: Strategy Options for the United
States and Its Allies (Washington, DC: Center for Strategic and Budgetary Assessments, 2017), 30.
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Western governments have lacked a coherent strategy or game plan for
achieving well-defined allied goals. Their actions in response to Beijing’s
assertive steps have almost always been reactive, involve very limited and
highly predictable activities in domains determined by the Chinese, and
could be readily ignored by Beijing. The result has been that the Western
allies have passed the initiative and momentum to Beijing, ceded a large
area of strategically important maritime territory, acquiesced to a flouting
of international law, and repeatedly conveyed an impression of weak allied
will, distraction, and disorganization.4

There will surely be disagreement about the degree of Babbage’s
criticism, but its overall message is hard to argue. What the United States
has largely lacked is a strategy that, on one hand, provides a consistent
and visible reminder of US commitment to the region that keeps the
Chinese military off-balance while, on the other hand, avoids escalation
by avoiding direct confrontation with China or impinging upon its key
redlines. A more sophisticated strategy must include several elements
that range from creative options for military operations to expanded
information operations; particularly important is a more prominent and
sophisticated approach to security assistance.

Security Assistance in Southeast Asia

During peacetime, combatant commanders have three primary
tools to support visible regional engagement: posture, operations, and
security cooperation. The Rebalance enhanced each of these tools to
varying degrees. Posture and presence have been a main focus, with
the major expansion and reconfiguration of US force deployments in
the Asia-Pacific region. Freedom of Navigation operations and joint
patrols by the United States and its partner navies, have also become a
centerpiece of the US Pacific Command’s (USPACOM’s) presence in the
region. Security cooperation, however, remains the most underdeveloped
of these tools, and has tremendous potential for shaping the Asia-Pacific
theater to achieve US objectives.
While most effective when used in concert with other tools,
security cooperation maintains a range of benefits the other tools do
not. First, only through security cooperation—including the sale of
equipment, the provision of equipment and training, the enhancement
of critical institutions, and the continual exchange of concepts and
personnel—can the United States help partners measurably improve
their military capabilities. Able partners can diminish risk to US forces
and, at least partially, check China’s ability to exploit other partners’
weaknesses. Second, security cooperation is highly attractive because
of the benefits it brings to partners, and is therefore one of the most
effective tools for strengthening relationships and coalitions. Finally,
and critically in the Asia-Pacific region where misunderstandings
can quickly become flash points, security cooperation is generally far
less provocative and risk inducing than tools such as the Freedom of
Navigation operations. Security cooperation can work gradually and
broadly to reshape the region’s security environment without producing
single points of confrontation.
Yet, despite these benefits, the security assistance resources in the
region have been limited, and available resources have been applied in
4      Babbage, Countering China’s Adventurism.
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ways that largely failed to produce tangible advances toward US strategic
priorities. Looking upon the South China Sea, and its associated policy
challenges, with a fresh perspective, the new administration will find
a tremendous opportunity to apply security cooperation in the region
more effectively for near-term gains.

Current Assessment

Security assistance in Europe and the Middle East spiked in the
last fifteen years as a result of the terrorist attacks on September 11,
2001; wars in Afghanistan and Iraq; Russia’s resurgent aggression; and
the constantly shifting landscape of extremism and insurgency in the
Middle East. Meanwhile, the Rebalance notwithstanding, the region’s
meager allotment of assistance resources has hardly changed.
The entire Asia-Pacific region, for example, generally receives about
one percent of the budget for Foreign Military Financing (FMF), the
State Department’s flagship security assistance program.5 In Fiscal Year
2015, the Southeast Asian countries that border the South China Sea
received $74.75 million from the program: the Philippines received $50
million, while Indonesia and Vietnam received the remaining allocation.6
On one hand, this amount represents a doubling of the region’s 2011
funding of $36.2 million.7 On the other hand, the total equates to the
program’s administrative costs.
Seeking to implement the Obama administration’s Rebalance
strategy, the State Department announced a few new regional
investments, including more FMF funding for Southeast Asian nations
and a $25 million Southeast Asia Maritime Law Enforcement Initiative.
Moreover, late in Obama’s administration, Carter launched the
Southeast Asia Maritime Security Initiative (MSI), to remedy the neglect
and aimlessness that had characterized regional security assistance, and
to foster more visible engagement in the region. Promoted as a 5-year,
$425 million effort, MSI significantly increased US investments in the
region and more than doubled the annual Foreign Military Financing
program with the five primary partner nations of Indonesia, Malaysia,
the Philippines, Thailand, and Vietnam.8 This investment is important,
particularly as an indication of the Defense Department’s increased
commitment to the region. But even after these new investments, the
entire region still receives less security assistance funding than it did
when the Rebalance began.9
While funding totals are an important measure of security assistance,
their impact in the region should not only be measured by monetary
value but also by their impact on partners’ military capabilities, the
strength of bilateral and multilateral relationships, and the deterrence
5       Eddie Linczer, “The Role of Security Assistance in Washington’s Pivot to Southeast
Asia,” American Enterprise Institute (AEI), August 26, 2016, https://www.aei.org/publication
/the-role-of-security-assistance-in-washingtons-pivot-to-southeast-asia/.
6      US Department of State (DoS), Congressional Budget Justification: Department of State, Foreign
Operations, and Related Programs: Fiscal Year 2017 (Washington, DC: DoS, 2016).
7          “Foreign Military Financing Account Summary,” US Department of State, January 20, 2017,
https://2009-2017.state.gov/t/pm/ppa/sat/c14560.htm.
8          Linczer 2016. According to the AEI report, FMF expenditures for the five nations total $76
million per year; MSI will add an average of $85 million per year to that sum.
9      Council on Foreign Relations, “America’s Pivot to Asia Actually Led to Drop in Security
Assistance for Southeast Asia,” Huffington Post, July 7, 2017.
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of provocative behavior. In other words, security assistance should be
measured by how successfully it advances US national security strategy.
On that scale, America’s assistance in the region also has a mixed record.
Certainly there have been individual success stories. Counterterrorism assistance to the Filipino military’s long campaign against
the Abu Sayyaf Group in Mindanao is generally regarded as having
transformed Filipino special operations forces and delivered a strategic
victory against the militants. The National Coast Watch Center in
Manila has provided the Philippines with a potential platform to expand
its maritime domain awareness efforts across multiple government
agencies. And Defense Institution Reform Initiative efforts to support
the Indonesian Ministry of Defense as it enhances its defense strategy
and planning processes have made important strides.
Despite these success stories, there is little to suggest any overall
strategic direction. Modest assistance budgets have been divided across
a broad range of programs, each with a different objective. Administration budget justification materials and other data indicate
counterterrorism, counternarcotics, counterproliferation, military professionalization, and maritime law enforcement have all been priorities
funded through dozens of different programs and implementers.10
This approach thinly distributed funds while risking redundant or
contradictory programming. Moreover, that such investments have
rarely focused directly on the emergent key security challenges in the
region of Southeast Asia, stability and free commerce in the South China
Sea, creates a sense of strategic aimlessness.

A New Strategy

Neglect and aimlessness will not deliver the strategic outcomes
our security interests in the region demand. A new approach is needed.
While the amount of resources devoted to the effort is important, the
most critical factor is ultimately the strategy driving security cooperation
in the region. America’s military engagements with, and assistance to,
partners in Southeast Asia must be driven by a coherent medium- to longterm strategy that understands and accounts for objectives, motivations,
and vulnerabilities of China and partner nations. Like other military
preparations, such planning must address scenarios based on potential
reactions by regional stakeholders or other developments. Such planning
must also include thoughtful approaches to strategic communications
with partners that are not always strategically aligned with US
objectives as well as stakeholders, like China, that may misunderstand
America’s intentions.
The building blocks for such an approach exist in the form of
collaborative programs such as MSI, extensive analysis of regional
stakeholders and security challenges, growing interest among partners
in achieving a just and stable regional order, and bipartisan, interagency
commitment to the effort. A handful of practical, feasible steps could

10      See, DoS, Congressional Budget Justification: Department of State, Foreign Operations, and Related
Programs, Fiscal Year 2018 (Washington, DC: DoS, 2017); DoD, FY 2016 Section 1211(a) Report to
Congress on DoD Assistance to Foreign Security Forces (Washington, DC: DoD, 2016); and additional
assistance data available at www.ForeignAssistance.gov.
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transform US engagement in the region and dramatically improve the
return on our security assistance investments.

Strategic Security Assistance

First, security assistance must be reoriented to focus far more sharply
on specific, strategic results. The United States should endeavor to
deliver capabilities to partners, especially those that might complicate or
replicate China’s A2/AD capabilities that could be reasonably employed
during a regional contingency. This focus cannot, as it has previously,
prioritize delivering hardware and neglect developing institutional
capabilities, such as personnel management and logistics systems, that are
vital to successfully employing such hardware. America’s assistance must
be planned to deliver truly viable capabilities rather than just showpiece
equipment. Surely our potential adversaries can discern the difference.
Such assistance should be informed by careful analysis of potential
contingencies, including possible US military responses, to identify
realistic roles for partners’ militaries. Partner nations bordering the
South China Sea region are in most cases smaller, less sophisticated,
and often oriented toward a narrower range of missions. These partners
may not be capable of defeating China in a direct conflict, but they can
contribute meaningfully to contingency operations. A regional network
of interoperable capabilities can form the basis of an effective military
coalition. Moreover, specific capabilities can complicate an adversary’s
war plans by denying or challenging access, enabling other actors (like
the United States) through logistics and intelligence support, defending
key infrastructure, and delaying enemy advances until help can arrive. If
improved partner capabilities accomplish one or more of these objectives,
the chances of a successful US or coalition contingency operation
increase substantially and risk to US forces diminishes. Capabilities
that can expand the range of America’s options for overcoming China’s
A2/AD capabilities would have a significant impact, and assistance
efforts should be targeted there.
In addition, Pacific Command stands to realize significant strategic
gains by more carefully considering the timing and messaging that
accompanies assistance, particularly in relation to provocative actions by
China. Take, for example, the construction of airfield infrastructure for
a partner air force, which might be used by US fighters in a contingency.
Such assistance addresses logistics requirements vital for successful
contingency operations, which is beneficial to the partner and the United
States. How much more of a strategic impact would the construction of
an airfield have, though, if it were framed as a direct response to, and
initiated within weeks of, the groundbreaking of Chinese reclamation
activities on a contested feature of the South China Sea? Timing, a
variable US assistance efforts have largely ignored, is critical.

Relevant Capacity-Building

During a contingency, China’s worst nightmare might not be the full
and unbridled firepower of the American military but an interoperable
and effective coalition of American and regional militaries, seamlessly
integrating their infrastructure and capabilities into synchronized
action. The demonstration of such coordination and interoperability
during peacetime, therefore, should serve as a powerful deterrent against
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potential Chinese provocations. Yet the truth is, our partners in Southeast Asia are not interoperable—not with the United States, not with
each other—nor are they currently capable of effective coalition action.
Pacific Command should increase its focus on the intersection of
security assistance and real-world operations, building regional capacity
for coalition warfare and exercising key capabilities and operational
concepts. In practice, such an effort would not simply entail more or
larger multilateral exercises but creative approaches to engagements
that generate more frequent and more robust bilateral and multilateral
operations in the South China Sea and in other key maritime regions.
For instance, joint patrols, either by the United States and one
or more partners or by multiple partners without the United States,
develop interoperability and habits of collaboration while enhancing
maritime domain awareness and law enforcement in areas of mutual
interest. Recently, Indonesia, Malaysia, and the Philippines agreed to
conduct such coordinated patrols in the Sulu Sea, which is an area
abutting the South China Sea that has seen significant threats from
pirate and militant groups.11 The United States has a substantial interest
in fostering this collaboration and could provide direct assistance to
the mission, particularly in the form of intelligence or logistics support.
Coast guards and navies from each partner may also need assistance
deepening interoperability and extending time at sea. Targeting security
assistance toward this mission would create an immediate impact, while
building the foundation for future multilateral collaboration.
America would also benefit by working with regional partners
to develop multilateral frameworks that institutionalize regional
collaboration. Successful examples of this approach abound in the
context of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization, where members
have increasingly pooled limited resources to achieve shared capabilities.
The Movement Coordination Center Europe (MCCE), for instance,
helps partners coordinate strategic lift assets to maximize efficiency and
cost savings. In concrete terms, the coordination allows one nation to
ship supplies on the plane or vessel of another member nation if there
is available space.12 Other examples range from the Alliance Ground
Surveillance system—a similar consortium pooling intelligence,
surveillance, and reconnaissance assets—to combining the resources of
multiple member nations to purchase US weapons technologies.
These models offer a compelling path for Southeast Asian nations
to tackle shared challenges in a cost-efficient manner while reducing
operating costs and providing a platform for deepening interoperability
and trust. Given the immense logistical challenges associated with
responding to events, such as humanitarian disasters or terrorist attacks,
across thousands of islands and thousands of miles, developing a shared
logistics initiative along the lines of MCCE should take top priority.
Finally, exercises should play an important role but repeating the
same annual exercises with no apparent strategic rationale is unlikely to
pay strategic dividends. As much as broad-based exercises such as the Rim
11      Arlina Arshad, “Jakarta, KL and Manila To Start Joint Patrols in Sulu Sea,” Straits Times
(Singapore), August 5, 2016.
12     “Welcome,” Movement Coordination Centre Europe, January 16, 2018, http://mcce-mil.com.
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of the Pacific and Cobra Gold can contribute to building relationships,
more targeted exercises offer greater operational value. These exercises
offer an important platform to develop and test operational concepts and
should thus be framed according to specific assumptions about coalition
participants and scenarios. Exercises also often bring opportunities
to develop necessary infrastructure and deepen knowledge about key
areas of operation. Furthermore, such exercises offer an opportunity
to demonstrate new capabilities in the region. While the US military
has rarely taken such an approach, it certainly deserves a place in the
commander’s playbook as a tool for deterrence or strategic messaging.

Provocation Planning

A playbook containing a range of realistic options for responding
to potential scenarios is becoming increasingly important for Admiral
Harry B. Harris Jr., the commander of US Pacific Command. As China’s
provocations become increasingly frequent and aggressive, Harris and
his leadership at the Defense Department and in the White House need
a robust set of options to allow the United States to respond in ways
that uphold the international rule of law, reassure allies and partners of
US resolve, and deter future provocations. While this playbook should
include a diverse range of tools, there is great and unrealized potential
for refining tools that involve assistance to and collaboration with
partners. Such engagement-focused tools are often, though not always,
less escalatory and, given the common resolve they demonstrate, may
have more impact.
A variety of such options drawing on the concepts articulated above
should be further developed to expand the commander’s playbook.
Joint patrols are one such option discussed repeatedly at USPACOM
headquarters, and some steps have been taken to expand such efforts.13
However, sufficient partner capability and interoperability necessary for
joint patrols often lags well behind ambitions. Rather than continuing to
discuss joint patrols as a hypothetical possibility, Pacific Command should
accelerate efforts to prepare partners for participating in such patrols. In
addition to providing important elements of required assistance such as
patrol boats and equipment—particularly interoperable communications
equipment—US assistance must also emphasize operator and unit
training, logistics and maintenance support, and bilateral exercises that
put operating concepts into practice.
Joint patrols require commencing capacity-building activities
now to ensure partners will be capable of participating in such patrols
when desired in the future. Other tools could be available without
such capacity-building; however, the United States should undertake
additional planning and analysis to ensure such resources can be
employed in an effective and timely manner. Building upon the previous
example, the Seabees or other military engineering units could easily
construct an airfield or a small port facility, but the impact of such action

13      Harry B. Harris Jr., “Department of Defense Press Briefing by Adm. Harris in the Pentagon
Briefing Room,” US Pacific Command, February 25, 2016, http://www.pacom.mil/Media
/Speeches-Testimony/Article/673521/department-of-defense-press-briefing-by-adm-harris-in
-the-pentagon-briefing-room/; HQ Pacific Air Forces Public Affairs, “PACAF Airmen Stand up Air
Contingent in Philippines,” US Pacific Command, April 18, 2016, http://www.pacom.mil/Media
/Article/723604/pacaf-airmen-stand-up-air-contingent-in-philippines/; and David B. Larter,
“Carrier Group Returns to South China Sea Amid Tensions,” Navy Times, April 14, 2016.
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would increase dramatically if undertaken in direct response to China
militarizing a contested feature.
Executing such an activity requires planning now by identifying
preferred locations, securing permissions from partner nations,
and developing concrete concepts of operations for executing and
messaging the activity. Another powerful option for the playbook
might be conducting a “snap” exercise, in which US forces carry out
an unscheduled training demonstration with little warning. Given the
provocative nature of snap exercises, they, too, require careful planning.
Still, as China’s activities become more aggressive, the commander’s
playbook must be filled with a spectrum of fully developed, executable
options to match a variety of scenarios.

Army Involvement

Admittedly, the new approaches discussed heretofore are not easy,
and they are made all the more challenging by the need for partners to
commit, with the United States, to these courses of action. A shared
sense of commitment cannot be taken for granted among a group of
diverse nations who each has a history of uneasy relations with the
United States. However, what is clearly a challenge can too easily become
an excuse. Partnerships are forged through consistent engagement and
through exploration of mutual interests and benefit. Many Southeast
Asian partners would likely argue that the United States has too often
sought to leverage regional nations to advance US interests without
fully considering the strategic objectives and priorities of the nations
themselves. To overcome relationship challenges, the US should work
to identify priorities shared by partners, avoiding a mismatch between
US and partner commitments.
Whether intentional or not, Pacific Command’s engagement in
the region has often represented such a mismatch. With a focus on the
maritime arena, US Navy and Marine Corps forces, along with their
regional counterparts, have inadvertently become the dominant players
in the region. Pacific Command has also prioritized engagement between
US and partner air forces. Left out, particularly in maritime security
engagements and assistance, have been the region’s armies, despite the
fact that the army is the dominant military service in each of the primary
regional partners.
Meanwhile, there is a growing recognition that the Army’s role in
confronting Chinese provocations and responding to a contingency must
expand. In fact, Harris has commented, “I think the army should be in
the business of sinking ships with land-based surface-to-ship missile
systems . . . What the Army brings traditionally is what they always bring,
which is mass and firepower and capability.”14 Yet, as the Army works to
expand its role in the region, there has been little recognition that these
same capabilities—mass and firepower based ashore but aimed at the
sea—could be contributed by partner armies in the region as easily as by
the Army itself. Ideally, a warfighting coalition would demonstrate the
same interoperability and scope of partner contributions in the armies’
domain as demonstrated by the other services.

14      Franz-Stefan Gady, “US Admiral: US Army Needs to Create Ship-Killing Units for South
China Sea,” Diplomat, November 17, 2016.
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Andrew F. Krepinevich Jr., in his Foreign Affairs article “How to
Deter China,” detailed a concept for establishing coastal defenses around
the South China Sea that notably recognizes the role partners might
play.15 While Krepinevich’s specific vision has its opponents, it points
the way to an assistance initiative with partners that would be attractive
to their army-dominated militaries and, as Krepinevich notes, align with
investments many partners have already signaled they intend to make.
Krepinevich even identifies specific systems, such as coastal radars, shortrange interceptor missiles, and short-range, precision-guided rockets and
mortars. Likewise, Harris named high mobility artillery rocket systems
and Paladin howitzers as two systems US forces might deploy to the
region, and there is no reason they should not be considered for transfer
to foreign partners. One of the key benefits of expanding engagement
with regional armies in support of a coastal defense mission is that many
of these systems are in relatively wide circulation globally and thus can
feasibly be shared without the significant technology security hurdles
that complicate many foreign weapons transfers.
In addition to building coastal defense capacity, the Army can play a
leading role in executing each of the concepts discussed above. Already,
the Army’s innovative Pacific Pathways program has proven to be an
effective tool for rotating Army units through the region. The Army
should consider how that program and other regular exercises might be
used for more strategic purposes, such as training partners in coastal
defense operations or demonstrating new operational capabilities.
Additional potential resides in reorienting the Army National Guard’s
State Partnership Programs in the region to undertake more operationally
relevant activities, such as joint intelligence collection missions or
amphibious warfare trainings, with their host counterparts.

Military Diplomacy

Forging the depth of partnership required to support a more
sophisticated US regional strategy will require substantially enhancing
military diplomacy in the region in addition to increasing the focus on
regional armies. Under Carter’s leadership as the Secretary of Defense,
the Defense Department took several important steps in this direction,
notably through Carter personally and persistently engaging in forums
like the ASEAN Defense Ministers Meeting (ADMM-Plus) and the
Shangri-La Dialogue. Secretary of Defense James Mattis began his
tenure by traveling to the Asia-Pacific region, signaling he understands
the importance of continuing these partnerships. Continued, and
additional, engagement at all levels will be important to nurturing such
relationships throughout the region.
Additionally, Pacific Command should look for opportunities to
elevate the level of bilateral staff talks, not only to signal the importance
of each partner in the region but also to help break through the respective
bureaucracies to secure commitments for new initiatives. Annual naval
staff talks, for example, are held by the US Seventh Fleet and include
key partners from Indonesia, Malaysia, the Philippines, and Singapore.
Elevating these talks from the Seventh Fleet to the Pacific Fleet—in
essence, elevating the partnership from the three-star to the four-star

15      Andrew F. Krepinevich Jr., “How to Deter China,” Foreign Affairs 94, no. 3 (March/April
2015), 78–86.
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level—could pay significant dividends in terms of partners’ perceptions
and US access to key leaders. Each service’s approach to bilateral staff
talks across the region varies, but all include opportunities to expand
and to elevate these engagements with key partners.
As China continues to escalate provocative behavior in the region,
a robust playbook representing options that are feasible and cover a
spectrum of scale, risk, and method will be essential for the commander
of USPACOM, the secretary of defense, and the president. The strategic
approach presented above provides a series of related and mutually
reinforcing concepts rather than a selection of limited choices to fill
out that playbook.
To summarize, a more sophisticated approach to security
cooperation in the region brings four valuable benefits: low cost,
international engagement, limited risk of escalation, and expansion of
military options. Partnerships that distribute contributions to regional
security cost the US less than other strategies. Empowering other nations
in the region to participate in their security engages them in forging
regional solutions that align with their strategic objectives and priorities
and strengthen regional security architectures. Such solutions also
allow the United States to act decisively without haphazardly escalating
tensions. Finally, well-targeted capacity-building investments will create
additional military options for the US and partners in future scenarios,
improving America’s strategic position. The approach detailed here is
only one part—and indeed not the most important part—of a broader
strategy required not only for the region but also to address global
concerns about China’s assertiveness. Yet, if the United States fails to
adopt a more strategic approach to engagements with regional partners
and allies, it will be ceding key ground to a China that is clearly asserting
its ambitions in the region and beyond.
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ABSTRACT: This article challenges strategists to reconsider longheld assumptions associated with the alliance between Belarus and
Russia when planning military support for the Baltic states.

S

ince the Russian annexation of Crimea in early 2014, security
experts have been busy exploring the nature of the current
threat environment facing East Central Europe as well as
identifying appropriate policy responses that the North Atlantic Treaty
Organization (NATO) and its local members could adopt. Much of the
existing analysis has focused on so-called hybrid warfare, the anti-access/
area denial (A2/AD) capabilities Russia brings to bear in the region, and
gaps in NATO’s deterrent capabilities. Yet experts have paid insufficient
attention to Russia’s only formal ally in the region, Belarus. At best,
they assume Belarus will participate in—if not just diplomatically
support—any military aggression that its senior ally would undertake
in the region. At worst, they neglect to mention it altogether, with the
implicit understanding that the Belarusian military would be too weak
and the political leadership in Minsk too deferential to the Kremlin to be
of any consequence.
Such expectations regarding Belarus might be wrong, however.
Military-to-military contacts between Belarus and Russia are not as
strong as some analysts assume. More importantly, Belarusian President
Alyaksandr Hrygorevich Lukashenka has diverged from Russia on key
issues relating to territorial disputes in the former Soviet space. He
provided halting diplomatic support to Russia on Georgia and even
bucked the Kremlin’s approach toward Ukraine. Indeed, because of his
country’s positioning between NATO and Russia, he is likely to be riskaverse with regards to military conflict. He may even fear entrapment,
believing that Russia might drag Belarus into a war he would prefer to
avoid. Not only would a war risk Belarusian resources and lives but it
could also create the conditions under which Lukashenka loses power.
Analysts are thus mistaken to believe the alliance between Belarus
and Russia represents a dynamic whereby the strong do what they can
and the weak suffer what they must. Should Belarusian leaders not want
conflict with NATO, they can create costs for Russia. Even if Russia
tries to impose its will on Belarus, either by withholding economic
subsidies or by dislodging Lukashenka from power, then it would do
so at potentially great expense. Any effort to undermine the Belarusian
regime could spark a backlash among members of society. Since such
an effort would suggest Russia is destabilizing Belarus for military
purposes, it would also escalate tensions with NATO.
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Whatever the plausibility of a Russian-led regime change in Belarus,
the prospect of having to deal with a reluctant and militarily deficient
ally could affect Russia’s cost-benefit calculations in challenging the
territorial and political order in East Central Europe. For its part,
NATO should prepare for varying levels of Belarusian involvement.
Holding Belarusian assets at risk may not be necessary if Minsk is able to
hamper Russian war plans. But if Russia succeeds in eliciting Belarusian
cooperation, NATO might feel compelled to target those Belarusian
bases that Russian troops could use as staging areas, thereby further
escalating a crisis. Belarus presents a complicating factor for both sides
with respect to crisis diplomacy and warfighting in the region.

Belarusian Foreign Policy since Independence

Called the last “outpost of tyranny” in Europe, Belarus became
an independent state in 1991 amid the dissolution of the Soviet Union.
Lukashenka has ruled the country since 1994 thanks to electoral fraud
as well as the violent suppression of political opposition and media.1
With a domestic policy subject to international condemnation for its
authoritarianism, Lukashenka has historically pursued a close relationship with Russia, even describing himself as a “most loyal ally” to the
Kremlin.2 The two countries forged their alliance through agreements—
the Treaty on Friendship, Good Neighborhood, and Cooperation of 1995
and the 1997 Union Treaty—that Lukashenka signed with then-Russian
President Boris Yeltsin. These treaties have provided the framework for
their security cooperation and joint military planning.3
Closeness with Russia served more than just a political-military
purpose, however. For Belarusian leaders, it preserved a certain
level of welfare despite highly unfavorable structural conditions that
characterized the national economy. At least throughout the 1990s,
Belarus maintained high living standards relative to other members of
the Commonwealth of Independent States—the non-Baltic countries
that used to form the Soviet Union.4 Integration with Russia has helped
Belarus sidestep otherwise difficult questions concerning its lack of
independent energy sources and highly militarized, state-managed
economy. Moreover, partnering with Russia has allowed Belarus to
obtain natural gas at reduced rates, effectively subsidizing the latter’s
economy. Some Belarusian policymakers recognized that these subsidies
would compromise the country’s autonomy, but they nevertheless
calculated that economic engagement with the West was too risky when
the costs of disengagement from Russia were certain to be high.5

1      David R. Marples, “Outpost of Tyranny? The Failure of Democratization in Belarus,”
Democratization 16, no. 4 (August 2009): 756–76, doi:10.1080/13510340903082986.
2      Clelia Rontoyanni, “Union of Belarus and Russia: The Role of NATO and the EU,” in
Security Dynamics in the Former Soviet Bloc, ed. Graeme P. Herd and Jennifer D. P. Moroney (London:
RoutledgeCurzon, 2003), 113.
3      Alena Vysotskaya Guedes Vieira, “The Politico-Military Alliance of Russia and Belarus: ReExamining the Role of NATO and the EU in Light of the Intra-Alliance Security Dilemma,” EuropeAsia Studies 66, no. 4 (June 2014): 557–77, doi:10.1080/09668136.2014.899769.
4      Rontoyanni, “Union of Belarus,” 113.
5      Andrew Wilson and Clelia Rontoyanni, “Security or Prosperity? Belarusian and Ukrainian
Choices,” in Swords and Sustenance: The Economics of Security in Belarus and Ukraine, ed. Robert Legvold
and Celeste A. Wallander (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 2004), 43–44.

TOC

Regional Challenges

Lanoszka

77

After Vladimir Putin became the Russian president in 2000,
relations between the two countries continued to develop. For example,
cooperation in air defense deepened, which culminated in an air defense
treaty in 2009. Yet distrust and acrimony between the two governments
accompanied the growth of such linkages. Lukashenka was lukewarm to
Putin’s suggestions that the six oblasts making up Belarus should become
part of the Russian federation. He rejected other Russian proposals for
greater fiscal integration between the two countries.6 Moreover, the two
countries publicly disputed over how to price surplus natural gas that
Belarus had hitherto imported from Russia at a reduced rate and then
exported at a higher rate. The negotiations had become so testy between
Belarus and the Russian supplier Gazprom that the company cut gas
supplies to Belarus in early 2007.7
In 2009, Belarus also boycotted a summit it chaired for the Collective
Security Treaty Organization (CSTO)—a regional multilateral security
alliance also comprised of Russia, Armenia, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan,
Tajikistan, and Uzbekistan.8 The purpose of this meeting was to decide
upon an initiative to create a combat-capable force called the Collective
Operational Reaction Forces (CORF) that the CSTO would deploy to any
one of its member-states in a crisis situation. Ultimately agreeing on the
formation of CORF, Belarus first dragged its feet, exposing the tensions
that began to mark its relations with Russia and other CSTO members.
These signs of discord were not the only ones, however. Belarus has
generally been ambivalent about Russia’s pattern of interventionism in
the former Soviet space.
Notwithstanding these disagreements, close ties with Russia have
influenced Belarus’ relations with NATO and the European Union.
Lukashenka has criticized NATO expansion and even echoed Putin’s
disapproval of Ukraine’s bid for membership in that alliance. Indeed, in
2002, its declared military doctrine observed the “expansion of military
blocs and alliances [were] to the detriment of the military security of the
Republic of Belarus.”9 By contrast, Belarusian diplomacy towards the
European Union is predicated more on cynical opportunism than on
heightened threat perceptions.10 Belarus has used its relationship with the
European Union as a “bargaining chip”—an outside option that could
offer some alternative economic goods if Russia withholds support.11
Yet the European Union has sometimes lost patience with Belarus,
and its human rights record, leading to sanctions imposed in 2004. An
effort to improve relations between the supranational organization and
Belarus stalled when Lukashenka’s regime imprisoned political activists
and dissidents after the 2010 presidential elections. New sanctions
were imposed on Belarus during the ensuing period and Lukashenka
   6     Wilson and Rontoyanni, “Security or Prosperity?,” 47–49; and Pavel K. Baev, Russian Energy
Policy and Military Power: Putin’s Quest for Greatness (London: Routledge, 2008), 147.
   7     Vieira, “Politico-Military Alliance,” 567–68.
  8       John A. Mowchan, The Militarization of the Collective Security Treaty Organization, Issue Paper
6-09 (Carlisle Barracks, PA: Center for Strategic Leadership, 2009), 5.
   9     Quoted in Steven J. Main, The Military Doctrine of the Republic of Belarus (Camberley, Surrey:
Conflict Studies Research Centre, 2002), 6.
10      Thomas Ambrosio, “The Political Success of Russia-Belarus Relations: Insulating Minsk
from a Color Revolution,” Demokratizatsiya 14, no. 3 (2006): 417. To be sure, the EU has supported
Belarusian pro-democracy groups in the past.
11      Vieira, “Politico-Military Alliance,” 575.
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was excluded from the Warsaw Summit of the Eastern Partnership
initiative.12 Following the October 2015 presidential elections, a report
by the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe determined
very limited progress was made in Belarusian efforts to have elections
operate more democratically. The European Union subsequently lifted
most permanent sanctions while retaining the arms embargo.13

Analytical Neglect of Belarus

Although the Belarus-Russia alliance features greater nuance than
commonly presumed, the current literature on security in East Central
Europe superficially engages with Belarus. In discussing the A2/
AD capabilities that Russia has at its disposal in that region, Stephan
Frühling and Guillaume Lasconjarias barely mention Belarus. They note
that Belarus represents the rare instance in which Russia has gained
“strategic influence” before assuming Belarusian forces might fight
alongside their Russian counterparts in exploiting the so-called Suwałki
Gap—a corridor that lies between the Russian exclave of Kaliningrad
and Belarus, thereby forming the only mainland connection between
Poland and Lithuania.14 Still, they later imply Belarusian neutrality
would improve NATO’s odds of achieving favorable battlefield
outcomes.15Another analysis of the A2/AD problem neglects Belarus
entirely.16 One think-tank report arguing for improving NATO’s regional
deterrent posture only mentions Belarus in reference to Kaliningrad.17
A major essay, and the subsequent forum it inspired, on how NATO
should address Russia never mentions Belarus.18 Discussions of Russian
military doctrinal thinking or regional strategies often exclude Belarus.19
Some analysts have done better. Luis Simón recognizes the
importance of Belarus for NATO defense planning, writing that
“although Minsk is politically close to Moscow, it still maintains an
important degree of military autonomy in the sense Russian armed
forces do not have a significant presence in Belarusian territory; nor
12      Vieria, “Politico-Military Alliannce,” 558–59.
13      Robin Emmott, “Europe Ends Sanctions on Belarus, Seeks Better Ties,” Reuters, February
15, 2016; and Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE) and Office for
Democratic Institutions and Human Rights (ODIHR), Republic of Belarus, Parliamentary Elections,
11 September 2016: OSCE/ODIHR Election Observation Mission Final Report (Warsaw: OSCE /
ODIHR, 2016).
14      Stephan Frühling and Guillaume Lasconjarias, “NATO, A2/AD and the Kaliningrad
Challenge,” Survival 58, no. 2 (April–May 2016): 103, 105, doi:10.1080/00396338.2016.1161906.
15      Frühling and Lasconjarias, “NATO, A2/AD,” 107.
16      Alexander Lanoszka and Michael A. Hunzeker, “Confronting the Anti-Access/Area Denial
and Precision Strike Challenge in the Baltic Region,” RUSI Journal 161, no. 5 (November 2016):
12–18, doi:10.1080/03071847.2016.1253367.
17      Edward Lucas and A. Wess Mitchell, Central European Security after Crimea: The Case for
Strengthening NATO’s Eastern Defenses, Report Number 35 (Washington, DC: Center for European
Policy Analysis, 2014), 5.
18      Matthew Kroenig, “Facing Reality: Getting NATO Ready for a New Cold War,” Survival 57,
no. 1 (February–March 2015): 49–70, doi:10.1080/00396338.2015.1008295; and Steven Pifer et al.,
“Forum: NATO and Russia,” Survival 57, no. 2 (April–May 2015): 119–44, doi:10.1080/00396338
.2015.1026090.
19      Kristin Ven Bruusgaard, “Russian Strategic Deterrence,” Survival 58, no. 4 (August–
September 2016): 7–26, doi:10.1080/00396338.2016.1207945; Dmitry (Dima) Adamsky, CrossDomain Coercion: The Current Russian Art of Strategy, Proliferation Papers 54 (Paris, France: Institut
Français des Relations Internationales Security Studies Center, 2015); and Alexander Lanoszka,
“Russian Hybrid Warfare and Extended Deterrence in Eastern Europe,” International Affairs 92, no.
1 (January 2016): 175–95, doi:10.1111/1468-2346.12509.
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are they in a position to transit Belarusian territory or airspace freely.”20
Nevertheless, his analysis proceeds to suggest that growing defense ties
between these two countries (as of 2014) should lead NATO defense
planners to assume that they would cooperate with each other.21
Interestingly, a well-cited RAND study on wargames in the Baltic
region that found Russia could quickly conquer Baltic territory barely
acknowledges Belarus. To the extent that Belarus would play a role,
according to these wargames, it would be to “subject [NATO forces] to
long-range artillery and flank attacks” from its side of the Suwałki Gap
should those forces attempt to enter the Baltic region from Poland.22
Another recent wargame held in Warsaw acknowledged Belarus could
be a flashpoint in a future crisis between Russia and NATO. Indeed, it
envisioned a scenario where Russia dislodges Lukashenka from power
and installs in his place a general who proceeds to invite troops from
Russia—a scenario that might have drawn inspiration from reports of
Russian plans to send unusually large numbers of railway carriages into
Belarus in 2017 ahead of joint military exercises in September.23
That many expert analyses of regional security relations overlook
Belarus might reflect how NATO views non-NATO territory differently
because of its interest in defensive operations. But this neglect might also
reflect how Belarus has neglected its own military, weakening it so much
relative to Russia that experts feel they can make simplistic assumptions
about Belarusian behavior in a future crisis. When Belarus achieved
independent statehood, it acquired a strong military force that had
previously formed the Belarusian Military District in the Soviet Union.
Because of its geographical positioning in what would have been the rear
of the frontline forces of the Warsaw Pact, the inheritance included an
extensive array of heavy weapons, an oversized army of 240,000 military
personnel, as well as education facilities and high-tech factories capable
of making components for military equipment.24
But the military industry that Belarus inherited from the Cold
War was inappropriate for its particular defense needs. As in Ukraine,
Belarusian factories did not close the production cycle independently,
thus they remained dependent on access to Russian militaryindustrial enterprises for various weapon components.25 Given these
structural problems, Belarus had to downsize the size of its military
four-fold. Nevertheless, the government continued subsidizing, and
retaining control over, defense production. Doing so helped avoid
any social dislocations that would have ensued in a national economy
disproportionately centered on military production. To maintain the
viability of its defense industry, Belarus oriented its military production
20      Luis Simón, “Assessing NATO’s Eastern European ‘Flank,’ ” Parameters 44, no. 3 (Autumn
2014): 71.
21      Simón, “Assessing NATO,” 72.
22      David A. Shlapak and Michael W. Johnson, Reinforcing Deterrence on NATO’s Eastern Flank:
Wargaming the Defense of the Baltics (Santa Monica, CA: RAND Corporation, 2016), 4.
23      Arseni Sivitski, “Belarus at the Centre of Russia-NATO Wargame Simulation,” Belarus
Digest, February 13, 2017; and Arseni Sivitski, “Will Russia Occupy Belarus in 2017?,” Belarus Digest,
November 29, 2016.
24      Siarhei Bohdan, Belarusian Army: Its Capacities and Role in the Region, Analytical Paper 4 (London:
Ostrogorski Centre, 2014), 6–7.
25      Hrihorij Perepelitsa, “Military-Industrial Cooperation between Ukraine, Belarus, and Russia:
Possibilities, Priorities, Prospects,” in Legvold and Wallander, Swords and Sustenance, 132–33.
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to Russia more so than to its own army, thereby adding to its reliance on
Russia for obtaining financial resources. Consequently, Belarus limited
its own possibilities for accessing other technologies from alternative
providers.26 The European Union’s arms embargo on Belarus since 2011
compounds this problem.27
The Belarusian military thus atrophied since the country gained
independence. Defense spending has been low, never taking up
more than 1.48 percent of the gross domestic product during the
2000s.28 With badly aging equipment and a military in sore need of a
modernization program that the country can ill-afford, one analysis
surmises Belarus “would not be capable of repulsing a serious incursion
across its border.”29 The Belarusian armed forces have undertaken some
restructuring, with the army featuring not only ground forces but also
an air force, air defense systems, and special operations forces.30 Yet the
combat credibility of that air force is dubious even if about half of the
active personnel in the 48,000 strong army are in the air force and air
defense.31 Nevertheless, Belarus has sought to improve its air defenses
and to replace older combat aircraft with Sukhoi Su-30SMs by 2020.32
Whether it will succeed in these efforts remains unclear.
Though this military deficiency might indicate Belarus would have
no choice but to follow the Kremlin’s lead, it could also be evidence
of Belarusian foot-dragging on efforts to enhance interoperability.
Lest it would be dragged into an undesirable conflict, Belarus might be
trying to limit military integration with Russia. Moreover, that Russian
forces may have to traverse Belarusian territory or to use Belarusian
bases presents opportunities and challenges for NATO planners—for
example, Russian movements within Belarus would allow NATO
more time to detect potentially aggressive behavior. Still, Belarusian
cooperation is not a given.

Political Discord between Belarus and Russia

Strong reasons exist to be skeptical that Belarusian leadership would
kowtow to Russia on foreign policy matters. The best inference one can
make regards Lukashenka’s primary interest to hold onto power. Though
Lukashenka may share Putin’s dislike of Western-leaning regimes and
prodemocracy movements, he has been reluctant to support Putin’s
willingness to destabilize other former Soviet republics. Lukashenka
withheld full recognition of the two breakaway republics of Abkhazia
and South Ossetia from Russia—something Russia did following its
five-day war with Georgia in August 2008—and continued to respect
Georgia’s territorial integrity.33

26      Perepelitsa, “Military-Industrial Cooperation,” 135–41.
27      “Embargoes and Sanctions on Belarus,” GOV.UK, March 3, 2016, https://www.gov.uk
/guidance/arms-embargo-on-belarus.
28      Bohdan, “Belarusian Army,” 10.
29      The Military Balance 2016 (Abingdon, Oxfordshire: Routledge, Taylor & Francis / International
Institute for Strategic Studies [ISS], 2016), 182.
30      Bohdan, “Belarusian Army,” 8.
31      Military Balance 2016, 182.
32      The Military Balance 2017 (London: ISS, 2017), 203.
33      Vieira, “Politico-Military Alliance,” 563; and Oksana Antonenko, “A War with No Winners,”
Survival 50, no. 5 (October 2008): 26–27.

TOC

Regional Challenges

Lanoszka

81

Belarus and Russia also diverged in their stances towards Kurmanbek
Bakiyev’s deposal during the second Tulip Revolution (2010) in
Kyrgyzstan. Shortly after granting asylum to Bakiyev, Lukashenka
implicitly condemned Russia for tolerating the turmoil that unseated
the Kyrgyz leader. Russia had supported regime change in Kyrgyzstan,
having disliked Bakiyev for accepting large loans from Moscow
while allowing the United States to keep using the Manas air base to
support its operations in Afghanistan.34 Amid a recent debt dispute
with Russia, Lukashenka reportedly said “right now fraternal Ukraine
is fighting for its independence. We cannot afford to fight. We are a
peace-loving people.”35 Indeed, shortly after the Russian annexation of
Crimea, Lukashenka carefully maneuvered between Russia and Ukraine.
Despite recognizing Russia has de facto control over Crimea, he has
cooperated with the post-Maidan government in Kyiv. Lukashenka even
attended the inauguration of President Petro Poroshenko in June 2014.
He criticized the ousted former President Viktor Yanukovych for having
fled from Ukraine.36
Russian access to Belarusian military assets and territory should also
not be overstated. Russia used the Baranovichi air base between 2013
and 2016, but Russia wishes to have its own air base partly to compensate
for shortcomings in Belarus’ own contributions to their joint air defense
system. Russia currently uses two other facilities: the Gantsevichi Radar
Station and a Russian Navy communications point near the town of
Vileyka.37 Yet these facilities are not military bases per se and recent
diplomatic tensions have prevented a greater Russian military presence
in Belarus.38 Belarus has even renewed efforts to bolster its air defense
system so as to obviate further Russian deployments of fighter jets on
its own air bases.39 Thus, notwithstanding statements about loyalty to
Russia, Belarusian leaders have been unwilling to host forward-deployed
Russian forces. This reluctance persists despite how Belarus has seen
an expanding NATO presence on its western borders since the 2016
Warsaw Summit.
Lukashenka might wish to forestall a greater Russian political
presence for reasons connected to his own political survival. After all, he
may not wish for Belarus to be the next Crimea since, as Arkady Moshes
notes, some similarities exist between the two former Soviet territories.40
To begin with, sections of the Belarusian population have sympathies,
34      Kathleen Collins, “Kyrgyzstan’s Latest Revolution,” Democracy 22, no. 3 (July 2011): 156,
doi:10.1353/jod.2011.0040. On the divergence, see Vieira, “Politico-Military Alliance,” 563; and
“Belarus Ready To Accept Bakiyev—Report,” RT, April 18, 2010.
35      “Brother Ukraine Is Fighting for Its Independence—Belarus President,” Moscow Times,
January 27, 2017.
36      Alena Vysotskaya Guedes Vieira, “Ukraine’s Crisis and Russia’s Closest Allies: A Reinforced
Intra-Alliance Security Dilemma at Work,” International Spectator 49, no. 4 (December 2014): 97–111,
doi:10.1080/03932729.2014.964520. See also Andrew Wilson, “Belarus Wants Out,” Foreign Affairs,
March 20, 2014.
37      “Kremlin Pushes for Russian Airbase in Belarus after Presidential Elections,” Belarus in Focus,
April 22, 2016, http://belarusinfocus.info/society-and-politics/kremlin-pushes-russian-airbase
-belarus-after-presidential-elections.
38      Military Balance 2017, 203.
39      Siarhei Bohdan, “Thwarting Plans for a Russian Airbase, Minsk Strengthens Its Air Force,”
Belarus Digest, October 12, 2016.
40      Arkady Moshes, Belarus’ Renewed Subordination to Russia: Unconditional Surrender or Hard Bargain?,
Policy Memo 329 (Washington, DC: PONARS Eurasia, 2014). According to Moshes, another
similarity in 2014 is that Russia had a military presence in Belarus; however, that military presence
was limited and inadequate for grabbing territory and seizing strategic assets within Belarus.
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if not an affinity, for Moscow. Russian broadcast media also has a large
presence in Belarus. Though state censorship can prevent Moscow from
exploiting that presence to advance its own preferred narrative in Belarus,
Belarusians could still access Russian programming on the internet.
Hence some Belarusians were able to view an incendiary documentary
about Lukashenka aired in Russia in 2012. This information war erupted
between the two governments during a dispute over export duties on
the crude oil that Belarus was receiving from Russia.41 Moreover, just
as with the Ukrainian military in Crimea and eastern Ukraine, the
integration of Belarusian armed forces with some parts of the Russian
military raises questions of loyalty. As one report observes, “unlike the
security agencies or police, the army is not [Lukashenka’s] closest ally”
and suffers from his mistrust.42
Belarus might thus be exposed to the so-called hybrid warfare
that Russia allegedly practiced in Ukraine. Specifically, Belarus may be
subject to Russian provocations at the subconventional level, and selfdeterred from responding forcefully out of a desire to avoid militarily
confronting a superior foe in Russia.43 So in 2016, Belarus unveiled a
new military doctrine—its first since 2002—explicitly discussing the
concept of hybrid war. This doctrinal innovation reflected fear that
adversaries could use subversion to destabilize, if not to unseat, the
Belarusian government.
Though the Arab Spring and the Color revolutions in the former
Soviet space might have inspired such fears, invocations of hybrid
warfare suggest at least some concern of Russian interference.44 To be
sure, a Crimea-like scenario is far-fetched. Russia probably does not want
further political instability on its borders, and an agreement between
the two governments in April 2017 to resolve an oil and gas dispute
could mean that Putin sees few acceptable alternatives to supporting
Lukashenka.45 The perceived hybrid threat could also be mostly Western
in origin since the Belarusian minister of defense obliquely asserted “all
the wars of the past 10–15 years were in effect hybrid wars.”46
Yet the European Union’s only media presence in Belarus is through
the Polish-funded Belarusian language television channel Belsat. Thus
Russia has more opportunities to subvert its ally because of their common
language and ties to members of Belarusian society. Still, Ukraine was
a much more open society wracked by greater ethnic grievances than
Belarus. Because the Belarusian state is repressive and controls media
tightly, Russia might have trouble identifying aggrieved individuals
willing to revolt against the heavy-handed Belarusian government.

41      Joanna Szostek, “Russian Influence on News Media in Belarus,” Communist and Post-Communist
Studies 48, no. 2–3 (June–September 2015): 125.
42     Bohdan, “Belarusian Army,” 8.
43     See Lanoszka, “Russian Hybrid Warfare.” For a critique of Western notions of hybrid
warfare, see Andrew Monaghan, “The ‘War’ in Russia’s ‘Hybrid Warfare,’ ” Parameters 45, no. 4
(Winter 2015–16): 65–74.
44     On Russian perceptions of Western hybrid war, see Rod Thornton, “The Changing Nature
of Modern Warfare,” RUSI Journal 160, no. 4 (September 2015): 42.
45     Siarhei Bohdan, “Belarus Has Obtained Gas and Oil Concessions from Russia: But What Did
Russia Get in Exchange?,” Belarus Digest, April 11, 2017.
46     Andrei Ravkov, “All Wars of the Past 15 Years Can Be Called Hybrid Wars,” Belarusian
Telegraph Agency, February 24, 2016.
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The new Belarusian military doctrine does have a traditional
military bent. The language emphasizing increased mobility and
readiness throughout the entire country, however, implies some concern
about Russia. Minsk may be hedging against multiple threats, whatever
their origin.47 Moreover, Lukashenka disavowed the use of military
force abroad by stating “we will never fight on someone else’s territory
because we are committed to a defensive military doctrine.”48 Though
incentives not to broadcast a desire to mount armed aggression exist, the
weak posture of the Belarusian military makes this doctrine credible.
Belarus might have trouble participating in Russian military actions
against NATO countries, preferring instead to engage those countries’
forces only if NATO were to strike first.
The military deficiency could also reflect a fear of Russian entrapment
emerging from the so-called alliance dilemma. Whereas providing too
weak of a commitment to an ally might render that ally so insecure
as to fear abandonment, too strong of a commitment might embolden
an ally to undertake a riskier foreign policy than it would otherwise
adopt. Entrapment ensues when such risk-taking behavior provokes an
undesirable war, compelling the participation of the committed state.49
By limiting its defense ties with Russia, Belarus may be trying to
reduce the likelihood of being ensnared in a conflict involving NATO
but instigated by Russia. The ramshackle state of the Belarusian military
suggests it cannot fight a large-scale war with NATO forces. One
analysis concludes Belarus does not have the offensive capabilities to
attack NATO forces single-handedly, or even in tandem, with Russia.50
From Lukashenka’s perspective, a lost war could weaken his power. This
fear is well-founded: political science research has found the tenure of
nondemocratic warfighting leaders greatly depends on their victories.51
Lukashenka’s risk-aversion to anything that might undermine his rule
could mean he would prefer to be a bystander than undertake any
revisionism of his own.

Strategic Implications

Many security analysts tend to neglect Belarus when assessing the
balance between NATO and Russia. They commonly assume Belarus
would assist Russian efforts to close the Suwałki Gap, thus preventing
NATO forces in Poland from reinforcing and resupplying the Baltic
countries on the ground. Such assumptions may be unwarranted.
Belarus has reluctantly supported the Kremlin’s responses to territorial
and political disputes within the former Soviet space. Belarus provided
halting diplomatic support to Russia in its 2008 war against Georgia, and
it expressed sympathy for Ukraine amid its war with Russia. Lastly, given

47      Yauheni Preiherman, “Belarus Prepares to Adopt New Military Doctrine,” Eurasia Daily
Monitor 13, no. 40, February 29, 2016.
48      Quoted in Jaroslaw Adamowski, “Belarus Unveils New Military Doctrine amid Armenia’s
Criticism,” Defense News, April 18, 2016.
49      Glenn H. Snyder, Alliance Politics (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1997). See also Vieira,
“Politico-Military Alliance.”
50          Bohdan, “Belarusian Army,” 15. To be sure, Belarus has participated in joint military
exercises with Russia and will continue to do so, at least through the medium term. Bohdan,
“Belarusian Army,” 24–25.
51      Alexandre Debs and H. E. Goemans, “Regime Type, the Fate of Leaders, and War,” American
Political Science Review 104, no. 3 (August 2010): 430–45, doi:10.1017/S000305541000019.
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Lukashenka’s strong preference to maintain power, and the poor state
of the Belarusian military forces, Belarus might even fear entrapment
by Russia in a war with NATO. If so, a militarized crisis between Russia
and NATO may not involve Belarus. Belarusian nonparticipation would
help NATO to isolate and to hold hostage the enclave of Kaliningrad,
while hampering Russian efforts to close the Suwałki Gap.52
For some readers, this policy implication may be an overstatement
since they may still ask whether Belarusian foreign and defense policy
matters at all. Russia could compel Belarus to accept Russian troops
on its territory regardless of Minsk’s interests in a war against NATO.
Yet consider the hypothetical scenario whereby Belarus does assert
its desire for neutrality during a crisis—a plausible course of action
given Lukashenka’s distaste for territorial revisions in the former
Soviet space and the weakness of the Belarusian military—aside from
withholding diplomatic support, Belarus could delay efforts to enhance
interoperability or provide supporting forces. These actions could
frustrate Russian calculations to help NATO. Nevertheless, if Russia
responds by undertaking such extreme measures as a direct intervention
in Belarusian domestic affairs, then this move could backfire because
opponents of both Lukashenka and Putin could mobilize in response.
Such a move could also be escalatory if NATO interprets—rightly or
wrongly—any effort to curtail Belarusian sovereignty as intending to
gain a major military advantage over Poland and the Baltic states.
NATO thus should not assume Belarus would play only a supporting
role for Russia. Although Minsk might not derail the Kremlin’s regional
ambitions, it could still frustrate them to NATO’s benefit. Moreover,
Belarus is also a complicating factor for NATO: efforts to extract
security assurances from Belarus could prove meaningless, if not
counterproductive. Indeed, NATO should not try to distance Belarus
too far from Russia (if at all possible) because doing so could cause the
Kremlin to retaliate lest it loses a treaty ally. With respect to planning war,
NATO should think through several contingencies. For one, defense
planners need to consider their readiness to fight a Belarus that appears
to be a reluctant and hesitant Russian ally. For another, how NATO
should prepare defensive operations could differ if it expects Belarus
to provide frontline forces fighting alongside Russian forces, frontline
forces fighting for uniquely Belarusian objectives, frontline forces
mounting a diversionary attack, or supporting forces handling rear-area
security or pacification. Rather than take for granted certain notions
of the Belarus-Russia alliance, analysts should be more mindful of the
various ways Belarus could impact the regional security environment,
however subtly.

52      Frühling and Lasconjarias, “NATO, A2/AD,” 107.
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ABSTRACT: After a brief history of the longest-running insurgency
in the Western Hemisphere, this article contextualizes recent
developments in the transition of the Revolutionary Armed Forces
of Colombia (FARC) to legal politics in Colombia. The authors
also provide policy recommendations for the US Department
of Defense.

O

n August 24, 2016, the Colombian government and the
Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia announced a peace
accord to end the world’s longest civil war. Over the next
month, lawmakers in Bogotá publicly backed the agreement, FARC
leadership ratified it, and a signing ceremony took place in Cartagena.
Polls suggested a strong majority of Colombians would vote “yes” in a
plebiscite on October 2.1 Instead, Colombians rejected the deal by less
than half of one percent.2
That same year, the parties returned to the table and reached what
is widely considered a better deal. President Juan Manuel Santos and
FARC leader Rodrigo “Timochenko” Londoño signed a revised accord
on November 24, the Colombian congress unanimously endorsed it later
that month, and on December 13 Colombia’s constitutional court ruled
that there need not be a second referendum.
Although legal challenges have continued, and political and military
hurdles remain, after 53 years, more than 220,000 casualties, and 7.6
million refugees, FARC is laying down its arms.3 Colombia is ending
its war.4
Because the inventory of death and destruction goes far beyond
atrocities perpetrated by FARC, some might argue assigning so
much significance to the demobilization of a single group would be
disingenuous. There is truth to this claim. Other insurgencies responsible
for mass killing and violations of human rights have included the April
19 Movement (M-19), the National Liberation Army, the Popular
Liberation Army, and lesser known groups. Paramilitaries like the
United Self-Defense Forces of Colombia have massacred entire villages
believed to support guerrillas. The state itself has committed war crimes.

1      “Colombians Would Vote in Favor of Peace in Plebiscite—Poll,” Reuters, September 9, 2016.
2      Helen Murphy and Julia Symmes Cobb, “Colombia’s Peace Deal in Limbo after Shock
Referendum,” Reuters, October 3, 2016.
3      Dayra Carvajal, “As Colombia Emerges from Decades of War, Migration Challenges
Mount,” Migration Policy, April 13, 2017, www.migrationpolicy.org/article/Colombia-emerges
-decades-war-migration-challenges-mount.
4      “Court Says Colombia Can Speed Peace Laws through Congress,” Reuters, December 13, 2016.
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Nevertheless, FARC has been at the epicenter of political violence in
Colombia since its inception. The organization has carried more political
and military weight than other guerrilla groups, and at times it has
governed vast swaths of territory. This actor prompted the rise of such
counterinsurgency and paramilitary forces as the United Self-Defense
Forces, which caused much damage during the conflict. In classical
strategic terms, FARC has been the center of gravity in Colombia’s
long war.
For all the weight of this moment, the disappearance of FARC
as a military force will not end problems stemming from violence or
politics in Colombia. Poverty, drug trafficking, and common crime will
endure; neoparamilitary groups will undermine state authority; and
unforeseen obstacles will arise. These challenges require understanding
the historical context and thinking clearly about the future. To that end,
this article outlines Colombia’s war, analyzes peace processes in recent
decades, and recommends policies the US Department of Defense could
implement to facilitate Colombia’s transition toward peace.

Colombia’s War

Colombia’s confrontation with FARC is rooted in La Violencia,
a period of civil war between liberals and conservatives in the midtwentieth century. The assassination of the Liberal presidential candidate
Jorge Eliécer Gaitán on April 9, 1948, marked the beginning of a
catastrophic decade characterized by events similar to what Colombia
has suffered more recently: internal displacement, land dispossession,
and brutal political violence.
Early in the conflict, a peasant named Manuel Marulanda Veléz
and some of his close family members took up arms, moving back and
forth between the departments of Quindío and Valle del Cauca west of
Bogotá.5 Before long, Marulanda was leading dozens of liberal guerrillas
and coordinating with groups led by the Colombian Communist Party.
By the late 1950s, he had fully embraced communist politics and was
practicing guerilla tactics.6
In 1958, political elites implemented a power-sharing agreement,
the National Front, whereby the Liberal and Conservative Parties would
alternate power every four years until 1974. This agreement extricated
Colombia from La Violencia but excluded anyone not politically
aligned with the traditional parties. Those on the far left felt betrayed
by Colombia’s elites, especially as they saw leftist politics take root
elsewhere in Latin America. The following year, Fidel Castro would
lead the Cuban Revolution (1956–59) and begin his decades-long rule.
In 1964, the government began a military offensive designed to subdue
restive settlements of communist farmers in Marquetalia, Guayabero,
5      Born Pedro Antonio Marín, the founding father of FARC, took his nom de guerre from a
union worker who was tortured to death by the government of Laureano Eleuterio Gómez in 1953.
Marulanda was also known as Tirofijo, or Sureshot, for his aim with a rifle early in the conflict.
6      Garry M. Leech, The FARC: The Longest Insurgency (Halifax: Zed Books, 2011), 13. For a
brief period in 1959 and 1960, Marulanda demobilized and reincorporated into civilian life. When
his friend Jacobo Prías Alape (alias “Charro Negro”) was killed, he returned to arms. Patricia H.
Micolta, “Illicit Interest Groups, Social Capital, and Conflict: A Study of the FARC,” in Social Capital
and Peace-Building: Creating and Resolving Conflict with Trust and Social Networks, ed. Machaelene Cox
(London: Routledge, 2008), 78.
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El Pato, and Rio Chiquito. From the government’s perspective, these
populations threatened the stability of the state, and armed residents’
refusal to recognize authority undermined the government’s monopoly
on the use of force. The government’s attacks had the unintended effect
of galvanizing local support for resistance.
In 1966, some 350 guerrillas who had fought the Colombian army
in 1964 held the Second Guerilla Conference of the Southern Bloc.
The movement agreed to be called the Revolutionary Armed Forces
of Colombia and chartered a socialist agrarian platform that called for
revolutionary change.7 From that moment forward, FARC’s Marxist
ideology was clear, and its association with Colombia’s Communist Party
was public.
Until the late 1970s, FARC’s growth was relatively modest. Dramatic
expansion during the mid- and late 1980s resulted from decisions made
at the Seventh Guerrilla Conference (1982), when the group decided to
reorganize from a large guerrilla band into a formal army. In addition
to ambushes, members would attack police and military units in
strategically important areas, including small urban centers. To expand
geographically, FARC would delve further into kidnapping for ransom
and extortion.
The organization also became deeply involved in the drug trade,
especially in cocaine, during the 1980s. Early involvement was tangential,
through the taxation of drug traffickers, but FARC eventually moved
directly into the production chain. Manufacturing and trafficking drugs,
kidnapping, and extortion served as key sources of finance to reinforce
the group’s presence throughout the country. These activities became
even more important as funding from external actors, especially Cuba
and the Soviet Union, faded at the end of the Cold War.
The FARC’s transformation by the Eighth Guerrilla Conference
(1993) was substantial. During the conference, the group drew up
ambitious military plans that assumed continued growth over the next
five years and established a plan to govern the country after taking power.
This plan would influence the negotiating agenda when the government
and the FARC held formal talks from 1999 until 2002.
During those talks, and amid an ongoing war, both sides
strengthened their military power. Increased defense spending and US
assistance through Plan Colombia, which began in 1998, fortified the
Colombian armed forces, who had clearly gained the upper hand by
2002. At some 18,000 soldiers, however, FARC had never been larger.
Both sides believed they were in positions of strength, but the condition
most conducive to successful talks—what negotiation theorists call
mutually hurting stalemate—was absent. The government believed its
offer was more than sufficient to end the war. The FARC sought more
than the state could grant.
When talks broke down in early 2002, Colombia changed its approach
to fighting the guerrillas. The newly modernized military retook territory
key to the security of large populations, the national economy, and citizen
perception. Guerrillas were driven from towns and villages where they
7      “Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia—People’s Army,” Stanford University, August 15,
2015, http://web.stanford.edu/group/mappingmilitants/cgi-bin/groups/view/89.
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had influence and reverted to a previous organizational structure. For
years, FARC had operated as a formal military, concentrating soldiers in
large formations. Now under pressure, small bands were employing hit
and run tactics again. From 2002 to 2008, state advances were frequent,
vicious, and sometimes illegal, but they had their intended effect. Over
that period, more than half of all FARC soldiers deserted or were killed
or captured.
In this context, an important development in 2008 went mostly
unnoticed by the public. Signs emerged that the FARC was slowing, and
in some cases reversing, government advances. Casualties in the ranks of
the armed forces multiplied as civilians remained caught in the crossfire.
Increasingly, analysts began to believe that defeating the FARC militarily
would be prohibitively costly in humanitarian and financial terms. As
former presidential candidate and FARC hostage Ingrid Betancourt
would later write, “Despite the government’s undeniable military
achievements, the country was still moored by FARC’s presence.”8
These two stages of the war—the debilitation of FARC from 2002
to 2008 and the inability of the state to defeat the group definitively
from 2008 to 2010—were the structural conditions that led Santos to
consider negotiations when he took office in 2010. Colombia, he judged,
had reached a mutually hurting stalemate. Both sides were suffering the
costs of war; neither could end it through force. The time had come
again to seek peace through dialogue.

Failed Negotiations

The prospect of a negotiated solution to Colombia’s internal conflict
first arose during the administration of Belisario Betancur Cuartas
(1982–86). Exploring the possibility of dialogue has been a constant
across administrations ever since, and successes were achieved with the
M-19, the Popular Liberation Army, and the Socialist Renewal Current
(a faction of the National Liberation Army), as well as with smaller
organizations like the indigenous guerrilla movement Quintín Lamé.
Until recently, however, talks with FARC, and the broader National
Liberation Army, have been a series of failures.
Betancur sought peace especially with M-19 and FARC. Dialogue
with the former broke down quickly, but significant advances were
made with the latter. After agreeing to a truce in 1984, for example,
FARC formed the Patriotic Union, a Leftist political party that included
guerrillas who had laid down arms. The same talks contributed to
political and administrative reforms that had roots outside the peace
process, including the introduction of local elections for mayors.
The paramilitary phenomenon emerged around this time, in part
because a negotiated settlement threatened the interests of key sectors
in society. The military had tentatively cooperated with Betancur’s peace
initiative but harbored doubts about guerrilla intentions that contributed
to unraveling the peace process. Local politicians, landholders, and
drug traffickers, in contrast, opposed talks outright and sought to
combat FARC free of legal constraints. As the conflict took on this new
dimension, skirmishes between the parties led to larger confrontations.
8      Ingrid Betancourt, “At War over the Right Kind of Peace,” New York Times, December 5, 2016.

TOC

Regional Challenges

Cantey and Correa

89

Talks between the government and FARC were waning by 1987; the
process officially died in December 1990.
A perverse consequence of this early attempt to achieve peace
through dialogue was the annihilation of the Patriotic Union in the
late 1980s. More than 3,000 of its members, including congressmen,
city councilmembers, and mayors, were assassinated.9 Through direct
action, or by failing to protect individuals, the state was responsible for a
large number of these assassinations. Other responsible actors included
paramilitaries, local political bosses, and drug traffickers. This history
contributes to the trepidation some guerrillas feel about giving up arms,
and it has framed recent discussions about security guarantees for FARC.
By 1997, after unsuccessful negotiation attempts between FARC,
the National Liberation Army, and President César Gaviria Trujillo
(1990–94), the war had become a humanitarian disaster, civilians its
principal victims. The perceived lack of respect for basic human dignity
among the warring parties catalyzed a popular movement, the Citizen
Mandate for Peace, to call for a return to the negotiating table. Meanwhile,
paramilitaries acted without restraint, often with the quiet approval of
politicians and the state’s military and intelligence apparatus. Guerrilla
kidnappings increased to the highest levels in history, extortion was rife,
and entire communities were caught in the crossfire.
Andrés Pastrana Arango was elected president (1998–2002) because
he was perceived to be the person most likely to negotiate a settlement
with FARC. In January 1999, his administration began formal talks
with the group in San Vicente del Caguán. The state’s greatest initial
concession was logistical: the dialogue took place in a demilitarized
zone (DMZ) measuring some 42,000 square kilometers (roughly the
size of Switzerland), where FARC could reside without fear of a military
presence.10 The substance of the agenda was expansive: it included 12
main points and more than 100 subpoints that ranged from the social
and economic structure of the state to environmental policy. It was a
recipe for endless negotiation.11
Talks also suffered from procedural problems. From the beginning,
Pastrana conveyed the image of a government, as he explained in his
memoir, “willing to do anything for peace.”12 The president routinely
extended deadlines and made other concessions to FARC for little or
nothing in return. Well-intentioned attempts to build good will convinced
FARC that the president was weak. The group learned that it could test
the government, freeze talks, and issue ultimatums without fear of
repercussions. The continued growth of paramilitary forces beyond the
DMZ complicated the picture, in part because FARC correctly believed
that the government could have done more to combat it.
The Caguán peace process lasted three years, ending abruptly on
February 20, 2002, after FARC hijacked an airplane and kidnapped
    9        John Otis, “Guerrilla Politics: Colombia’s FARC May Soon Be on the Ballot,”
Public Radio International, September 25, 2013, https://www.pri.org/stories/2013-09-25
/guerrilla-politics-colombias-farc-may-soon-be-ballot.
10      US General Accounting Office (GAO), Narcotics Threat from Colombia Continues to Grow
(Washington, DC: GAO, 1999), 10.
11      Harvey F. Kline, Chronicle of a Failure Foretold: The Peace Process of Colombian President Andrés
Pastrana (Tuscaloosa: University of Alabama Press, 2007), 71.
12      Andrés Pastrana Arango, La palabra bajo fuego (Bogotá: Planeta Colombiana, 2005), 142.
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one of its passengers, Senator Jorge Eduardo Gechem Turbay. This
event, in the wake of myriad challenges to the peace process, united
the government and public opinion against FARC, which was more
confident in its numbers and capacity than ever before. It was the final
blow to a battered process that, by this time, few believed had any
prospect of success.
The failure at Caguán led to a situation in Colombia where even
talking about negotiations with FARC became taboo. Most Colombians
believed the government had bent over backwards to accommodate
the group—that it had done so to a fault—and that the guerrillas had
negotiated in bad faith throughout the process. The alternative they now
sought was mano dura, a hard line against FARC whereby the newlymodernized military would confront the group directly and mercilessly.
After the election of Alvaro Uribe Vélez (2002–10), the public began
to believe that military defeat of the insurgency was possible, and it
increasingly accepted the government’s refrain that FARC had long
abandoned politics in favor of narco-terrorism. This perspective set the
stage for a loosening—and sometimes breaking—of the rules of war.
Alleged government ties to paramilitaries and “false positive” scandals,
like that in Soacha in 2008, crowded the headlines. Though in his
second term Uribe made overtures to the National Liberation Army, and
even tentatively to FARC, his eight years in office were overwhelmingly
characterized by military attacks on the guerrillas. Uribe was effective:
on his watch, the FARC’s ranks fell to some 7,000 soldiers.13
When Santos took the oath of office in 2010, many believed he
would continue Uribe’s hard line against FARC. As Uribe’s minister
of defense from 2006–09, Santos had overseen dramatic military gains
in the war. In his inaugural address on August 7, 2010, however, he
suggested that there may be another way, that “the door to negotiations
was not locked” and could be opened if the guerrillas demonstrated a
real desire for peace.14 In this context, with public opinion firmly against
renewed talks, Santos quietly initiated back channel contacts with FARC
to see if the parties could return to the table.

Dialogue in Havana

Discrete contacts preceded conversations with guerrilla
representatives in Cuba, where formal negotiations would continue
when they went public in 2012. Though it may have been possible to
negotiate elsewhere, talks in Colombia were unthinkable: the memory
of Caguán remained a nightmare. Legal risks for FARC negotiators in
many countries were considerable. Negotiations in Venezuela, which
had given aid to the insurgents, would have been unpalatable to the
Colombian public. Of all potential locations, Cuba was the logical
choice. Its government was sympathetic to the FARC’s politics, yet the
island had begun its own political and economic transition. As a host,
Cuba had credibility in the eyes of all critical stakeholders.

13      Claire Felter and Danielle Renwick, “Colombia’s Civil Conflict,” Council on Foreign
Relations, January 11, 2017, https://www.cfr.org/backgrounder/colombias-civil-conflict.
14        “Discurso complete de posesión de Juan Manuel Sanatos [Complete text of Juan Manuel
Santos’s Inauguration Speech], Semana (Bogotá), August 7, 2010.
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In contrast to Caguán, the agenda in Havana was limited and
well-defined. Topics included (a) agricultural reform; (b) political
participation and democratic opening; (c) cessation of hostilities and
guerrilla demobilization; (d) the problem of illicit drugs; (e) victims’
rights; and (f) implementation, verification, and popular endorsement
of the agreement. At no point did the talks consider anything that could
undermine the sovereignty of the state or alter its political, economic,
or social structure. The dialogue was reformist but with the tradeoffs
required to end the war.
Reaching agreement on the details of incorporating former FARC
members into legal politics, and especially how they would be represented
in institutions such as Colombia’s congress, posed a serious challenge.
So too did reaching agreement on punishment for those responsible
for war crimes and crimes against humanity. These two issues—FARC
political representation and “transitional justice”—were the principal
impediments to the settlement. They were, and continue to be, the areas
critics of the accord target most effectively, arguing that FARC impunity
and influence through legal politics are the opposite of justice.
Leading the “No” campaign throughout this process have
been former presidents Uribe, the man most responsible for FARC’s
diminution leading up to negotiations, and Pastrana. These men and
the conservative opposition they represent argue that dialogue with
FARC should be limited to terms of surrender, not extended to political
compromise. For months before and after the initial accord, and en route
to the public referendum on October 2, 2016, they campaigned vigorously against the agreement, often stretching the truth to its breaking
point. Nevertheless, most analysts, world leaders, and Colombians
believed their efforts would fail. In the weeks leading to the October
referendum, polls suggested that a two-to-one split in favor of the accord
was more likely than its defeat.
As with other geopolitical surprises in 2017, the analysts and experts
were wrong. Many reasons contributed to the upset, but a development
one week before the vote merits special mention. For months, Santos had
explained that public rejection of the accord would mean a return to war,
but preceding the vote the FARC’s leader, Timochenko, told a newspaper
that FARC would not return to war regardless of what happened in the
referendum. That statement, widespread hatred of FARC, a vigorous No
campaign, and perhaps the national assumption that the measure would
pass created apathy. Only 37 percent of eligible voters cast a ballot in
perhaps the most important referendum in Colombia’s history. The tally
was 49.8 percent for, 50.2 percent against.15
Six weeks after the referendum failed, the government and FARC
signed a revised deal that clarified dozens of ambiguities in the text and
incorporated more than 50 substantive changes in line with opposition
proposals. Among these, the new agreement provided assurances to
land owners regarding property guarantees, specified that FARC would
provide a balance sheet of assets to be used for victims’ reparations,
clarified the government could use aerial spraying to eradicate illegal
crops, prohibited foreign judges from participating in a forthcoming
15      Daniela Gonzalez, “Colombia’s Vote against Peace Was Far from a Failure,” Stanford Politics,
February 1, 2017.
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special tribunal, and reduced the amount of funding the FARC’s political
party would receive to compete in upcoming elections.
These changes strengthened the accord in many respects, but the
most important parts of the agreement remained unchanged. Cosmetic
modifications notwithstanding, on the core questions of political
representation and transitional justice, neither the government nor
FARC were willing to budge. According to the current agreement, like
the initial one, the political party that succeeds FARC will participate in
elections with ten seats guaranteed in congress—five in the lower house
and five in the senate—for two congressional terms (until 2026). Rather
than face prison time, those responsible for war crimes and crimes against
humanity will have restrictions placed on their movements, contribute to
victims’ reparations, and otherwise serve their communities for periods
of five to eight years.

Recommendations for US Defense Policy

In November 2016, Colombia’s congress endorsed the revised
agreement unanimously.16 Colombia’s constitutional court has since
approved congressional ratification of the accord, as well as a fast-track
mechanism that enables quicker passage of legislation than possible
during the normal legislative process. In the months since, thousands of
FARC guerrillas have congregated in more than two dozen demilitarized
zones to begin the process of demobilization.
The momentum of the process is on the side of those advocating
for an end to war, but progress is not irreversible. Rulings by Colombia’s
constitutional court in May 2017 paved the way for opponents of the
accord to string out the process of implementation ahead of 2018
presidential elections, introducing further uncertainty into the process
and complicating efforts to fully transition away from political violence.17
In this context, the US Department of Defense should implement policies
that signal its commitment to support Bogotá through and beyond the
end of Colombia’s war. Adoption of the following recommendations
will do that, thereby strengthening the state, reducing the likelihood of
renewed insurgency, and paving the way for peace.
Continue robust assistance to Colombia’s armed forces. Over the past two
decades, US aid to Colombia has exceeded $10 billion, much of which
has taken the form of security assistance. As the war winds down, calls
for the United States to scale back support for the Colombian armed
forces have begun in both countries. These calls should be resisted.
In the coming months and years, Colombia will need to expand the
state’s presence to areas where it has been historically weak, counter
recent spikes in coca cultivation, and combat criminal and other illegal
16      The vote was 130-0 in the 166-member lower house and 75-0 in the 102-member senate.
The conservative opposition led by Alvaro Uribe’s Centro Democrático abstained. Helen Murphy,
“Colombian Peace Deal Passed by Congress, Ending 52-Year War,” Reuters, November 30, 2016.
17      On May 17, 2017, Colombia’s constitutional court overturned part of the peace accord’s
legal framework, which prevented making decisions on laws and reforms en masse and required
modifications only occur by changing the agreement with government approval. A high-ranking
FARC official, responded, “The court’s decision doesn’t help the implementation of the accord,
it opens the doors to a return to war.” James Bargent, “Colombia Court Ruling Spells Trouble for
FARC Peace Process,” InSight Crime, May 19, 2017, https://www.insightcrime.org/news/analysis
/colombia-court-ruling-spells-trouble-farc-peace-process/.
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networks that seek to fill the void left by FARC.18 While nonsecurity
assistance will be at least as important as security assistance going
forward, Colombia’s armed forces will be essential to maintaining
stability in postconflict environments.
President Barack Obama’s commitment in March 2016 to aid
Colombia to the tune of $500 million per year over the next five years
would represent further substantial investment in a country that has been
a leading recipient of US aid for years.19 Properly allocated, however,
and subject to proper conditions, addressed in further detail below, the
investment would be money well spent. It would facilitate Colombia’s
transition to peace, end war in the hemisphere, and reinforce relations
with a strategic ally. Military leaders in the Southern Command in
particular, who have strong relationships with Bogotá, should advocate
for continued and robust security assistance.
Advocate for limiting the internal role of the Colombian military. Although
security assistance must continue, the Department of Defense should
use its political and financial leverage, and the good will it has built with
Bogotá in recent years, to advocate for a more limited internal role for
the Colombian military. For decades, Colombia’s army has conducted law
enforcement in some of the areas most affected by the war, a condition
justified by circumstance. Law enforcement is not a proper role for any
army, however, or for any other branch of the military. Militaries are
trained to use overwhelming violence to defeat enemies, not minimal
violence to police communities. Differences in culture, training, and
tack between military and police forces can and do lead to disparities in
outcomes on the ground—including, perhaps most importantly, civilian
trust in state authority.
As Colombia moves into a postconflict environment, the Department
of Defense should encourage augmenting police forces throughout the
country, especially in the areas most affected by the war. Simultaneously,
the Defense Department should push for a gradual reduction of the
military’s role in the daily lives of average citizens and an increased focus
on the traditional role of militaries: external defense. This transition
will not happen overnight but should be constantly monitored and
reassessed. Security assistance to Colombia should increasingly reflect
this prioritization. If Bogotá does not make progress in this regard as
Colombia consolidates peace, policymakers should condition subsequent
security assistance on such progress.
Condition security assistance on increased respect for human rights. One of
the key policy debates coming out of Colombia’s war will involve a
basic question about ends and means. Did loosening the military’s rules
of engagement under the Uribe administration, which contributed to
18      Coca production, up 18 percent from 2015–16, is at the highest point since 1994. Associate
Press, “Colombia’s Coca Production Soars to Highest Level in Two Decades, US Says,” Guardian,
March 14, 2017.
19      Daniel Kurtz-Phelan and Dan Restrepo, “Colombia’s Tenuous Peace Needs U.S. Support,”
Foreign Policy, May 17, 2017; and Arlene B. Tickner, Colombia, the United States, and Security Cooperation by
Proxy (Washington, DC: Washington Office on Latin America [WOLA], 2014). This figure includes
military and nonmilitary spending, but dollar amounts allocated to support the armed forces are
substantial: $143 million for international narcotics control and law enforcement, $44.6 million
from the defense budget for counterdrug programs, $38.5 million in foreign military financing, and
$21 million for nonproliferation, antiterrorism, demining, and related programs. Adam Isacson,
“‘Peace Colombia’: What’s New about It?,” Washington Office on Latin America, February 15, 2016,
https://www.wola.org/analysis/peace-colombia-whats-new-about-it/.
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decimating FARC but involved gross violations of human rights, play a
decisive role in ending the war? Even if the answer to that question is
yes, human rights violations perpetrated by the Colombian military have
not come without significant costs. In some parts of Colombia, trust in
the armed forces is no higher than in the illegal groups that share their
battlespace. Rebuilding that trust will take time, and will be a tenuous
process, but it will be essential for the proper functioning of the state in
the years to come.
The Department of Defense, along with the Department of State
and others, can take several steps to encourage increased respect for
human rights among Colombia’s armed forces. First among these is the
conditioning of security assistance. The key tools in this regard are the
Leahy laws, introduced in 1997 and expanded in 2011, which require
the United States to restrict security assistance to police and military
units engaged in human rights violations.20 Importantly, this tool is a
scalpel, not an axe, that allows the continuation of assistance to units
not engaged in human rights violations within the same country. That
distinction is appropriate, but to avoid scenarios where some units have
more flexibility (implicit or explicit) regarding respect for human rights,
US defense officials working with their Colombian counterparts must
remain vigilant and foster a culture of reporting that can detect indirect
violations of the policy.
Other steps that would encourage increased respect for human rights
include the promotion and funding of sensitivity training, especially visà-vis race and gender; working with counterparts to design financial
and promotional incentives that promote human rights; and the trials
of officials who have allegedly overseen or committed human rights
violations.21 American officials might also consider postponing plans to
have members of the Colombian military train officers in other countries
until Colombia has renewed its track record of consistent respect for
human rights.
Assist the expansion of state presence throughout Colombia. Colombia will
need to expand its presence into areas where it has been historically
weak. US counterparts should assist Bogotá and local governments to
bring courts, education, healthcare, housing, infrastructure, and other
services to all parts of the country, especially those most affected by the
war. These endeavors do not fall within the authority of the Department
of Defense, nor should they, but a now-famous 2013 statement by US
Secretary of Defense James Mattis (then-commander of US Central
Command) looms large: “If you don’t fund the State Department fully,
then I need to buy more ammunition ultimately.”22 The secretary’s
message here is that war and peace are about more than bullets and
bombs. Defense officials should continually reinforce this message in
Washington, Bogotá, and throughout Colombia, recognizing that the
military component of peacemaking is one of many.
20      10 U.S.C.; Foreign Assistance Act of 1961, Pub. L. No. 87-195, 22 U.S.C. 2378d, § 620M
(2017); and National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2018, Pub. L. No. 115-91 (2017).
21      Many of the hardest-hit populations in Colombia’s war have been Afro-Colombian and
indigenous, and these populations have disproportionately suffered human rights abuses at the
hands of the state.
22       Joseph K. Grieboski, “A Real National Security Budget Would Fully Fund
State Department,” The Hill, March 23, 2017, http://thehill.com/blogs/pundits-blog
/international/325320-a-budget-that-emphasizes-national-security-would-fully-fund.
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On the security front, expanding state presence will involve
confronting criminal groups that may or may not have political roots
(especially in the paramilitary United Self-Defense Forces), but that all
have an interest in contesting state control of local territory and the state’s
monopoly on the use of force. The most important organization in this
regard is the Gaitanista Self Defense Forces of Colombia, which operates
primarily in Colombia’s northern departments. Taking on this group
will require both military and police action, which should be supported
by the United States through the provision of funding, training, and
intelligence. Defense officials in both countries should be careful not
to let Colombia slip into the bad habits that once characterized the war
with FARC. Though a serious problem, this organization does not pose
a threat to Colombia along the lines that FARC once did, nor is such a
threat posed by any existing group foreseeable.
Augment support for guerrilla reintegration. Among the principal
challenges Colombia faces as it transitions from war is the reintegration
of former guerrillas into civilian life. Former guerrillas will sometimes
face resentment from fellow citizens and potential employers.
Knowledge of weaponry, surveillance, combat, and other skills relevant
to war will make these individuals attractive to drug traffickers and
organized criminal networks like those mentioned above. Although the
peace accord provides transition assistance of $6,100 to each former
guerrilla for the first two years of the transition, reports suggest that
some illegal armed groups are offering up to triple that amount. When
former guerrillas realize that they can make more money for themselves
and their families by breaching the accord, even if not by returning to
the fray of political violence, incentives to do so will be strong.
To mitigate these risks, the Department of Defense should support
Bogotá in its allocation of welfare, job training, mental health counseling,
and security guarantees to those who have chosen to give up arms.
The Defense Department’s role in some of these areas will be more
direct than others, but the success of these programs will bear directly
on Colombia’s long-term security environment. The Departments of
Defense and State should also plan for the contingency that resources
currently allocated for these programs will be insufficient. Though
it would be unwise to advertise the availability of additional funds if
necessary—this would create incentives for existing resources to not
complete the job and give ammunition to critics who object to any aid
for former FARC members—the United States and Colombia should do
what it takes to ensure the success of the reintegration effort.
Push for a comprehensive truth and reconciliation commission. Truth and
reconciliation will be necessary for the construction of a durable peace.
As a longtime partner of Bogotá, and a key actor in Colombia’s war for
decades, the Department of Defense should work closely with Colombia
and other countries (especially Ecuador and Venezuela, to the extent
possible) to release previously classified information about the conflict.
This communication should happen as soon as possible, consistent with
the requirements of national security. The guiding principle of the process
should be transparency. Extensive interviews with former combatants,
victims, political leaders, and others will be required. Ample resources
from the Department of Defense and elsewhere should be dedicated
to psychological support, the construction of a formal record of the
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conflict, such as through the creation of a national museum, and other
programs aimed at national reconciliation. Commissions like these have
been integral to ending various civil wars, including those in a majority
of countries in South America. It should come as no surprise that truth
and reconciliation will be essential to end the world’s longest civil war.

Conclusion

As Colombia moves toward presidential elections in mid-2018,
President Santos and all Colombians dedicated to ending the war must
work expeditiously to carry out the terms of the recent peace accord
so its benefits may be felt by all Colombians. The United States should
back this effort in word and in deed, providing political, diplomatic,
military, financial and technical support for implementation on the
ground. The more the parties can do to consolidate peace now, the
less likely the accord is to be successfully challenged before or after
presidential elections.
The impending absence of large-scale political violence in Colombia
suggests the country is poised for significant positive change. What
comes next is the need to focus on solving the problems that remain:
corruption, healthcare, education, infrastructure, employment, social
security, poverty, inequality, economic diversification, and more. Each
of these challenges is serious, and the current states of some are dire, but
addressing all of them will be made easier by the absence of war. For the
first time in more than half a century, that reality is upon us.
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Abstract: This article provides insights valuable to transitioning
America’s military intelligence resources from counterinsurgency
operations to the force necessary for responding to a near-peer
competitor in a major war.

T

he US Army has arguably not fought a capable state adversary
since World War II. Now, after decades of conducting limited
interventions, the expansibility and adaptability of military
intelligence capabilities are in question. In a potential major war, the fight
will focus on decisive operations and owning terrain, but it will also have to
deal with the added complexities of globalization, advanced technologies,
state-sponsored hybrid adversaries, and nonstate irregulars.1 This article
examines how US military intelligence would expand in the event of a
major war that required the Army to double in size and capability.
The Army’s Military Intelligence Corps would have to expand
accordingly through a doubling of expeditionary military intelligence
brigades and theater intelligence brigades, while incrementally expanding
support at the strategic level. But, such an expansion would also affect
“intelligence federations” within the intelligence community, which
includes the Army Reserve, National Guard, civilians, and contractors,
as well as its coalition partners.
1

Assumptions

In addition to doubling the Army, another major assumption is that
the continental infrastructure of the United States, though vulnerable to
cyberattack and sabotage, will remain relatively safe from massive kinetic
attacks from long-range missiles. The architecture and communication
systems that make sharing intelligence possible may be degraded, but
they may not be completely destroyed.
Third, US Army forces will be dedicated explicitly to each theater
of operations in question. Hence, a two-front scenario, such as one
involving Country A in European Command’s area of responsibility
and Country B in Pacific Command’s area of responsibility, would
require military intelligence to increase linguists, cultural experts, and
foreign area officers for Countries A and B, who are knowledgeable
in those theaters of operations. Military intelligence forces would need
to be flexible and modular, able to shift resources between combatant
commands throughout the theater intelligence brigade structure to
1     David Johnson, Redefining Boundaries for the 21st Century Land Force (Carlisle, PA, US Army War
College, December 10, 2016), briefing slides..
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reinforce each region.2 Joint intelligence operations will continue to be
conducted with operators and analysts from the Army, Navy, Air Force,
Marine Corps, and Coast Guard.
Fourth, decision-makers will select the right force structure for a
major war. Military intelligence currently supports the Army service
component at the command, corps, theater, division, and lower levels.
To expand in a major war, military intelligence support would remain
consistent with active duty divisions and therefore expand in concert
with them. Staying within the bounds of current units, and within the
constraint of doubling brigade combat teams, intelligence units would
then double at the expeditionary brigade, theater intelligence brigade,
and strategic levels, which would all increase by seven.3

Expanding Military Intelligence

The Office of the Director of National Intelligence describes the
intelligence community as “a federation of executive branch agencies
and organizations that work separately and together to conduct
intelligence activities necessary for the conduct of foreign relations
and the protection of the national security of the United States.”4 The
largest restructuring of the intelligence community since its inception
came from implementing the recommendations in the 9/11 Commission
Report. Among many changes, the one with the greatest impact unified
“the many participants . . . and their knowledge in a network-based
information-sharing system that transcends traditional governmental
boundaries.”5 Vertical stovepipes became more horizontal due to a new
paradigm of intelligence sharing that ensured each organization was not
an independent entity but rather an integrated, coordinating part of a
greater community of 17 federal organizations.6
Lieutenant General Mary Legere (Retired), a former Army G-2,
defines the intelligence federation as a “national and tactical community
of interests that includes the Interagency, a coalition of the willing, and
your formal and informal intelligence organizations, as well as others
that can contribute to your mission.”7 Building a solid federation means
aligning the national mission to the tactical objective, having good endto-end federation doctrine, and exercising the federation from the top
down and then back up. The federated intelligence enterprise—with
increased analysis, predictions, and value to decision-makers—is the
starting point in a major war.
2      MG George Franz (commanding general, US Army Intelligence and Security Command),
interview by author, November 14, 2016.
3      Other assumptions for this study: six Army Service Component Commands for the six
Geographic Combatant Commands; combat support units above corps will increase slightly;
combat support units at corps level and below would double, consistent with the increase in combat
units. Corps would increase from three to six. Divisions would increase from 18 to 36. Total BCT
expansion would be from 57 to 114.
4      “Frequently Asked Questions,” Office of the Director of National Intelligence (ODNI),
February 28, 2017, https://www.dni.gov/index.php/about/faq?start=2.
5      National Commission on Terrorist Attacks Upon the United States (9-11 Commission), The
9/11 Commission Report: Final Report of the National Commission on Terrorist Attacks upon the United States
(Washington, DC: 9-11 Commission, 2004), 400.
6      “Members of the Intelligence Community,” ODNI, February 28, 2017, https://www.dni
.gov/index.php/intelligence-community/members-of-the-ic.
7      LTG (Ret) Mary A. Legere (former US Army G-2), interview with author, October 30, 2016.
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During interviews for this study, intelligence leaders repeatedly
mentioned three areas that require special attention in order to expand
the Army intelligence corps: (1) shortages of airborne intelligence,
surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR) assets; (2) limited processing,
exploitation, and dissemination (PED) capacities; and (3) insufficient
human intelligence and counterintelligence capacities.
The insatiable appetite for ISR, “a continuous, recursive operation
focused on the collection of relevant information that is analyzed to
create intelligence to inform the commander’s visualization,” would
continue.8 To increase collection of the necessary intelligence ISR brings,
the US Army would need multimission aircraft capable of acquiring
signals intelligence and full-motion video while simultaneously
operating as a shooter, which would mean an increased production
of airborne platforms that could exponentially expand the capacity to
collect intelligence.9
Processing, exploitation, and dissemination is “the execution
of the related functions that converts and refines collected data into
usable information, distributes the information for further analysis, and
provides combat information to commanders and staffs.”10 In wartime,
there will be an exponential need to refine data into usable intelligence
for further analysis and dissemination, necessitating increased stateside
PED battalions.
In terms of human intelligence and counterintelligence, there
has always been the challenge of having trained personnel with the
requisite language skills and cultural knowledge to collect intelligence
through interpersonal means and to thwart our enemies’ intelligence
gathering. Human intelligence provides crucial knowledge not only of
enemy capabilities but also of their intentions. As a current commander
on the ground and consumer of intelligence put it, “there is nothing
better than a human eyeball answering the commander’s priority
intelligence requirements.”11

Expanding Skills and Capabilities

An obvious solution to expanding capacity is to acquire and to
retain personnel with the right balance of skills. Many intelligence
military operational specialties are currently considered low density—a
few soldiers with the specialty are required within the organization
or unit, and without those essential skills, various tasks and missions
could not be completed. These specialties span six basic intelligence
skill sets, or collection disciplines, of signals intelligence (SIGINT),
imagery intelligence (IMINT), measurement and signature intelligence

8       Headquarters, US Department of the Army (HQDA), The Stryker Brigade Combat Team
Infantry Battalion, Field Manual 3-21.21 (Washington, DC: HQDA, 2003), 3-1. For more on the
ISR enterprise and the increased demand for it, see Government Accountability Office (GAO),
Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance: DOD Can Better Assess and Integrate ISR Capabilities and Oversee
Development of Future ISR Requirements, GAO-08-374 (Washington, DC: GAO, 2008).
9      MG Mark R. Quantock (former director, J-2, US Central Command), interview with author,
November 9, 2016.
10      COL Constantin Nicolet, 201st Expeditionary Military Intelligence Brigade (Ft. Lewis, WA:
Military Intelligence Readiness Command, leader professional development brief, February 28,
2017), briefing slides.
11      MG Paul J. LaCamera (deputy commanding general, XVIII Airborne Corps), interview with
author, November 2, 2016.
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(MASINT), human-source intelligence (HUMINT), open-source
intelligence (OSINT), and geospatial intelligence (GEOINT).12
Growing the intelligence workforce will be a difficult and complex
challenge. The intelligence corps will be competing for manpower with
all other branches, so in terms of rapid expansibility, leaders must define
which intelligence disciplines will be needed immediately, which would
be needed within 90 days, and what the force could wait on.13 There will
be a call for bigger, better, and faster intelligence from the beginning of
the US Army’s preparations for war, yet the availability of skills will need
to be prioritized. During the first 90 days, leaders would have to rank
the hard-to-get and hard-to-develop intelligence disciplines in terms of
depth, complexity, training, and certification against those disciplines
that are acquired faster or require less skill. Structuring a pipeline by
first placing the right people in the specialties that take longer to develop
would allow more risk in lower-skill sets that can be slowly filled.
Currently, intelligence has difficulty filling high-demand, lowdensity specialties in the signal and human intelligence disciplines.
The skills required for signal and cyber are more complex than ever
as the technical aspects of those missions have increased. For human
and counterintelligence, seasoned soldiers with more life experience
generally perform better, making recruiting a young soldier to be a
successful agent difficult. After recruiting for these high-demand, lowdensity specialties, the intelligence corps will eventually need to expand
all intelligence disciplines.
While training acts as a choke point, technology can help in an
expansion. Intelligence leaders will need to shorten the training pipelines
for a quicker throughput of qualified soldiers.14 In the absence of enough
qualified, cleared, and trained people, intelligence will need automated
tools that can do what people currently do. Specific areas where
intelligence could develop new automated tools include the insatiable
appetite for ISR, the need for more PED, and the explosion of raw data.
Humans cannot be taken out of the intelligence process, but
technology can provide increased throughput and reduce the cognitive
burden on analysts. Doing so would allow analysts to manage the
volume and variety of intelligence data and the reporting necessary to
answer intelligence requirements while reducing the risk of missing
key and essential information. Incorporating new technologies that
automate processes will also free up personnel for other tasks. The
Army needs to optimize the use of current sensors and baseline systems,
but then it must adapt those systems, or commission new systems, for
unanticipated needs, all while ensuring commonality of architecture and
interoperability for sharing.15
Synchronizing the efforts of multiple intelligence agencies to limit
duplicated efforts is essential. The recent conflict in Iraq demonstrated
that, at the onset of war, most national agencies shifted their attention
from around the world to Iraq. An initial lack of deconfliction and
12      “Frequently Asked Questions,” ODNI.
13      BG Karen H. Gibson (former director, CJ2, Combined Joint Task Force-Operation Inherent
Resolve), interview with author, November 11, 2016.
14      Quantock, interview.
15      Franz, interview.
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coordination meant several different agencies were duplicating collection
and analytical efforts, adding to inefficiency while decreasing capacity.16
The National Intelligence Support Plan is an effort to integrate theater
and national intelligence capabilities, to synchronize intelligence
operations, and to identify gaps in supporting a combatant command’s
mission.17 A well-defined intelligence support plan between units,
between tactical and higher-level headquarters, and with strategic-level
intelligence agencies deconflicts intelligence tasks and synchronizes
capabilities among the various players.

Army Reserve

One of the assumptions identified at the beginning of this paper
was a recall of all individuals in the Army Reserve and National Guard
to active duty. As the reserve component becomes fully mobilized,
the current units of action (7,500 soldiers) in the Military Intelligence
Readiness Command would be activated.
According to the current commander, Brigadier General Christie
Nixon, doubling quickly is not a viable option for the reserve component.18
In one proposal, the Reserve would add two additional expeditionary
military intelligence brigades and one additional theater brigade, which
would augment intelligence support by about 2,100 soldiers.
In order to understand intelligence in the reserve component, one
needs to understand the Military Intelligence Readiness Command,
a new paradigm of reserve support formed in 2005. Aggregating 75
percent of intelligence forces in the Reserve, the functional command
provides “operational intelligence support to nearly every national
intelligence agency and combatant command, and conducts multidiscipline intelligence operations in support of Army Service Component
Commands and worldwide contingency operations.”19
Select units and theater support battalions are operationally aligned
with Intelligence and Security Command theater intelligence brigades
and units, while the expeditionary brigades are aligned with corps.20
Mission and vision alignment among the regular Army, Reserve, and
National Guard at the theater level is imperative and will need to
continue to enable a quick expansion that balances the right skills and
mitigates gaps.21
What is compelling about the Military Intelligence Readiness
Command is its ability to provide units for current operations under
its Title 10 mission requirements while providing significant support
to civilian agencies, particularly the Defense Intelligence Agency.22 In
a major war, the type of support currently provided by the command
16      Legere, interview.
17      US Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS), Joint and National Intelligence Support to Military Operations, Joint
Publication 2-01 (Washington, DC: JCS, 2012), IV-5.
18      BG Christie L. Nixon (commander, Military Intelligence Readiness Command), interview
with author, November 30, 2016.
19      Nixon, interview; and “Military Intelligence Readiness Command,” US Army Reserve,
January 30, 2017, http://www.usar.army.mil/Commands/Operational-Functional/MIRC/.
20      Nixon, interview.
21      Franz, interview.
22      LTC Bryan L. Bain, Army Reserve Military Intelligence: Time for Change, Civilian Research Project
(Carlisle, PA: US Army War College, 2010), 10.
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will need even greater communication and connectivity. These
communication hubs will be vulnerable to kinetic attacks, cyberattacks,
and degradation through overburdening the system.
The processing and analysis system, the Distributed Common
Ground System-Army, gathers intelligence from all echelons,
enables operational visualization, provides situational awareness, and
disseminates data.23 Before a conflict, the system needs to be standardized
for interconnectivity between military intelligence agencies and the
entire intelligence community. Leaders will also need to reduce Reserve
support at the strategic level and to national intelligence agencies, which
could arguably be provided by civilian hires, to meet the intelligence
requirements of the fighting force.
In preparation for a major war, decision-makers should build Army
Reserve capacity; specifically, military intelligence could be supported
by increasing the number of processing, exploitation, and dissemination
platoons for full motion video and interrogation capabilities.24 Three
interrogation battalions in the reserve component are not sufficient to
provide interrogators and interrogation facilities theater entry capability
that is generally essential to mission success.
With the active component losing its interrogation capacity, the
Army’s entire interrogation capacity will soon reside in the reserve
component. Planners also need to include reserve forces into combatant
command theater contingency plans so that time-phased force
deployment data gets sourced with these units.25 The conversation
regarding the flow of resources should occur during the planning phase,
so mobilizing necessary reserve support becomes easier.
A current challenge is tracking the outflow of both active duty and
reserve intelligence personnel. Human Resources Command and the
Military Intelligence Readiness Command need to ensure an accurate
roster of departing personnel and their associated skills. These personnel
typically get placed into the Individual Ready Reserve, which “consists
of a pool of individual soldiers who have been trained, through their
service in the active forces or in the Selected Reserve, and are available
for mobilization in time of war or national emergency.”26 Having a list of
former intelligence personnel who have been trained and who are easily
reached in time of war provides a straightforward way to expand quickly.
Shortening the training pipeline is another imperative for rapid
expansion. Civilian capabilities allow reservists to bring context and
knowledge from the private sector for a more nuanced understanding
on the ground. Yet this “dual life” makes it difficult for reserve soldiers
to maintain certifications because the lengthy training and certification
times surpass even the limiting factor of funding.27 Instead of adding
standards and certificate requirements, decision-makers need to be
realistic about essential skills and balance the intelligence corps’s
23      “Distributed Common Ground System-Army,” Distributed Common Ground SystemArmy, February 1, 2017, https://dcgsa.army.mil/about/.
24      Nixon, interview.
25      Nixon, interview.
26      Secretary of the Army, memorandum, “Army Directive 2017-09 (Management of the
Individual Ready Reserve),” Washington, DC, February 6, 2017, 1.
27      Nixon, interview.
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resources where risks are the greatest. In a major war, a firm grounding
in the truly essential skills of certain specialties and on-the-job training
will be the winning strategy.

National Guard

The National Guard military intelligence force of just under
11,000 professionals resides at the strategic level in the 300th Military
Intelligence Brigade (Linguists), at the operational level in two new
expeditionary brigades (the 58th and the 71st), and in the eight division
headquarters in the G-2.28 At the tactical level, the National Guard
also uses military intelligence companies within the 28 brigade combat
teams. Accordingly, the National Guard primarily holds division G-2
positions, analysis and control elements, and military intelligence
companies that deploy in support of the brigade combat teams. In
wartime, this intelligence structure would expand by two additional
expeditionary brigades, increasing the National Guard intelligence
force by about 1,400. The 300th Brigade (Ling) would grow to the size
of the theater intelligence brigades with a linguist battalion aligned to
each. This expanded brigade would provide interrogation, signal, and
human-intelligence support to the Intelligence and Security Command
as necessary in the appropriate theater.
The National Guard is postured for the possibility of full mobilization
and would rely on the regional training institutes in Utah and Georgia
that operate under the One Army School System with the US Army
Intelligence Center and School at Fort Huachuca. Whereas one of the
largest constraints among active duty, reserve, and National Guard
soldiers is institutional training, one key to expanding the intelligence
force would be minimizing the training timeline while maintaining the
quality of instruction. Increasing the course load while shortening the
timeline for Advanced Individual Training would train the specialties
in highest demand: intelligence analysts, human intelligence collectors,
cryptologic linguists, and counterintelligence agents. As a member of the
Army intelligence enterprise, the National Guard will need to continue to
provide sufficient Secure Internet Protocol Router Network (SIPRNet)
bandwidth to remain on the secret-level network 24/7 for training or
accommodating a large reach-back expansion. The communications
pipelines will have to expand for increased support in a major war.29
The National Guard would continue to train and to maintain
military intelligence readiness prior to such a conflict. The federal
military intelligence mission allows the National Guard to build
readiness while supporting preparedness for state missions. With full
mobilization authority from the president, the National Guard will
mobilize to support the fight as well as support homeland defense and
homeland security missions in support of a governor, the Department
of Homeland Security, and US Northern Command. Based on federal
and state requirements, the National Guard will manage the force
to provide optimal support to both the conflict and the homeland.30

28      COL Greg Hadfield (director, National Guard Bureau Chief ’s Action Group), interview with
author, November 30, 2016.
29      Hadfield, interview.
30      “Intelligence,” National Guard, January 30, 2017, https://www.nationalguard.com
/careers/intelligence.
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Once law enforcement is able to provide homeland defense and security
requirements, however, National Guard assets are transitioned to
forward mobilization.

Civilians

An advantage military intelligence has over other Army branches
is the depth of its federated enterprise. The current estimated total
workforce of civilians, contractors, and uniformed soldiers working
in the national intelligence community is 183,000.31 Within that pool,
contractors are estimated at 58,000 personnel, or 32 percent of the
total workforce.32
One possibility for rapidly expanding at the strategic level,
and perhaps even at the operational level, is to increase the civilian
component of the Army intelligence enterprise. This solution avoids the
exigent physical and health standards of the Army as well as the more
laborious process of recruiting people into the military. Specifically
designating civilian positions that need not be forward deployable has
some basic advantages, such as relieving the government of educational
benefits or costly Veterans Affairs benefits after the conclusion of a
war. Furthermore, these civilians can work reach-back intelligence
support from safe locations within the United States and select locations
overseas. Minimizing the number of uniformed soldiers working in
national intelligence while maximizing their presence at the tactical and
operational levels will put more uniform-wearing intelligence specialists
down at the fighting-force level.

Contractors

In addition to expanding civilian roles in the Army intelligence
enterprise, expertise could be added from the intelligence contracting
industry.33 Defense firms have personnel with the full set of intelligence
skill sets and requisite clearances. Military intelligence leaders can use
them to fill agency gaps, to complete emergent taskers, or to focus
on developing future technology solutions. Many of these companies
hire former military intelligence analysts and employ current members
of the Reserve—an estimated 20 percent of contractors are also
Reserve soldiers.34
Defense companies have also built sensitive compartmented
intelligence facilities (SCIFs) for intelligence communications. Certain
intelligence disciplines, like the high-demand, low-density specialties
mentioned previously, cannot be built quickly. Cooperation with private
industry will help mitigate these gaps in the force until the Army recruits
and trains replacements.
The contractor workforce will need to augment any support
that does not exist in the current forward-deployed Corps structure.
Currently, knowledge management, intelligence systems architecture,

31      Tim Shorrock, “Five Corporations Now Dominate Our Privatized Intelligence Industry,”
Nation, September 8, 2016.
32      Shorrock, “Five Corporations.”
33      Quantock, interview.
34      Nixon, interview.
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and dissemination are not present within the corps-level G-2 staff.35 Such
staffs are busy conducting intelligence analysis; processing, exploitation,
and dissemination with minimal dissemination outside of the corps
structure; and briefing the theater commander. Hence, the auxiliary
duties of knowledge management and intelligence systems architecture
could be assumed by contractors or a civilian workforce.
The difficulty in predicting where future conflicts will occur limits
decision-makers’ ability to know what linguistic and cultural expertise
capabilities should be built in advance.36 Contracting this type of
specialty to defense firms will increase the availability of native speakers,
who also understand the unspoken language, such as body language,
and the cultural context of the society.37 These cultural skills are hard to
acquire through language school alone. By using contractor expertise,
the intelligence corps can easily draw upon a linguist or cultural expert
without maintaining such expertise when it is not necessary.38
Two obstacles to expanding the contractor workforce rapidly are
funding and vetting. The typical planning, programming, budgeting,
and executing of the governmental budgetary process is too lengthy,
creating a major choke point. Overseas Contingency Operations funds,
or war funds, is a strategic resource that could be used to fund contractors
more efficiently in a major war.39 Further extending the timeline for
expansion, the current individual security clearance process takes over
two years. Part of this constraint comes from a legitimate need to run
thorough background checks on contractors due to past leaks and
security breaches, which skews and slows the clearance process. During
wartime, however, risk calculators will need to be adjusted to meet
urgent demands while maintaining the appropriate security posture.

Coalition Partners

In a major war, the United States would most likely participate as a
member of a coalition or an alliance. Cultivating the intelligence corps
within that coalition will help America follow its doctrine of “by, with,
and through” others.40 Some of our current coalition partners in the
Middle East have already started to develop a more robust intelligence
corps and strategic intelligence agencies.41 It is important for the United
States to encourage those activities, as our coalition partners would not
only know their backyards best, but their intelligence forces also act
as a force multiplier to speed military intelligence expansion through
other means.

35      Gibson, interview.
36      As Secretary of Defense Robert Gates stated, “When it comes to predicting the nature and
location of our next military engagements, since Vietnam, our record has been perfect. We have
never once gotten it right.” Micah Zenko, “100% Right 0% of the Time: Why the US Military
Cannot Predict the Next War,” Foreign Policy, October 16, 2012.
37      Quantock, interview.
38      Gibson, interview.
39      Franz, interview.
40      GEN Joseph Votel (commander, US Central Command), discussion with author,
October 2017.
41      Legere, interview.
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Conclusion

During the past decade of conflicts, American tactics, techniques,
and procedures, as well as networks, were cleared for intelligence sharing.
While the first step is to ensure intelligence agreements with security
classification guides are in place, preferably prior to a conflict, they must
be continually refined. Early investments can occur with open-source
sharing, analytic exchanges, training, and exercises, and then expanded
by collaboration among multiple intelligence disciplines. Dedicated
coalition intelligence sharing will naturally grow as relationships and
partnerships deepen.42
The key at the beginning of a war is to establish the network
and the classification guidelines to support coalition operations, and
then to engineer those requirements into an information technology
architecture for coalition communications. Resource management
officials from all countries need to collaborate early to define a new
coalition-sharing architecture.43 Military intelligence leaders will need
to be ready to implement new laws, policies, and authorities to ensure
intelligence sharing with partners is successful.
The essential mission of military intelligence is to collect and to
analyze all relevant information that supports command decisionmaking in wartime. In coordination with doubling the size of the Army
to meet a potential near-peer threat, military intelligence would also
need to expand quickly and effectively to perform its mission.
To expand intelligence, leaders would need to address the challenges
of doubling the expeditionary brigades and the theater intelligence
brigades while incrementally expanding intelligence support at the
strategic level. Smartly expanding personnel resources in the right
competencies is important, but it is not the only concern. Leaders
will also need to address system shortfalls in processing, exploitation,
and dissemination; intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance; and
human intelligence capabilities, as well as develop technological tools to
increase throughput and synchronize intelligence plans throughout the
intelligence federation.
Leaders must take full advantage of the Army Reserve, National
Guard, civilians, and contractors, as well as coalition partners to reach
the necessary expansion goals. Each of these components adds value to
a coordinated intelligence federation and must be leveraged to expand
intelligence capacity quickly during a major war.

42      Gibson, interview.
43      Quantock, interview.
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Expansibility and Army Special
Operations Forces
Eric P. Shwedo
ABSTRACT: This article examines how Army Special Operations
might prepare to expand in the event of a major war by resolving
impediments to growth, improving recall procedures, and developing
plans to expand training capacities.

A

lthough the US Army Special Operations Command maintains
education and training programs to ensure soldiers have the
skills to be successful in any environment, it currently lacks the
scale needed to fight a major war. Over the past 15 years, the US military
has focused on counterinsurgency and stability operations. Accordingly,
there has been less preparation and training for major combat operations
against a peer or near-peer competitor. Even though the nature and
intensity of a major war will determine how much risk can be assumed,
recommendations for developing special operations capacities can be
flexible and scalable so situations can be met with appropriate responses.
Moreover, several factors preclude assuming the doubling of the Army,
introduced in previous articles in this series, would equate to doubling
Army special operations forces (SOF).
Even so, enlarging SOF in the face of a major war will require
significant adjustments by each of its regiments. These forces may accept
risk by reducing steady-state and shaping activities. Theaters’ special
operations commands can assess where the presence of special operations
forces can be reduced and the risk associated with those decisions.
Although the rapid growth of the Army will proportionately expand
the recruiting pool for SOF, maintaining the unique capability of this
force requires little compromise in core skills or the SOF Truths. These
truths provide a foundation for constructing the special operations force;
without them, there is nothing unique about SOF. These values will help
set proper parameters when planning to accelerate the training pipelines:
• Humans are more important than hardware.
• Quality is better than quantity.
• Special operations forces cannot be mass produced.
• Competent special operations forces cannot be created after
emergencies occur.
• Most special operations require non-SOF assistance.
Maintaining the viability of these truths while increasing the
size of special operations units in the face of an existential threat is a
daunting task. Even so, some mitigating actions can ensure the SOF
Truths guide the expansion process. If there is a major war, there will
be two overarching concerns guiding changes to training: the Special

COL Eric P. Shwedo
serves as the executive
officer for the Deputy
Under Secretary of the
Army. Commissioned
in 1992, Shwedo has
served in the 3rd
Special Forces Group,
Special Operations
Command-Central,
US Special Operations
Command, the Office
of the Secretary of
Defense for Legislative
Affairs (SOLIC), US
Army John F. Kennedy
Special Warfare
Center and School,
and US Army Special
Forces Command.

TOC

108

Parameters 47(4) Winter 2017–18

Operations capability actually required to defeat the threat and the risk
associated with any changes.

The Key to Success

The concepts, growth patterns, and training proposals provided
in this article, and previously expressed by several members of the US
Army Special Operations Command (USASOC), are only ideas on
which forecasting can begin. The emphasis going forward should be on
planning. When discussing planning the Army’s future, Chief of Staff
General Mark A. Milley quoted British historian Michael Howard in
saying “you don’t have to get it right, you just have to be less wrong than
your enemy.”1 Today’s planning should increase the Army’s chances of
being “less wrong.”

Special Forces

Selecting the right person for special operations has always been
a trademark of the force. During World War II, William J. “Wild
Bill” Donovan established the Office of Strategic Services, which was
a precursor to today’s Special Forces.2 He took a novel approach to
recruitment because he wanted only the best operators, regardless of
their demographics. Because Donovan did not limit the recruiting pool,
fully one-third of all Office of Strategic Services personnel came directly
into the organization from the civilian world.3 During the 1950s, special
forces heavily recruited eastern European immigrants to fill its ranks to
train partisan fighters in the event of an invasion by the Soviet Union
into western Europe.4 In a major war, the United States would likely call
upon today’s special forces to conduct similar types of operations.
Although Special Forces are proficient in several missions, their
expertise in unconventional warfare will set them apart in a major
war. With an area of operations that could extend from the Baltics to
Vietnam, unconventional warfare will be a force multiplier that can “buy
down risk” as the United States enlarges the conventional force.5 During
this time, special forces will also need to be expanded quickly. Previous
models for increasing the number of special forces operators will assist
planners to some degree, but growth for a contemporary major war will
be exceptional in many ways.
From 2008 to 2012, special forces grew by one battalion per year.
The growth of the 4th Battalion was the first major increase in the
force since 3rd Special Forces Group was reactivated in 1990.6 Today’s
active duty Special Forces group consists of three line battalions, one
1      GEN Mark A. Milley, “Changing Nature of War Won’t Change Our Purpose,” US Army,
October 4, 2016, https://www.army.mil/article/175469/changing_nature_of_war_wont_change
_our_purpose.
2        “Office of Strategic Services: The OSS Primer—The Beginning,” US Army Special
Operations Command, December 28, 2016, http://www.soc.mil/OSS/the-beginning.html.
3       Giles Raymond DeMourot, “A New Center for Global Engagement: A Revamped CVE
Effort Engenders Skepticism,” LinkedIn, January 8, 2016, https://www.linkedin.com/pulse
/new-center-global-engagement-revamped-cve-effort-raymond-demourot.
4         “10th SFG (A) History,” USASOC, December 16, 2016, http://www.soc.mil/USASFC/
Groups/10th/history.html.
5          Robert Warburg (USASOC G9 office), interview by author, December 7, 2016.
6        “3rd SFG (A) History,” USASOC, December 10, 2016, www.soc.mil/USASFC/Groups
/3rd/3rdSFG(A)History.html.
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sensitive activities battalion, and one support battalion. A group in
the National Guard consists of three line battalions and one support
battalion.7 The Army Special Operations Command built this new
force structure by increasing the number of students going through
Special Forces Assessment and Selection (SFAS) and the Special Forces
Qualification Course.
Although an informative model, this process may not prepare enough
operators to respond sufficiently in a major war. Although situational
assessments would be continuous, a possibility that the majority of
available active duty Special Forces would deploy in short order exists.
Thus, as the National Guard groups are activated, they could deploy
to the battlespace or replace active duty personnel conducting vital
operations in other locations. And, a major war would likely necessitate a
World War II deployment model where very few personnel would rotate
back home.
Based on interviews with multiple staff officers at USASOC and the
Special Warfare Center, this article will examine an initial expansion of
two special forces groups, which would be difficult even if it occurred in
a time of relative peace. Adding the potential for significant casualties,
increasing this force becomes exponentially more complex. But Army
Special Operations Command can take a series of steps to infuse
personnel into the groups until the Special Warfare Center can ramp up
production at SFAS and the qualification course.
The obvious first step is a Department of Defense-wide stop-loss.
This action will halt approximately 540 special forces soldiers from
leaving the Army each year.8 Next, the Army should recall eligible
veterans who separated within the last five years. If one-third of those
recalled are qualified to join a tactical formation, 900 personnel would
be added quickly to the ranks. Those who may not be qualified physically
could potentially fill other positions in training or headquarters.
The next step is to reintegrate most of the 630 special forces soldiers
who work in billets external to the regiment.9 Special Forces Command
already tracks these personnel and should assess which of their positions
could be replaced with contractors and soldiers who require limited
duty. Although not optimal for headquarters or the training pipeline, as
many as 50 percent of the personnel in other billets could potentially be
transferred to deployable units. This number discounts those on limited
duty and those too senior to return to groups. These two steps could
increase special forces by over 1,200 operators, which would be more
than enough to fill three battalions. These steps, however, are only shortterm solutions until recruitment, selection, and training can accelerate.
The Special Warfare Center selects the right candidates by ensuring
they have all the Army SOF attributes: integrity, courage, perseverance,
personal responsibility, adaptability, team player, and capability.10 All
   7      LTC Larry Henry (USASOC National Guard office), email message to author, February
23, 2017.
  8      LTC Joseph Long (commandant’s office, special forces, US Army John F. Kennedy Special
Warfare Center and School [SWCS]), interview by author, December 8, 2016.
  9      USASOC, Current Operations, Army Special Operations Forces (ARSOF) Worldwide by Command
(Fort Bragg, NC: USASOC, December 7, 2016).
10      LTG Charles T. Cleveland, ARSOF Next: A Return to First Principles (Fort Bragg, NC: ARSOF,
[2015]), 35.
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USASOC regiments emphasize risk should never be assumed during
the assessment and selection process, which is the best indicator of a
candidate’s success and the least time-intensive part of the training
pipeline.11 Even if the quantity of personnel entering the Army during
major war should, at a minimum, double, special forces recruitment
should remain integrated across the force to maintain the needed
quality and quantity of Army special operations forces. The growth
should provide enough prospects to negate any temptation to change
special forces’s entrance standards. Increasing the mechanisms to
conduct targeted recruiting will maintain high-quality candidates for
the Special Operations Recruiting Battalion. Any SOF growth scenario
will also require proportionate resourcing of the Special Operations
Recruiting Battalion.
When evaluating the qualification course, understanding the
capability needed on the imminent battlefield is important. The utmost
skillset Green Berets bring to the fight is an unsurpassed expertise of
unconventional warfare. This competence should not be depleted during
preparations for a major war. Therefore, the Special Warfare Center may
consider streamlining other portions of the course.
Ideally, nothing changes in the qualification course. Since that goal
may not be feasible, several alternate approaches—such as limiting the
language requirement to two members of each detachment, temporarily
removing universal military freefall for all graduates, reducing the time
between selection and the qualification course, or training during the
few free weekends—could be considered. These implementations could
be feasible, however, any training cuts should be thoughtful and based
upon many situational factors, from the force requirement in theater to
the casualty rates among special forces units.
Army Special Operations Command can begin preparing for a
major-war by first evaluating the impact of training 500–1,000 additional
students a year. Expanding the training capacity of the Special Warfare
Center will take time. Key areas include training equipment sets, ranges,
Robin Sage lanes, and critical portions of the qualification course. The
center must also train a larger cadre that will include recalled personnel
and contractors. Although none of these factors have a short-term fix,
planning to overcome the limited resources should begin.
Second, the Army could assign a reserve component unit with a
secondary duty to form the core of a new special forces group.12 The
Guard has 10 special operations detachments. These detachments
are generally 30 personnel led by a special forces colonel that support
organizations such as special operations commands in theater and
NATO.13 Given some guidance, and a minimal amount of equipment,
these units could expedite the formation of a new special forces group.
Finally, the Army could ensure an accelerated method is in place
to process and evaluate personnel quickly. With a recall to active duty,
assessing and optimizing the abilities of those recalled will be important.
11      COL Larry Niedringhaus (G-3 office, USASOC), email message to author, February 23, 2017.
12      COL Samuel Ashley (G-8, USASOC), interview by author, December 7, 2016.
13         Joseph Trevithick, “Maryland Now Has a Special Forces Unit Dedicated to
Countering Russia,” War is Boring, May 15, 2016, https://warisboring.com/maryland-now
-has-a-special-forces-unit-dedicated-to-countering-russia/.
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This task may seem small, but if USASOC has a plan, its staff can
concentrate on more pressing issues.

US Army Civil Affairs and Psychological Operations

Psychological operations and, to a lesser degree, civil affairs share
a common lineage with special forces. In 1952, Major General Robert
A. McClure consolidated unconventional warfare into the Psychological
Warfare Center at Fort Bragg.14 The 10th Special Forces Group, which was
formed from the Special Operations Division of the same headquarters,
was established as the first special forces unit at this time.15 In 1956,
the Psychological Warfare Center became the US Army Special Warfare
Center School.16
Civil affairs also has a long history of working with SOF. In 1955,
the Army established the Civil Affairs/Military Government Branch.
With the establishment of the US Army Civil Affairs and Psychological
Operations Command, civil affairs became a member of USASOC
in 1985.17 In 2006, the Army transferred the US Army Civil Affairs
and Psychological Operations Command from USASOC to Forces
Command. US Army Civil Affairs and Psychological Operations
Command retained all reserve component civil affairs and psychological
operations units. All active component psychological operations, which
are now known as military information support operations, and the 95th
Civil Affairs Brigade became subordinate to USASOC.
Addressing the deficiencies in civil affairs and psychological
operations will be similar to the recommendations for special forces. A
stop-loss, recall, efforts to return soldiers to tactical units, and accelerated
recruiting are well suited to expanding psychological operations and civil
affairs personnel; however, distinct manning issues reside in the reserve
component. Even though these reserve units are not special operations
forces, tracking their trends and issues is important for the Special
Warfare Center because the center is responsible for all civil affairs and
psychological operations training and doctrine.18 Notably, civil affairs
and psychological operations personnel in the reserve component are
not required to attend a selection process nor language training.

Civil Affairs

Clearly invaluable in the past 15 years of war, civil affairs personnel
provide unique support to “the warfighter by engaging the civil
component of the battlefield,” which will be crucial in a major war.19
Civil affairs specialists maintain expertise in all facets of governance

14           “Special Forces: The Early Years,” Special Forces Association, January 7, 2017,
http://www.specialforcesassociation.org/about/sf-history/; and Headquarters, US Department of
the Army (HQDA), Army Special Operations Forces Unconventional Warfare, Field Manual (FM) 3-05.130
(Washington, DC: HQDA, 2005), J-1.
15        “History of Special Forces,” National Guard, December 28, 2016, https://www
.nationalguard.com/special-forces-history.
16      Cleveland, ARSOF Next, 24.
17      US Army, “Special Operations: John F. Kennedy Special Warfare Center and School,”
Military.com, December 19, 2016, http://www.military.com/special-operations/john-f-kennedy
-special-warfare-center-and-school.html.
18         LTC Les Parks, Civil Affairs (Fort Bragg, NC: United States Army Civil Affairs and
Psychological Operations Center [CAPOC], Fort Bragg, February 15, 2017), briefing slides; and MG
Eric P. Wendt, USAJFKSWCS Academic Handbook Fiscal Year 2015 (Fort Bragg, NC: SWCS, 2015), 12.
19         HQDA, Civil Affairs Operations, FM 3-57 (Fort Bragg, NC: SWSC, 2011), 1-6.
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that helps engage local populations in developing a “stable and viable
civil administration.”20 With the possibility of great urban decimation
and displaced populations, civil affairs must grow at the same rate as the
rest of the force.
In 2007, the 95th Civil Affairs Battalion was expanded into the 95th
Civil Affairs Brigade due to increased demand for their capabilities.21 In
2011, another unit, the 85th Civil Affairs Brigade, was formed to provide
rapid deployment of language, regional, and cultural support.22 Since
the beginning of the Global War on Terror, civil affairs units have been
among the most deployed in the US military. On the reserve component
side, there are four civil affairs commands aligned to support regional
combatant commands.23
Despite a heavy deployment tempo, active duty civil affairs units
are currently experiencing a decline. The 85th Civil Affairs Brigade and
two of its battalions were deactivated in January 2018.24 This decrease
in personnel will put additional strain on the civil affairs force and their
doctrinal requirement to provide one company for every brigade combat
team and Joint special operations task force.25
Units currently meet the requirements for active component Army
Special Forces; however, the 95th Civil Affairs Brigade also supports all
Joint special operations.26 Therefore, in the event of a major war, the active
component of civil affairs would have to be augmented to support all of
the special operations components that would be deployed. Moreover,
civil affairs would not have the capacity to cover the special operations
of the National Guard, the US Navy and Marine Corps, numbered task
forces, nor interagency operations.27 This aspect means active duty civil
affairs units will have to grow at a much faster rate than the units they
will be required to support in a major war.
To alleviate some of these issues, USASOC may want to add SOF
civil affairs capacity to the reserve components. Additionally, such
personnel should be required to meet the same training and language
requirements as active duty servicemembers in the same roles.
In the reserve component, the number of units are less of an
issue than how the units are manned. Currently, civil affairs units are
almost fully manned. Nevertheless, this statistic does not account for
personnel who have not completed civil affairs training or whose rank
or skill mismatches with staffing requirements.28 These deficiencies
are significant because they result in civil affairs units having many
unqualified personnel despite being “fully manned.”
20      “What is Civil Affairs,” Special Operations Recruiting Battalion (SORB), December 18, 2016,
http://www.sorbrecruiting.com/SORB_CA.html.
21      “95th Civil Affairs Brigade (Airborne),” US Army Special Operations Command, December
16, 2016, http://www.soc.mil/95th/95thhomepage.html.
22        “85th Civil Affairs Brigade,” GlobalSecurity.org, December 17, 2016, http://www.global
security.org/military/agency/army/85ca-bde.htm.
23      “What is Civil Affairs,” SORB.
24      Todd Pruden, “85th Civil Affairs Brigade Inactivated,” Fort Hood Sentinel, February 8, 2018.
25      COL Jonathan Mapley-Brittle, email message to author, February 27, 2017.
26      Mapley-Brittle, interview by author, February 26, 2017.
27      Mapley-Brittle, interview.
28      G-1, Delta Report (Fort Bragg, NC: CAPOC, December 31, 2016), spreadsheet; and MapleyBrittle, interview.

TOC

Army Expansibility

Shwedo

113

Reserve civil affairs units are also substantially over strength in the
ranks of E1–E4.29 Likewise, readiness rate distortions occur because the
ranks of E5 through O4 are more depleted than some numbers would
convey. These two factors account for significant manning issues.
In addition to the previously mentioned solutions, allowing the
Reserves to make civil affairs an accessions branch so soldiers could
directly join may assist with manning issues.30 Because any civil affairs
soldier that transitions to active duty will need to pass selection and
language requirements, the active component would not be affected by
this change. If this recommendation is implemented, however, the Army
may want to consider changing the active duty SOF civil affairs military
occupational specialty code to track their unique capabilities.31

Military Information Support Operations

A fully integrated psychological operations force is essential in major
combat operations. Active duty military information support and reserve
component psychological operations units have the ability to “develop
campaigns to move an audience from one behavior to another using
culturally relevant steps and programs.”32 Psychological Operations was
able to do just this during the Persian Gulf War. In a concerted effort
of leaflets, radio broadcasts, and loudspeaker appeals for surrender,
they helped convince 44 percent of the Iraqi military to surrender.33
This outcome is one of many examples of how a correctly apportioned
psychological operations force can enhance every operation.
Reserve psychological operations units face manning issues similar
to those faced by their civil affairs brethren, but they also have unit
shortages. In 2014 the Army approved new rules of allocation for
psychological operations, which changed the support structure for such
units.34 For the reserve component, a psychological operations group
supports a corps. Under this construct, the Army is short one group. A
psychological operations battalion supports a division; however, there
are currently eight battalions supporting 16 divisions. Finally, 32 tactical
psychological operations companies support 56 brigade combat teams,
not including the support provided to the US Marine Corps.35
These numbers are surprising, but since not all brigades are
deployed at once, the psychological operations groups have found ways
to keep supporting warfighters. In a major war scenario, gaping holes
will appear in this support. This environment means psychological
operations has a wide divide between the current and projected force
structure. This issue is complicated further by the attrition rate in the
reserve component, which results in an annual loss of almost 18 percent
of personnel to expired terms of service or to transfers to other units.36
29      LTC Les Parks (G35, CAPOC), interview by author, February 24, 2017.
30      Parks, interview.
31      Mapley-Brittle, interview
32      Cleveland, ARSOF, 27.
33      Ed Rouse, “The Gulf War,” Psywarrior, December 27, 2016, http://www.psywarrior.com
/gulfwar.html.
34      David Farrington, email message to author, February 27, 2017.
35      David Farrington, Psychological Operations Current Structure (Fort Bragg, NC, SWSC, December
7, 2016), spreadsheet.
36      G-1, Delta Report.
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The only positive side of the high attrition rate is the potential for an
effective recall to active duty.
On the active duty side, the biggest gap in support is created with
only one battalion dedicated to supporting every Joint Special Operations
Task Force. Thus, psychological operations cannot support the current
force structure. As with civil affairs, USASOC may want to add reserve
psychological operations units to the special operations forces to make
up for current shortages.
To increase the number of students in training, the qualification
course leadership may find opportunities to improve efficiency. It is
important to understand, however, that cultural awareness is a hallmark
of Army special operations that is even more crucial in psychological
operations. This characteristic means cuts to the training curriculum
come with great difficulty. Nevertheless, some steps taken now can
increase the likelihood of proper psychological operations support. First,
consider more incentives to keep psychological operations soldiers in the
force. Second, increase unit structure to levels that support the current
force. Finally, if psychological operations manning is still lagging,
USASOC may need to revert to the previous rules of allocation until
additional personnel can be trained.

Ranger Regiment

Rangers have a long and heroic history. They have honed advanced
infantry capability not found anywhere else in the world. To maintain
their advantage, the Ranger regiment recruits from the rest of the Army
to ensure it has the best infantry officers and noncommissioned officers
available. Enlisted personnel come straight from advanced individual
training or apply from other units and are required to pass a rigorous
selection process.
The Ranger Assessment and Selection Program 1 (8 weeks) is for
enlisted to junior noncommissioned officers, and Program 2 (5 weeks) is
for noncommissioned officers, warrant officers, and officers.37 Although
the regiment would need to assign more assets for selecting soldiers, the
time required for this process is not as burdensome as that required for
the rest of the Army SOF community. Potentially, the Ranger regiment
could match the growth rate of the rest of the Army and expand to
six maneuver battalions in addition to achieving current efforts for the
special troops and the military intelligence battalions.38
Despite having the least amount of obstacles to expansion in Army
SOF, issues still exist. First, USASOC must decide if the six maneuver
battalions would be structured as one, or possibly two, O6 commands.
Second, because all recruitment for officers and senior noncommissioned
officers comes from in-service sources, the Ranger regiment may get
resistance from units losing soldiers. Third, the expansion also has
to account for the high potential of combat losses, which could slow
growth significantly.

37      MAJ Gregory Escobar (75th Ranger Regiment RS35), email message to author, February
27, 2017.
38       COL Brandon Tegtmeier (commander, 75th Ranger Regiment), interview by author, January
16, 2017.
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There are mitigating actions to help increase the size of the
Ranger regiment until recruitment and selection can increase capacity.
As with the rest of Army SOF, a stop-loss, recall to active duty, and
adding contractors to be selection cadre could help. Rangers, however,
have one advantage over the rest of Army SOF—most Rangers rotate
into conventional infantry units and back again. The regiment loses
approximately 200 infantry soldiers per year either to regular rotations
to other units or to expiring terms of service. Assuming 50 percent
attrition of recalled personnel, a five-year recall would allow the Army
to fill about 500 infantry billets in the regiment quickly.39 Many of the
soldiers should be suitable for integrating into the maneuver battalions;
however, physically limited soldiers could support selection billets
or fill other noncombat roles. Because recruitment will need to be
accelerated during a major war, one potential time-saving method for
the Special Operations Recruiting Battalion would involve integrating
psychological evaluations and other Ranger selection criteria into
advanced individual training.40

Special Operations Aviation Regiment

The Army special operations aviation force has been flying sensitive
missions for the Army since Task Force 160 was formed in 1981, after
the failed rescue attempt of US hostages in Iran. The unit, dubbed the
Night Stalkers, provides a unique deep penetration, special operations
capability and unparalleled skill during hours of darkness. The unit has
been involved in every major US operation since Grenada. Beginning as
a battalion-sized organization, it has experienced sizable growth since
its inception. Today there are five battalions—four maneuver battalions
and one training battalion—as well as one Gray Eagle unmanned aerial
system company manned, trained, and equipped by the Army Special
Operations Aviation Command.41
As the only rotary-wing unit that is allocated to not only Army SOF
but all special operations forces, the 160th Special Operations Aviation
Regiment (Airborne) will need to expand significantly for major war.42
With two additional special forces groups, twice as many Rangers, and
undetermined growth in the special operations forces of the US Navy
and Marine Corps, ideally Night Stalkers would also double in size;
however, there are three categories of huge challenges to growth: “iron
[aircraft], personnel, and sustainment.”43
Encountering similar recruiting and training issues as other
regiments, the 160th has the greatest impediments to growth because they
have the most unique equipment requirements of the five regiments. No
other country can match the technological capability that resides in the
160th. They receive already advanced aircraft and improve them—for
example, the Army buys a CH-47 Chinook helicopter for approximately

39      Escobar, interview.
40        MSG Kevin Nelson (noncommissioned officer in charge, force modernization, 75th Ranger
Regiment), email message to author, February 15, 2017.
41       LTC William Garber, Command Brief for Foreign Officers (Fort Bragg, NC: US Army Special
Operations Aviation Command [USASOAC], February 2, 2017), briefing slides.
42       LTC Mark Johnson, email message to author, February 21, 2017.
43       LTC Hunter Marshall (G-8, USASOAC), interview by author, February 1, 2017; and LTC
William Garber (G-3, USASOAC), interview by author, February 1, 2017.

TOC

116

Parameters 47(4) Winter 2017–18

$14 million. The aviation command transforms that aircraft into a special
operations version, MH-47, at the cost of an additional $22 million.44
Current orders to replace the unit’s helicopters will be filled
between 2017 and 2026.45 Many issues associated with increasing current
production will only extend the production timeline when competing
against the rest of the Army.46 As noted, there is no easy way to mitigate
the lack of aircraft, and the possibility of significant combat losses
further complicates increasing such capabilities.
To compensate for lack of aircraft, the Night Stalkers will need to
scrutinize what missions truly need a SOF aviation capability. Forward
deployed units have done this to some degree, but a rigorous process for
allocating the specialized aviation assets is needed. Additionally, Special
Operations Command needs to pursue greater aviation integration
between special operations and conventional forces.47 Potentially,
USASOC could establish a reserve component force to support SOF
aviation requirements that do not necessitate 160th expertise. Currently,
there are Army Reserve units that perform similar functions, but there
is no established relationship and these assets will likely not be available
during a major war. These measures may alleviate some capacity issues,
but manning will continue to be challenging.
From 2010 to 2016, the Army has underassessed the entire force by
a total of 730 aviators, the equivalent of more than two brigades.48 This
lack of personnel has had a ripple effect in SOF aviation recruitment.
Conventional units are now more reticent to allow their pilots to apply
for the 160th. So, the first step in fixing the regiment’s manpower issues
is fixing such issues in Army aviation as a whole.
Unlike the Ranger regiment, most pilots do not leave the 160th for
parts of their career. Although this practice retains experience within
the unit, it may also be a fatal flaw. With the exception of a recall to
active duty, there is no ready-made source of pilots. If a five-year recall to
active duty were implemented, the 160th would garner up to 180 pilots,
assuming a 33 percent acceptability rate.49 This influx of personnel is a
good start, but it is onetime.
Army Special Operations Aviation Command may want to consider
the Ranger model allowing pilots to transition into, and out of, the
160th, which would have multiple benefits.50 First, this policy allows
the cross pollination of expertise into the conventional Army. Second,
the policy provides a pool of personnel to draw from in the case a major
war develops. Finally, units may be less apprehensive about allowing
pilots to be selected for the 160th since their experience will create a
positive long-term effect for the conventional force. Ultimately, if the
160th considers forcing pilots, crewmembers, and maintainers to serve
in the conventional force, they will also have to increase the capacity of
44      Marshall, interview.
45      Ashley, interview.
46      LTC Robb C. Mitchell, “Rapid Expansion and the Army’s Matériel: Is There Enough?,”
Parameters 47, no. 3 (Autumn 2017): 101–10.
47      Garber, interview.
48      Hunter, interview.
49      LTC Troy Worch (G-1, USASOAC G1), interview by author, February 1, 2017.
50      Hunter, interview.
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the training battalion significantly. By investing appropriately now, any
short-term issues caused by conventional service will be alleviated.
Much like manpower, unit sustainment cannot be overlooked.
Unlike conventional combat aviation brigades, the 160th does not have
an aviation support battalion. Battalion maintenance companies and
the aviation maintenance support office, which is manned mostly by
nondeployable contractors, provide much of this capability.51
Key aspects of the 160th’s support package, such as the ability to
overhaul aircraft away from its home station, are lacking. In the current
fight, this deficiency is not a problem. But during extended deployments,
the unit will need some expeditionary capability. Next, the unit depends
on the supported SOF unit for bulk logistics requirements, which
could not be maintained with current SOF sustainment assets. Thus,
organizational change or planned augmentation to special operations
sustainment battalions during complex operations, such as major war,
may be needed.52 Finally, with the possibility of the Special Operation
Aviation Regiment being pushed forward to remote locations, the unit
will need a fuel testing capability it does not currently possess.
This section only identifies a few of the disparate topics affecting
special operations aviation. Any detailed investigation on expanding the
regiment will need to address the above topics as well as others—such
as the Aviation Foreign Internal Defense program, training pipeline
efficiencies, expanding the training battalion, and size requirements for
the Gray Eagle fleet.

Conclusion

Longtime Army special operators may look at this article with skepticism, which is understandable since shortcuts run counter to everything
they have learned. More important, any plan to get Army special
operations to the battlefield quickly runs the risk of breaking the SOF
Truths regarding mass production and creating special operations after
emergencies occur. This article, however, makes these recommendations
using the perspective of an existential threat to the United States.
With America facing greater military competition, as well as
friction from Russia and China, an escalation of force from one of many
situations is not unthinkable. Army Special Operations Command must
ensure plans and mechanisms to address major war scenarios are in
place. To quote ARSOF Next, Army special operations forces must be
prepared when the nation once again asks them to “respond to strategic
and operational change much faster than other military elements or
government agencies by transforming.”53

51      LTC Robert Patton (USASOAC G4), interview by author, February 1, 2017.
52      Johnson, email.
53      Cleveland, ARSOF Next, 27.
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Commanding Military Power
Robert L. Bateman

I

distinctly recall the warning given by my first instructor in computer
programming. “Remember,” he said, “the computer will do exactly as
it is told. It will ‘compute’ any values you place into it, in exactly the
manner that you tell it to. So if it’s garbage that goes in, it’s garbage that
comes out.” I did not know at the time that this is such a truism among
computer scientists that it even has an acronym, GIGO.
War By Numbers, written by the head of the DuPuy Institute
Christopher Lawrence, consists largely of graphs and charts that purport
to demonstrate the effects of various factors upon combat success ratios.
The book does not attempt to develop a new theory of war, per se, but
claims that, its author “establishes what we know about conventional
combat and why we know it. By demonstrating the impact of a variety
of factors have on combat he moves such analysis beyond the work of
Clausewitz and into modern data and interpretation” (back cover). No
matter how you slice it that is a pretty lofty claim.
Unfortunately, in reaching for this “understanding” Lawrence
exclusively uses databases created by the DuPuy Institute and formulas
that are uniquely their own. And that is the insurmountable problem
with War By Numbers, one that undercuts any claim it might have to
move beyond Clausewitz. In this book there is a near complete lack of
transparency and, therefore, also of reproducibility of the research or
the means of analysis. The endnotes that do exist (and some chapters
have only five or eight) are almost completely self-referential to yet other
DuPuy Institute studies (available for a fee of course). In other words,
we cannot tell what has gone into their computer analysis at all, and we
have no insights as to what their computer algorithms may be. Thus, we
cannot tell if there have been any mistakes, we have no idea what the
quality of the research supporting those databases might be, or in almost
all cases even what the original historical sources might have been. All of
this information is proprietary to the institute, and if you want access, it
will cost you tens of thousands of dollars, though what a customer might
get for that money is unclear.
Like Isaac Asimov’s character Hari Seldon and that other wonderful
manipulator of reality, the Wizard of Oz, Lawrence hides his workings
(and data) behind a curtain. In essence what he has done is produce charts
and tables that show how the DuPuy Institute’s computer-based projections match the “historical reality.” But there is no way to determine if
there is real and viable source material underneath these projections, or
if some of the numbers have been fudged in order to make the outcome
appear to match what they alone declare was the historical reality. Thus,
a reader is effectively required to believe their de facto assertion, “trust
us, we know more than you do.”

Books Reviewed
War By Numbers
By Christopher A.
Lawrence
Commanding Military
Power: Organizing for
Victory and Defeat on the
Battlefield
By Ryan Grauer

Robert L. Bateman, a
retired Army lieutenant
colonel, is a former
strategist assigned
to the Office of Net
Assessment, Office of
the Secretary
of Defense.

TOC

120

Parameters 47(4) Winter 2017–18

In short, what this book amounts to is a massive piece of corporate
advertisement for the real money-maker for the Dupuy Institute, their
contracted studies. It is a 374 page infomercial. But the kicker is that it is
one that you are expected to pay for the privilege of reading.
In distinct contrast, there stands a new work of theory. It is supported with reproducible research, as well as a call for other academics
to further the examination of the theory through the case studies presented. Ryan Grauer’s Commanding Military Power is a solid work fusing
evidence with a theory that seeks to explain. It is a book that professional
soldiers, academic historians (and for that matter amateur historians),
international relations specialists and politicians should read, consider,
and as far as possible replicate and develop.
One of the most fruitful methods of advancing our incomplete
understanding of war, in all permutations, is to introduce new intellectual
concepts borrowed from other fields to help us make sense of the chaos
of war. Clifford Rodgers quite successfully advanced the understanding
of “military revolutions” by importing the genetic/biological idea of
“punctuated equilibrium” in the 1990s. Clausewitz himself borrowed
from then-developing ideas from the field of physics when he used the
concept of “friction.” Now Grauer, leaning upon the work of organizational theorists, (a field which heretofore dealt almost exclusively with
business, economics, and political science) does the same to great effect.
In Commanding Military Power, Grauer initially observes that “from
a theoretical perspective, no extant model of military power incorporates armed forces capacities to cope with and overcome the effects of
uncertainty in combat” (9). To fill this gap he proposes something he
calls “command structure theory.” Simply stated, Grauer proposes that
the best way to examine historical conflicts is to study and analyze the
means that armed forces used to organize and manage information and
uncertainty on the battlefield. This method, he argues, allows one to
understand how much combat power that force may be able to generate
in a given conflict. By adjusting components of command structure,
such as the ratios of subordinates to leaders, the degree of centralization
in decision making, and the communications network used to transmit
and process data, a military force can match its structure to the particular environment in which it is fighting.
In developing his arguments, he examines four unique case studies,
at least for Western readers. The first is a campaign from the RussoJapanese War, the second is from the Chinese Civil War, while the third
and fourth both come from the latter phases of the Korean War. Each
case study is well researched, leans heavily upon primary sources, and
is worth reading alone. But more importantly, because they are studies
with reproducible research, they are open to critique and revision.
Indeed, that is much of the point of the work. Grauer is explicit in this.
Unlike Lawrence, he clearly invites readers and scholars to cross-check
his work, unpack and engage with the theory he presents, and take that
theory to the next level by applying it to other historical case studies
for comparison and refinement. That is how scholarship is supposed
to work.
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Commentary and Reply
On “Military Force
and Mass Migration in Europe”
Claude A. Lambert
This commentary responds to Matthew N. Metzel and John M. Lorenzen’s article
“Military Force and Mass Migration in Europe” published in the Autumn 2017 issue
of Parameters (vol. 47, no.3).

I

n “Military Force and Mass Migration in Europe,” Matthew N. Metzel
and John M. Lorenzen convincingly articulated the seriousness of
Europe’s migration problem and its potential to destabilize US allies
and partners in the region. They proposed solid recommendations for
addressing the consequential challenges of mass migration but only
briefly touched upon potential actions and activities to conduct before
an orchestrated crisis begins.
Specifically, the authors did not highlight coercive engineered
migration, which is a potential problem in the European theater. As Kelly
M. Greenhill explains, “Those cross-border population movements
that are deliberately created or manipulated in order to induce political,
military and/or economic concessions from a target state or states” have
been historically underrecognized, and their threat is underappreciated
(Strategic Insights 9, no. 1 [Spring–Summer 2010]: 116–17). In short,
coercive engineered migration can be considered a tool for operating
in the gray zone—that awkward and uncomfortable space between
traditional conceptions of war and peace.
In the European theater, Russia expertly uses unconventional
warfare, or gray zone techniques, to deal with states and regions on the
periphery of its federation, and it seems they are leveraging coercive
engineered migration techniques to great effect. During and after
Russia’s violent annexation of Crimea, for example, there were reports
of ethnic Russians moving into the peninsula. As of January 2017,
upwards of 150,000 people have moved to Crimea, mainly from Russia,
but also from other Eurasian states. At the same time, roughly 150,000
former residents, out of a total population of 2.3 million people, have
left Crimea. This sudden and sizable demographic shift, driven mainly
by migration, seems to be solidifying Russia’s control of the peninsula.
In particular, liberal democracies are predominantly vulnerable
to such events because, as Greenhill states, they have “codified
commitments to human rights and refugee protection through” the
Geneva Convention. International human rights and humanitarian laws
establish “normative standards” for judging actions, obligating “states
to meet the responsibilities” (Weapons of Mass Destruction, 136).
Thus, the migration threat seems to present a larger dilemma to US
allies and partners in Europe than criminal or terrorist organizations Major Claude A.
is an active duty
embedding themselves in, or recruiting from, vulnerable or migrant Lambert
US Army strategist.
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populations. So, how can the US, its allies, and its partners seize the
initiative, strengthen NATO’s security posture and get “left” to counter
this threat? What military capabilities might augment or complement the
other elements of national power to identify and deter this phenomena?
Lastly, in addition to the authors’ recommendation of “establishing
a planning team focused on studying the problem of mass migration
in Europe,” intelligence and systems analysis resources would be
needed to adequately assess the likelihood of a coercive engineered
migration event (Parameters, 61). Rational strategic approaches to the
problem require a common, compelling, and adaptive operating picture
to orient and counter the threat quickly. Additionally, this viewpoint
cannot be insular; it must account for the widest perspectives from the
intelligence community as well as US agencies, allies, and partners since
such migration is often concealed or “embedded within mass migrations
strategically engineered for dispossessive, exportive, or militarized
reasons” (Strategic Insights, 117). As the authors’ rightly note, dealing with
this complex challenge requires all of the elements of national power—
particularly if an event is engineered by a revisionist actor to exploit their
interests while obscuring their designs, methods, and intentions.

The Author Replies
Matthew N. Metzel

I

greatly appreciate the interest and response of the reader concerning
our recent article on the mass migration crisis in Europe and its impact
to the security posture of our NATO allies. The reader correctly
identified coercive engineered migration as a possible cause for at least
some number of the spike in migrant activity that has recently plagued
Europe. During initial research, I spent considerable time exploring
this possibility, but a respected academic advisor steered us away from
making this a central point of our argument. To be fair, Europe’s spike in
migrant activity from the Middle East and North Africa region involves a
wide range of complex international factors, some of which may include
coercive engineered migration from one or more nation-states; however,
the degree of influence or the involvement of any particular nation-state
is often difficult to quantify with any level of certainty.
The reader will note that we referenced Greenhill’s academic
concept of international actors employing “weapons of mass migration”
against their enemies. Our research identified convincing evidence that
terror groups were using the migration crisis to purposefully gain entry
into Europe for strategic purposes. There is less convincing data that
Russia (or any other nation-state) has played a direct or indirect role in
orchestrating or leveraging the migration crisis. However, we do not rule
out this possibility and invite the reader to join us on a potential future
article that explores this concept further.
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Rebooting Clausewitz: On War in the 21st Century
By Christopher Coker
Reviewed by Dale C. Eikmeier, Assistant Professor, US Army Command and
Staff College

C

arl von Clausewitz’s On War may look more impressive on our
bookshelves, but Christopher Coker’s Rebooting Clausewitz ‘On
War’ in the 21st Century will be more useful. Coker argues forcefully that
Clausewitz is not only relevant in the twenty-first century but still the
world’s greatest war theorist, and those interested in the study of war
still need to understand his work. Coker believes that by “rebooting”
Clausewitz, his greatness as a theorist can be better recognized and
more fully understood. Just as modern physicists do not read Sir Isaac
Newton but also still know and understand his laws and principles,
military professionals and civilian members of the defense community,
need not wade through On War but must also understand Clausewitz’s
theory of war.
To be clear, Coker is not advocating ignoring On War. He believes On
War is the most complete text on the phenomenon of war. And despite
the criticisms of Basil Liddell Hart, Martin van Creveld, John
Keegan, and others, Coker argues Clausewitz is still unsurpassed.
Admittedly On War is a “dense philosophical forest that few of us have
the ability or inclination to navigate alone” (prologue). Herein lies the
contribution of Coker’s work. Military professionals, and war theory
instructors, now have a guide and do not need to navigate the
Clausewitzian forest.
Coker’s work brings Clausewitz to life for a student audience. And let’s
face it, when it comes to understanding Clausewitz, we are all students.
Coker departs from the traditional scholarly approach to Clausewitz
and uses a series of fictional seminar discussions between Clausewitz
and modern audiences. This is where he takes risks, but it is also the
strength of his book. The idea is to reach military and security
professionals that run from anything Clausewitz. The result is a
well-researched, well-sourced, highly informative, yet entertaining
analysis and explanation of Clausewitz’s theories applied to the
contemporary environment.
The first fictional seminar is with cadets at the US Military Academy.
The venue is deliberate. Coker and his fictional, albeit accurately sourced,
Clausewitz admit that On War was for senior military members and
policymakers, and thus too advanced for cadets with little contextual
experience to appreciate it. However, Coker believes the foundation
for understanding Clausewitz’s theories needs to be set early, hence the
cadet forum. The West Point discussion lays out the basics required
for understanding On War. The discussion covers what is theory, the
why and how of theory, and finally, what theory achieved. The cadets’
questions place Clausewitz’s theories in the current era with Clausewitz
attempting to answer and reconcile his nineteenth-century experience
with the twenty-first century. With the instructor as moderator, and
linking the cadets’ modern worldview with Clausewitz’s explanations, he

New York: Oxford
University Press, 2017
176 pages
$24.95
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addresses many modern criticisms. The seminar-formatted discussion
demonstrates the continued relevance of Clausewitz in the modern era.
The next seminar, takes place in a fictional Washington, DC, think
tank in the context of the Iraq and Afghanistan Wars. Participants include
Clausewitz, a journalist, a national security scholar and author, and a
retired Marine Corps general. This panel represents many of the current
critiques against Clausewitz and modern war. Topics include strategy,
political purpose and its role in strategic planning, intelligence, the fog
of war, and of course, the center of gravity. Even modern concepts such
as the revolution in military affairs and “shock and awe” make cameo
appearances. Many readers will find this section the most relevant as
it explores the enduring qualities of Clausewitz’s nineteenth-century
theories against twenty-first century realities.
The final seminar, at the Military History Circle in London, focuses
on the value of military history. According to Coker, Clausewitz used
history to backup ideas with illustrative examples, ground theory in
experience, illustrate a theory’s possible truth, and prove a theoretical
proposition. The discussion, more accurately described as an interrogation of Clausewitz, covers diverse subjects such as Newtonian
and quantum physics, causality, mathematical predictions, the role
of technology, and moral content. In these discussions, Clausewitz
rebuts, explains, corrects, or accepts the validity of the criticisms, and
thus provides the reader a point-by-point analysis of many modern
critiques of Clausewitz.
Coker departs from the fictional seminar format in the chapter
“What if Clausewitz Had Read Darwin.” Here he adds balance by
acknowledging Clausewitz’s shortcomings and failings. Coker claims
Clausewitz’s theories may be illuminating, but not illuminating enough,
because the objectives were too ambitious and at the same time too
modest. To address these shortcomings, Coker “sticks his neck out”
and “reboots” Clausewitz through the lens of Darwinism. This section
is Coker’s most significant and original contribution to both war theory
and the study of Clausewitz. Coker postulates that had Clausewitz
read Darwin (which was published 36 years after Clausewitz’s death),
he might have asked different questions on the nature of war. Coker
applies Clausewitz to the Darwinian framework of origins, mechanisms,
ontogeny, and functions, identifying where Clausewitz is silent and
where he contributes to the body of knowledge.
Coker concludes with a chapter titled “If Not Clausewitz, Then
Who?” The only other candidates, according to Coker, that address
the theory are Sun Tzu and Thucydides. He describes Sun Tzu’s work
as a list of aphorisms divorced from context while Thucydides was an
historian, not a theorist, who raised questions without answering them.
For these reasons, Clausewitz is the gold standard On War theory which,
if not read, should at least be understood.
Coker’s fictional seminars and analysis give nineteenth-century
theory twenty-first century legs. Thus Rebooting Clausewitz is not only
a useful guide for both novice and experienced scholars but also an
essential companion to On War. While On War may rest on the bookshelf,
Rebooting will likely be on the desktop, dog-eared and tabbed.
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On Tactics: A Theory of Victory in Battle
By B. A. Friedman
Reviewed by William F. Owen, Co-founder and Vice President of IJ Infinity Group

B

ottom line up front, you should read this book. That said, while I
do recommend it, it is not without some serious issues.
The book is an attempt to construct a theory of tactics. The author
justifies this ambitious goal on the basis that this has not been done to
date. He simply states, “There has never been a true tactical theorist” (1).
That might be correct, and possibly for a very good reason, but it would
also be fair to state that many people have written very insightfully and
usefully about tactics.
What is good, and possibly excellent, is that the author understands
well enough, and advocates for, an understanding of tactics based in their
utility to strategy and thus policy. He does so from the strategic theory
primarily provided by Clausewitz. In that regard, and in my opinion,
he cannot be faulted. This alone makes the work a notable and worthy
addition to the library. Thus the basic argument of the book is that
strategy can only be done as tactics, and tactics needs a body of theory
as rigorous and useful as that which Clausewitz provided for strategy.
He then goes on to provide a series of tenets, not principles, which
should provide the basis of a theory of tactics. These tenets are grouped
into JFC Fuller’s framework of moral, mental, and physical categories.
Any British officer will know these categories have long formed the
United Kingdom’s definition of combat power expressed as conceptual,
physical, and moral. It is noteworthy that combat power is not tactics in
the British framework.
This is where the problems begin because the author never explains
how and why he made the choices he did, and he makes some extremely
odd choices. For example, why Fuller? Fuller’s theoretical body of work
is far from infallible, and its utility is much debated. This might be said
to be a matter of opinion, but Fuller is far more widely criticized and his
ideas are far less certain than some imagine. In the case of conceptual,
moral, and physical, the physical presides over all else. Ask any logistician.
Sadly, the book is devoid of any real discussion of logistics.
While the author cites Foch’s 1903 Principles of War there is no
discussion of the core functions—surely one of the most widely used
tactical frameworks Foch ever developed and discussed as a campaign
planning tool linking strategy with tactics in one coherent form. Foch
is also absent from the discussions on so-called mission command and
attack by infiltration all of which were featured in this 1903 work.
While On Tactics champions the human element of war, Jim Storr’s
Human Face of War is cited exactly once despite being directly relevant
to almost everything the author has to say, especially when it comes to
firepower, maneuver, shock, and surprise. Friedman may wish to assert
there are no true tactical theorists, but Jim Storr is about as close as you
can get, and his work also notably addresses and discusses items such as
the core functions plus a great deal more relevant to tactics.

Annapolis, MD: Naval
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Robert Leonhard’s work The Principles of War for the Information Age,
and his wider body of work, is far too summarily dismissed despite its
wealth of relevance to what the author is trying to say and its provision of
excellent conceptual frameworks that would have served this work well.
Hans Delbrück’s Clausewitz conjecture, which is critical to
connecting strategy with tactics, is wrongly cited. He never mentions
Clausewitz and is relegated to a section on counterinsurgency instead
of being central to what Friedman says about strategy having to serve
tactics. The author simply seems unaware of this fairly major point.
The main problem with this work is that the author is, either by
accident or design, clearly intent on not being seen as standing on the
shoulders of those who have tackled the subject before him even when
they have skillfully and comprehensively presented many of the points
he wishes to make.
This should not detract from the basic utility of the book, but tactics
is not a little known subject. What creates “victory” is a vast field of
literature. It is a practical skill presided over by considerable physical
limitations, and there is a massive body of literature which covers it,
some risibly poor but some excellent and useful.
As strategy can only be done as tactics (ends and means) the true
results of tactics lie in their effect on policy. That said, there is no
worthwhile discussion on rules of engagement whose sole purpose it is
to align tactics with policy (means with ends), which is the very point the
author wants to champion. Given their centrality to modern operations,
this is another odd choice.
Despite all my criticism, very little—or nothing—in the book is
actually incorrect or misleading. Most of the major problems are those
of omission that would have served the writer’s wider cause.
On Tactics contains some excellent sections, and truly insightful
observations, most of which will be obvious to most readers. On Tactics
addresses a number of issues with precision and skill and says much that
practitioners can agree with. If you are new to the subject, then you will
be provided with a strong starting point that is unlikely to set you on the
wrong path. On Tactics more than passes the mark for making soldiers
curious about their profession and should be read by all those who are.

Clausewitz
By Bruno Colson
Reviewed by Vanya Eftimova Bellinger, Visiting Professor, US Army War College

A
Paris: Perrin, 2016
513 pages (in French)
€27.00

t the very end of absorbing the new biography of Carl von
Clausewitz, Bruno Colson cites the great French philosopher Rene
Girard. For Girard, the Prussian military theorist’s seminal treatise On War
allows the French to see their history and national hero Napoleon through
different eyes (391). The same could be said for Colson’s book. While
written in French and primarily intended for a Francophone audience,
this biography enables a wider circle of readers to see Clausewitz not just
as the Prussian officer and the German patriot, as he is often portrayed.
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From the pages of Colson’s book, Causewitz emerges as a man
who wrote in German but whose mindset radically transcended his
homeland’s physical and intellectual borders. He was edified by the
great promises of the Enlightenment and often clashed with the world
shaped by the French Revolution. Despite his deep personal resentments
against Napoleonic France, he advocated moderation after its defeat,
for he understood the political necessity of winning the peace. This
ability to see the world and war in complex and global contexts, beyond
a narrow national, militaristic, and momentary framework, transformed
Clausewitz from a Prussian officer into one of the West’s most influential
strategic thinkers.
Bruno Colson, a professor at the Universite de Namur (Belgium), is
also the author of Napoleon On War, a comprehensive collection of texts
and authenticated quotes by Napoleon on his vision of war, published in
English in 2015. In it, Colson built upon the framework of Clausewitz’s
seminal treatise to organize Napoleon’s ideas, and accordingly invited
comparison between the two.
Scholars often study Clausewitz’s life solely as the blueprint for
On War. Colson writes mostly about the man, and while discussing
Clausewitz’s prolific oeuvre, he trusts readers to make connections and
form conclusions. As a military historian, Colson is at his best when he
describes the battles Clausewitz participated in and analyses his possible
role and contributions. The chapter devoted to his time as a prisoner of
war in France, “A Bildungsreise in the Enemy’s Country,” reveals many
new details, as the French police kept the foreign officers under close
surveillance and the records are still preserved. Napoleon personally
read the reports and often left delightful comments about these, in
his words, officiers fanfarons (braggarts), although regretfully he never
mentioned Clausewitz by name (89).
In 1815, by Waterloo, while the Duke of Wellington’s Anglo-Dutch
Army and the rest of the Prussian Army fought against Napoleon, the
Prussian III Corps held Marshall Emmanuel de Grouchy by Wavre. The
decision to retreat in the face of an enemy twice as strong would darken
the image of Clausewitz, chief of staff of the III Corps, in the times of the
buoyant German Empire and militaristic Third Reich. While devoid of
glory, this was nevertheless the prudent course of action, for it preserved
his men’s lives, especially since the main battle was already won. Hard
choices like these, Colson argues, make Clausewitz appear modern and
close to our understanding about what war is fought for (385).
Contrary to popular modern academic assertions, Colson disputes
the notion that a sudden crisis occurred in Clausewitz’s thinking around
1827, causing him to rethink and rewrite his seminal theory. Famously in
the note of July 10, 1827, published as a preface of On War, the military
theorist asserted there were two types of war: one with the objective to
overthrow the enemy and “render him politically helpless” and the other
with limited objectives, such as forcing the enemy to the negotiating
table. As stated in the note, Clausewitz envisioned a careful rewriting of
his treatise in order to explore the two types throughout its pages.
For Colson, this groundbreaking idea pertained less to a sudden
change of mind but was instead a product of a long and careful
reconsideration (384). Clausewitz’s diverse experiences between 1793
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and 1815, which Colson meticulously emphasizes on the biography’s
pages, revealed the complexities of real war and how narrow, misguided,
and counterproductive “the imagination of war as a series of victories
and victory battles” was (385). Again, Clausewitz demonstrated he was
an individual who was well ahead of his time and could, through a
careful thought process, project both timeless and innovative concepts.
Colson’s Clausewitz deserves to find its English-language publisher
and wider audience. It is a carefully researched and well written scholarly
work. Yet thanks to its dynamic and accessible style and lively details,
it reads like a gripping novel. To assist its readers, the French publisher
Perrin also offers clever props such as a short chronicle of Clausewitz’s
life, year by year, and an index of geographical locations with their
nineteenth-century names and statehood, followed by the modern ones.
An American edition would probably require some amendments to
accommodate an audience less knowledgeable of European history.

More On War
By Martin van Creveld
Reviewed by F. G. Hoffman, National Defense University

T
Oxford: Oxford University
Press, 2017
227 pages
$16.36

he Israeli historian Martin van Creveld established his reputation as
a scholar decades ago. His early works, especially Command in War
and Supplying War: Logistics from Wallenstein to Patton, became and remain
mandatory requirements for any professional military library. These
works combined solid history with clear, blunt, and enduring
insights. More recently van Creveld has written on cultures of warfare
and about the changing face of war. These books spoke more to
contemporary context in Israel. But with More On War van Creveld
returns to military theory and provides an occasionally provocative
update to Sun Tzu and Carl von Clausewitz.
In his introduction, the author asserts a number of shortfalls in the
published writings of the two major strategic theorists from whom we
extract the most meaning today:
•• neither “has anything to say about the causes of war or the purposes
for which it is fought (3)
•• both “tend to make war appear more rational and more subject to
control than it is” (4)
•• both “come close to ignoring the implements of war, (i.e. the field
broadly known as military technology)” (5)
These statements will surely surprise students of war familiar with
Clausewitz’s concepts about the pervasive presence of passion, enmity,
fog, and friction at all levels of war. But it is true that Clausewitz chose
not to pay attention to the role of technology in war. Clausewitz lived
in an age where military technology was static and equally available to
protagonists. Scholars, including Hew Strachan in Clausewitz’s On War:
A Biography, argue the longevity of Clausewitz is precisely because he
ignored the transitory changes of technology for the more critical role
of politics, moral forces, and the human dimension.
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Military strategists will find van Creveld’s strategy chapter to be
particularly valuable. In this most original chapter of the book, and the
least tied to the canon, van Creveld contrasts the polar tensions of any
“strategy in action.” These include
•• maintenance of aim versus flexibility;
•• concentration versus dispersion;
•• battle versus maneuver;
•• breakthrough versus envelopment;
•• advance versus retreat; and
•• strength versus weakness.
In this chapter the real major choices available to commanders, like
direct versus indirect, annihilation versus dislocation, or attrition versus
exhaustion are not adequately addressed. Readers should see Antulio J.
Echevarria’s Military Strateg y: A Very Short Introduction for these strategic
options. This is an interesting approach to military strategy, ideal for
use in classroom and Joint Professional Military Education settings;
however, its connection to Sun Tzu and Clausewitz is limited.
More On War contains numerous creative chapters that seek to
extend our understanding of theory in its contemporary context. Given
the classical theoreticians were seemingly land-centric, van Creveld adds
a chapter on war at sea. However, the chapter does not apply the key
elements of policy, fog and friction, culminating points, or centers of
gravity to naval warfare.
Other contributions include chapters that Sun Tzu would have
been intensely interested in. These include a chapter on air, space, cyber
war, as well as one on nuclear war. Air power has been the subject of
intense development for many years, but few of its advocates find use
in Clausewitz. Both Colonel John Boyd’s and John Warden’s writings
were suffused with connections to Clausewitz. On War’s centers of
gravity, friction, fog of war, and decision-making were central to Boyd’s
understanding of war. Warden used the term “center of gravity” several
dozen times in Air Campaign, and explicitly cited Clausewitz nine times.
Neither embraced every element of the classics, but both found value
in starting with them to make their own arguments about generating
military effects. Several writers in the last decade have worked to apply
the traditional theories to new domains like cyber—such as Craig
Greathouse’s useful comments in “Cyber War and Strategic Thought: Do
the Classic Theorists Still Matter?” in Cyberspace and International Relations.
Likewise, Denmark’s Jeppe T. Jacobsen’s work The Cyberwar Mirage and
the Utility of Cyberattacks in War—How to Make Real Use of Clausewitz in
the Age of Cyberspace, has relevance. Van Creveld could have exploited
those insights to underscore the utility of the canonical theories to these
modern dimensions.
Another innovation was the author’s inclusion of a chapter on
law. The security field has taken an interest in lawfare partially due to
apparent Chinese exploitation of legal maneuvers as part of their “Three
Warfares” concept. There is more work needed in this area, and readers
seeking ideas should review the writings of the Heritage Foundation’s
expert on China Dean Cheng.
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In the conclusion, those opening misinterpretations of Clausewitz
and Sun Tzu come full cycle. The author adopts a Hegelian technique
and offers a synthesis more in keeping with the fundamental teachings:
•• “A great many things have not changed, nor do they seem about to
change. The challenge war presents and the demands it makes to those
who wage it do not change either”(196–97).
•• “The fundamental principles of strategy are dictated less by the tools
it uses than by its own nature” (198).
•• “War is a flexible and inventive beast. Like some mythical shape-shifter,
it will adapt itself without giving up its essential nature” (199).
These conclusions are far more consistent with the perspectives, one
from the East and one from the West, that frame our basic understanding
of war. There is a reason that Clausewitz remains relevant today.
Both Sun Tzu and Clausewitz can be accused of being both endlessly
frustrating and consistently invaluable. After reading More On War, their
continued utility will be self-evident. No one else has been able to grasp
the essence of war so succinctly—even if seemingly convoluted at times.
Sun Tzu may be even more valuable in an emerging era of great-power
competition with an Asian rival, and the greater odds of surprise and
deception today.
Their value is augmented, not replaced by van Creveld’s chapters on
the various domains and dimensions of war that today’s practitioners
must contend with. The author deserves credit for helping modern
students of war apply classical thinking to contemporary times. Some
readers might be concerned that van Creveld has committed heresy.
However, as Colin Gray once quipped “On War is not ‘Holy Writ.’ ” It is
simply the best distillation of historically based theory we have.
More On War is recommended for those with a bent for thinking and
for specialists in the various domains like airpower or cyber that are still
searching for their own Prussian sage.

Regional Studies
China’s Military Transformation
By You Ji
Reviewed by Andrew Scobell, Senior Political Scientist, RAND Corporation

O
Cambridge: Polity, 2016
284 pages
$22.95

ne of the world’s leading experts on the People’s Liberation Army
(PLA) has produced an important book. Readers should be clear
at the outset: China’s Military Transformation is not a comprehensive or
up-to-date assessment of the PLA under People’s Republic of China
(PRC) President and Central Military Commission Chair Xi Jinping who
has dominated Chinese politics since 2012. Moreover, this volume does
not provide a thorough overview or analysis of the organizational reforms of China’s national defense establishment announced in late
2013 and underway in earnest since 2015. Those seeking an up-todate assessment of China’s defense reforms must look elsewhere. This
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reviewer highly recommends the fine occasional paper authored by
Phillip C. Saunders and Joel Wuthnow, Chinese Military Reforms in the Age
of Xi Jinping: Drivers, Challenges, and Implications (Washington, DC: National
Defense University Press, 2017).
So what is China’s Military Transformation about? The study is an
illuminating and authoritative examination of some major facets of the
PLA under the tenures of Xi Jinping’s two immediate predecessors—
Jiang Zemin (1992–2002) and Hu Jintao (2002–12). This book is perhaps
best described as the long delayed sequel to You’s earlier volume, The
Armed Forces of China, published by IB Tauris in 1999. The book under
review makes good use of in-country interviews and primary Chinese
language sources to solidly address “a select spectrum of PLA reform”
(22). You pens illuminating chapters on civil-military relations, the
PLA’s role in national security policymaking, and developments in
aerospace, maritime, and the paramilitary People’s Armed Police. There
is also a particularly fascinating chapter on the evolution of military
strategy since 1949. What is missing, however, is comparable coverage
of the PLA’s strategic rocket force or ground forces.
Despite these omissions, a particular strength of the study is the
rare combination of authoritative analyses of both the hard and soft
power dimensions of the PLA. Most examinations of China’s military
modernization focus almost exclusively on hardware—numbers and
capabilities of new and anticipated weapon systems and platforms—
while overlooking key softer elements such as strategy and civil-military
relations. On the question of military allegiance to the Chinese
Communist Party (CCP), You makes the important but overlooked
observation that “the PLA has little incentive or need to disobey the
Party” because the military is a highly privileged organization that tends
to be well resourced by the CCP (29).
A recurrent theme permeating this volume is that over the years the
United States—both in its policies, military activities, and own defense
transformations—has been an underappreciated impetus for change in
China’s military. The PLA has undertaken three waves of modernization
since 1949. The first wave, which occurred in the 1950s, was in response
to the Korean conflict when PRC leaders realized the serious limitations
of the World War I-era Chinese forces when confronting the World
War II-era US military on the battlefield. The second wave of PLA
modernization occurred in the 1980s when China emerged from its
Maoist-era trance to an embarrassing performance in a short border war
against Vietnam in 1979. This prompted the PLA undergo extensive
reforms and downsizing with the US military as its prime exemplar.
The third wave of PLA reforms began in the 1990s prompted by
the recognition that, despite considerable military reform over the previous decade, China’s armed forces remained far from the equal of the
armed forces of any other great power. What was particularly shocking
for top Chinese political and military leaders were the impressive
high-tech displays of the US military prowess in the 1991 Persian Gulf
War, the 1995–96 Taiwan Strait crisis, and the 1998–99 air campaign
against Kosovo, which included the accidental US bombing of the PRC
embassy in Belgrade (125–35). (Many in China believe that this was
an intentional act.)
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Where the PLA’s aircraft carrier program is concerned, You focuses
on the array of aspirational maritime operational requirements carriers
are intended to meet, while omitting the fact that this program has also
been driven by a deep desire to compete with and counter the impressive
aircraft carriers of the US Navy (201–14). American carriers have signaled
on multiple occasions US power projection capabilities and persistent
presence in the western Pacific, including during the Taiwan Strait
crisis noted above. The combined impact of these displays provided the
impetus for the PLA to launch the shift from mechanized forces toward
an Information Age defense establishment. Not surprisingly, the model
for this effort was the US military.
You writes with considerable insight as well as from personal
experience—he literally grew up in the PLA because his father was a
general and he was raised in a military compound. This book is required
reading for PLA watchers and anyone seeking to understand the process
of China’s incomplete military transformation.

Chinese Naval Shipbuilding: An Ambitious and
Uncertain Course
By Andrew S. Erickson
Reviewed by Carl O. Schuster, Visiting Professor, Hawaii Pacific University

C
Annapolis, MD: China
Maritime Institute and The
Naval Institute Press, 2016
332 pages
$28.83

hina’s expanding fleet and operations have raised questions about
its future capabilities and intentions. However, few examine China’s
other maritime components, its merchant marine, coast guard, maritime
militia, and the shipbuilding industry that supports them all. That industry
experienced an unprecedented 13-fold increase in capacity from 2002 to
2013—one encompassing more than just shipyards. Naval shipbuilding
integrates heavy industry, electronics and information technology, and
and large-scale propulsion systems to construct weapons platforms
that balance human habitation, fuel, ordnance, aviation support, and
seakeeping requirements to meet a nation’s operational and strategic
needs. As such, it provides insight into the future plans and intentions
of the People’s Liberation Army’s Navy (PLAN). In writing Chinese
Naval Shipbuilding, Dr. Andrew Erickson and his team have made a vital
contribution to understanding China’s ability to build and maintain its
maritime forces, especially the PLAN.
China’s shipbuilding industry is the world’s largest, constructing
more ships, and a greater variety of them, than any other. It has given
Beijing the world’s third largest merchant marine and the largest fishing
fleets. China also has the world’s largest coast guard and is on track to
possess the world’s second largest navy by 2020. But numbers alone do
not tell the story. Via a combination of imitative innovation, extensive
study of foreign developments, and heavy investment in technology,
China has leapfrogged several stages of combat systems, sensor, and
weapons developments.
An industry and scientific community once devastated by war and the
Cultural Revolution has evolved from producing copies of obsolescent
post-World War II designs 40 years ago to one manufacturing and
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installing the latest sensors, weapons, communications, and information
technology into hulls that incorporate the most recent advances in stealth
features and shipbuilding techniques. By 2025, PLAN will qualitatively
match, or be closely equivalent to the United States Navy. Rapid though
that improvement has been, it is the result of an evolutionary design
process driven by a combination of changing strategy and mission
requirements as defined by the PLAN’s Naval Research Institute;
and the Naval Armaments Research Institute’s (PLAN’s research and
development community’s) judgements.
During the last 30 years, China has modernized its doctrine as
well as its military equipment to meet the nation’s evolving national
security requirements. The brief Sino-Vietnamese War (1979) exposed
the limitations of Mao’s “People’s War Doctrine,” forcing a reevaluation
of China’s approach to war. The resulting active defense doctrine of the
mid-1980s extended the PLAN’s mission to one of active defense of
the near seas. The “near seas” consisted of the seas near China’s coast
out to the “First Island Chain”—Spratly Islands, Indonesia, Philippines,
Taiwan, and the Japanese Islands. The distance and level of PLAN’s
naval operations has been expanding slowly and steadily since. From
a defensive mission, the PLAN now must safeguard China’s overseas
interests, protect its sea lines of communications, and contribute to
international security. That last mission is exemplified by the PLAN
joining the UN-mandated Indian Ocean anti-piracy operations in
2008. Then civil strife and conflicts forced the evacuation of thousands
of Chinese citizens from African and Middle Eastern countries. In
addition to providing valuable logistical and operational experience, the
deployments strengthened China’s diplomatic and strategic engagement
with Africa, the Middle East, and ultimately Europe. The PLAN is now
a permanent fixture and exercise partner in those waters.
China’s technological base initially struggled to keep pace with fleet
requirements but caught up within the last decade via foreign acquisition
and derivative development. Post-2009 PLAN warships are no longer
equipped with 1950s-era radars and weapons systems. They carry new
longer-ranged surface-to-air missiles derived from Russian designs but
largely retain the PLAN’s initial focus on anti-surface ship warfare, with
newer and more deadly anti-ship cruise missiles. Ships commissioned
since 2012 have Vertical Launch Systems for their missiles, accelerating
their combat engagement cycles and increasing their ordnance load.
To improve power projection, China acquired a derelict ex-Soviet
aircraft carrier in 1998. Commissioned in September 2012, the ski-ramp
equipped Liaoning has served as a fleet training and doctrinal development
tool, enabling the integration of naval aviation into fleet operations.
Future carriers will incorporate a conventional takeoff and landing
system, giving the carrier greater striking power, range and flexibility.
The PLAN started installing land attack cruise missiles on surface ships
and submarines in 2013. But, anti-submarine warfare (ASW) capabilities
remained underdeveloped. More ships were capable of embarking ASW
helicopters but the ships were limited to hull-mounted sonars until
variable depth sonars and towed arrays became available in 2014.
The submarine force has seen similar evolutionary upgrades since
the late 1980s. Hull designs became more streamlined and propulsion
systems more powerful and reliable. In the 1990s, Chia acquired Russian
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Kilo-class submarines with anechoic coatings that reduced vulnerability to
active sonar detection and battery technology that increased underwater
speed and endurance. China also purchased air-independent-propulsion
technology a decade ago. It then incorporated all those technologies in its
Yuan-class conventional submarines. However, for prestigious reasons,
the Communist Party rejected using foreign technology in its nuclearpowered submarine program with costly results. China’s early nuclear
powered submarines, the Xia ballistic missile and Han-class attack
submarines were underpowered, noisy, and difficult to operate. Their
problems forced a 20-year hiatus in nuclear submarine construction.
The nuclear-powered Jin-class SSBNs and Sang-class SSNs built since
2011 have better sensors and more reliable power plants, but they retain
their predecessor’s noisy acoustic signatures.
Dr. Erickson’s team has written the most comprehensive study
of China’s shipbuilding industry extant. The book’s maps and tables
clarify and strengthen the narrative. Chinese Naval Shipbuilding presents a
detailed, in-depth assessment of the PLAN’s future. Relying extensively
on Chinese-language sources, the authors base their analysis on intimate
knowledge of the economic, political, and strategic factors underpinning
China’s maritime activities from the PRC’s beginnings. They discuss
economic factors most other books ignore. They note China’s slowing
economy will constrict future defense funding growth and Beijing
eventually must shift resources from construction to maintenance as
expanded naval operations increase the wear on fleet units. Funding
global operations will also come at the expense of construction monies.
Well organized, insightful, and succinctly written, this is a must-read for
serious students of China’s maritime and economic developments.

Beyond Crimea: The New Russian Empire
By Agnia Grigas
Reviewed by Richard J. Krickus, Distinguished Professor Emeritus at the
University of Mary Washington and former Oppenheimer Chair for Warfighting
Strategy at the US Marine Corps University.

New Haven, CT: Yale
University Press, 2016
352 pages
$39.98

I

n August 1993, as a convoy of Russian trucks rumbled through the
cobblestoned streets of old-town Vilnius, the last one carried an
ominous message: “We will be back!” The locals who applauded the exit
of their “elder brothers” took comfort in the thought that never again
would Russian tanks traverse the byways of Lithuania. Confidence along
these lines later surged when the Baltic democracies entered the North
Atlantic Treaty Organization and rejoiced in the safe harbor of Article 5.
But President Trump caused alarm in Eastern Europe when, on a
spring trip abroad, he failed to reaffirm Washington’s commitment to
collective defense. What’s more, when German respondents were asked
whether or not their country should safeguard the security of the Baltic
democracies in face of Russian armed aggression, most answered “No!”
Not surprisingly, citizens of other former Soviet Russian republics are
especially unnerved by the thought that, after the 2008 war in Georgia
and the Crimean putsch several years later, they will be the next victims
of “little green men.”
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To put these concerns in perspective, Agnia Grigas has written an
important book, Beyond Crimea: The New Russian Empire, which explains
why these concerns prevail throughout much of the old Soviet space. Well
written and powerfully argued, this book rests on extensive research and
interviews of people residing in the “near abroad.” Grigas’s narrative
justifies speculation among Russian experts that Vladimir Putin is bent
on the “re-imperializaton of Russia.” Toward this end, he hopes to exploit
the 25 million ethnic Russians and over 100 million Russian speakers,
“the compatriots,” who once resided in the Union of Soviet Socialist
Republics, were considered a financial liability by Moscow upon the
Soviet Empire’s demise, and became an asset as the Russian economy
grew with a spike in oil prices. They served as a vital component in Putin’s
campaign to restore the Russian empire and, in turn, disembowel both
the European Union and NATO. This aspect of Putin’s foreign policy
has not received the attention it deserves by American security analysts,
and Grigas’s book ably fills this gap. Simultaneously, her unmasking of
this bold strategic campaign will be useful to those who are considering
the pros and cons of a reset in relations with Russia, which is one of the
major elements of President Trump’s foreign policy.
The people who are the central focus of her book represent a
significant segment of residents in Central Asia, the Baltics, Ukraine,
Georgia, and other former political entities that were once subjects of
various Russian empires—Czarist, Soviet, and today. Putin’s campaign
involves seven stages:
1. Soft power. The Russian language, the Russian Orthodox Church,
and extensive media outlets and business enterprises under Moscow’s
control that penetrate all the societies in question
2. Humanitarian polices. Real and alleged human rights violations to
promote turmoil within targeted societies
3. Compatriot policies. Honoring former Soviet policies such as pensions
for the elderly and educational opportunities for the young
4. Passportization. Compatriots without citizenship status who have
passports and retain the opportunity to return “home”
5. Information warfare. “Aggressive use of propaganda to destabilize,
demoralize, or manipulate the target audience and achieve an
advantage over an opponent including by seeking to deny, degrade,
corrupt or destroy the opponent’s sources of information” (44)
6. Protection. Scrutinizing the soft power represented above to display
hard power
7. Annexation. Formal or de facto annexations of the territories where
compatriots reside
Beyond Crimea is a valuable source for defense and foreign policy
analysts and practitioners who are taking stock of the pros and cons of
resetting relations with Russia, which according to conventional wisdom
may be sabotaged by America’s preoccupation with our 2016 presidential
election. But that distraction will have little bearing on Putin’s drive
to impose Russia’s influence upon the former entities of the Union of
Soviet Socialist Republics. To a significant degree, because of Putin’s
skillful exploitation of the compatriot issue, he has successfully disrupted
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the Euro-Atlantic Alliance. Among other things, he has forestalled—
perhaps permanently—Georgian and Ukrainian efforts to join the EU
and NATO while fostering serious discord between the Europeans
and Americans. American strategists who are working to counter this
campaign of disruption should read this book and consider some of the
author’s countermoves while acknowledging some disturbing facts.
First, the West must appreciate that Putin’s campaign is real and not
a flight of Cold War fancy. We must not adopt the realist perspective that
all of these countries “belong” to Russia, and it is foolhardy to think
otherwise. Furthermore, Grigas observes it is a profound intellectual
mistake to accept the Kremlin’s view of the status and nature of the
compatriots. In her interviews, she found people so identified may favor
Russian TV and share feelings of solidarity with other former Soviet
citizens but prefer living in their new homelands and not Putin’s Russia.
That said, the West must recognize that scenario is being outplayed
in Europe’s hybrid warfare with Russia. Putin’s drive to restore Russia’s
imperial outreach is showing results as many eastern-bloc countries in
the EU and NATO have sought closer ties with Moscow. Furthermore,
the Americans and the Europeans have assumed that when the ball is
in the soft-power court, they are favored to win, but the fact may be
just the opposite as recent events indicate. In response, the West should
develop aid programs, including education and training, for many of
the countries that are Putin’s target. The EU and NATO must “create
information alternatives to Russian propaganda” and prepare “for
Russia’s hybrid warfare” (255–56). This means “countering transnational
paramilitary groups, as well as engaging separatist territories and frozenconflict zones” (256). At the same time, Grigas has words of criticism
for the countries at risk. They are not paying sufficient attention to
legitimate grievances of their compatriots regarding arms, drugs, human
trafficking, terrorism, organized crime, and collapsed economies.
Prominent scholars, such as Steven Blank, and diplomats, such
as Michael McFaul, have justifiably applauded Grigas’s book, but one
cannot ignore one of its shortcomings—that is, not spending more time
on the role organized crime plays in the Kremlin’s reimperialization
campaign. Russian criminal organizations, often with the complicity of
indigenous mafias, play a critical role in corrupting the economic and
political systems of all former Soviet entities. They continue to exploit
the transition period from communism to a free market where even
otherwise patriotic cultural, economic, and political elites are vulnerable
to kompromat because of dodgy practices on their part or maturing
legal systems. In short, Russian bankers and business tycoons are so
entangled with organized crime figures it is impractical to deal with
them as separate entities. The same holds true of the oligarchs and their
involvement with Russian security institutions. Clearly, more work must
be done on this score, but that is the subject of another book.
Finally, in light of the disarray that afflicts the Euro-Atlantic Alliance
today, there is no reason to be optimistic that the Western response
to Putin’s reimperialization campaign will be up and running any time
soon. Planners at the Departments of State and Defense must rectify
that situation as soon as possible
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NATO’s Return to Europe: Engaging Ukraine, Russia,
and Beyond
Edited by Rebecca R. Moore and Damon Coletta
Reviewed by Elie Perot, PhD candidate, Institute for European Studies (IES),
Vrije Universiteit Brussel (VUB)

T

he troubles in Ukraine have compelled NATO to shift its attention
back to the Old Continent. After years during which collective
defense was not at the front stage of the Alliance’s preoccupations, the
renewed focus on this mission is a small revolution. In brief, NATO is
back in Europe and back to its original raison d’être.
But, to what extent is this true, and to what extent should it be
the case? To put it differently, in the wake of the Ukraine crisis, how
has NATO struck a balance between diverging geographical priorities
and between its three self-assigned missions (i.e., collective defense,
crisis management and collective security)? And what should the future
equilibrium look like? These are the questions to which NATO’s Return to
Europe: Engaging Ukraine, Russia, and Beyond intends to provide an answer.
As indicated by the editors, the book’s chapters can be grouped
under three broad sections. The first one focuses on the major strategic
issues facing NATO today. The opening chapter by John R. Deni argues
NATO’s current force posture is ill-prepared to deter conventional
aggression by Russia as a consequence of the continuous decrease of
allies’ armed forces—despite the adaptation and reassurance measures
recently adopted. As underlined by Schuyler Foerster in the subsequent
chapter, however, the continuing relevance of extended deterrence for
NATO should not let us forget that such a strategy inevitably raises
perennial credibility concerns and dilemmas. Foerster warns against
extending the deterrence guarantee towards NATO’s partners such as
Ukraine and Georgia, as this would result in a “dilution” of the guarantee.
In turn, Andrew T. Wolff weighs the prospects for further enlargement
of NATO to encompass Ukraine. Contemplating the respective tradeoffs entailed by Ukraine’s membership, or by the present status quo,
the author argues then in favor of a third option, which would be to
renounce enlargement of NATO—an appeasement signal sent to
Moscow—while establishing another type of relationship with Kiev to
encourage democratic reforms.
In the fourth chapter, Magnus Petersson examines to what extent
the global and the regional ambitions of NATO are pushing the Alliance
into incompatible directions. Expeditionary strategy and territorial
defense are two approaches that complement one another, as both
presuppose a certain degree of interoperability and offensive capabilities.
In a similar vein, Sten Rynning shows several lessons learned by NATO
in Afghanistan can be put to good use in future contingencies: the need
to share the same politico-strategic vision among Allies, the necessity
to adopt a comprehensive approach, and the requirement of close
coordination with operational partners.
The second section of the book deals with NATO’s partnership
policy and security cooperation with Russia. Ivan Dinev Ivanov assesses
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the relationship between the various patterns of institutionalization
of NATO’s partnership agenda and the compliance of the Alliance’s
partners with its security policies. Of particular interest is the description
of NATO’s central partnership dilemma between extending the “liberal
security order” in Europe, for example, to Ukraine or Georgia and
keeping a stable relationship with Moscow. Continuing this discussion,
Rebecca Moore shows that, although the Ukraine crisis has made clear
that NATO’s Article 5 does not extend to its partners, the Alliance
should not be intimidated into renouncing the liberal order through its
partnership policy. The last chapter of this section, by Damon Coletta,
delves into the opportunities for NATO-Russia technical cooperation,
in particular on missile defense. Hindered in many ways since the
Ukraine crisis, technical cooperation is nonetheless partially ongoing
and it should be expanded in order to generate positive spill-over effects
for the relationship between NATO and Russia.
The final group of contributions is more eclectic. Huiyun Feng
focuses on the impact of the Ukrainian crisis on the Russia-China-US
triangle. If the Russian intervention in Ukraine has contradicted the
principles of noninterference and of the respect of state sovereignty
defended by China, the crisis has also brought Russia and China—
driven by a common rivalry with the United States—to forge closer ties
in the economic, military, and political realms. Finally, the conclusion
of the book, by Stanley R. Sloan, puts the significance of the Ukrainian
crisis for NATO into a broader historical perspective by analyzing the
evolution of the Alliance’s identity through time. The volume closes on
the idea of building a stronger “transatlantic community” through a
deeper cooperation between NATO and the European Union.
In terms of analysis, NATO’S Return to Europe delivers a very robust
and updated overview of the Alliance’s current strategic situation. One
may notice some overlap between contributions, although this may be
unavoidable in an edited volume. Individually, the chapters do not provide
a direct answer to the overall theme of the book, but by reading the
chapters successively, the reader may sketch an overarching conclusion.
In terms of policy prescription, some recommendations advanced
by different contributors may not accord with one another, notably
because of a divergence in their assessments of Moscow’s benign or
hostile intentions. From different diagnostics follow distinct remedies.
Gauging which of these policy options are sound is ultimately a matter
of political judgement, but the necessity of “a Schuman Plan of some
sort” between NATO and Russia may raise more skepticism than more
conventional proposals contained in the book (212).
Some readers may regret no specific chapter has been devoted to
the very issue on which the book ends, namely the relationship between
NATO and the European Union. One could argue that some of today’s
hottest policy proposals, the creation of a “military Schengen,” for
example, precisely revolve around this complex relationship.
In any case, these are minor reservations. The book should be of great
value and interest for practitioners and students of transatlantic relations.
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Technology & War
Nanoweapons: A Growing Threat to Humanity
By Louis A. Del Monte
Reviewed by Robert J. Bunker, Adjunct Research Professor, Strategic Studies
Institute, US Army

T

he author of Nanoweapons, Louis A. Del Monte, has a corporate
background in microelectronics, sensors, and integrated circuits at
the micro- and nano-technology levels. He has also written earlier books
on artificial intelligence and time travel (theoretical) to which this book
on the subject of nanoweaponry is, in many ways, a natural progression.
The subject focuses on nano (one billionth of a meter), as opposed
to micro (one millionth of a meter), technology manipulation and
the increasingly evident weaponization potentials this offers to states,
corporations, terrorist organizations, and potentially even brilliant—yet
amoral and unstable—individuals.
The 246-page work is divided into acknowledgements, an introduction, three thematic parts (The First Generation of Nanoweapons,
The Game Changers, and The Tipping Point) spanning 12 chapters, an
epilogue, three appendices, notes, glossary, and an index.
Nanotechnologies—unbeknownst to most of us—are becoming
ubiquitous in the consumer, industrial, and medical industries with a
product value exceeding $1 trillion dollars (43). Further, they have a
projected value of $6 trillion by 2025, which would place their product
valuation at about 7 percent of the entire global economy (34). In
addition, active American (leader), Chinese (a near follower), and Russian
(a distant third) nanoweaponry programs exist at the classified level
(67). While the majority of information pertaining to these programs
is shrouded in secrecy, Del Monte has been able to synthesize enough
disparate open source intelligence together to create basic outlines of US
military service initiatives as well as those belonging to a number of other
nations—both potentially belligerent as well as allied (45–75, 191–203).
The initial generations of nanoweapons as discussed in the work
clearly function as enhancers of present conventional—even nuclear—
weaponry as well as sensors, body (or tank) armor, and a host of other
forms of matériel. For example, nanoparticles added to explosives or
even nukes are able to enhance their efficiency and destructive yield
and, in some instances, even allow for their miniaturization (11,
47–48). It is not this component of the work, however, which is its real
importance. Rather, it is the potential longer-term technological trends
some decades away where the strategic implications of this advanced
weaponry form become significant. These are derived from the projected
emergence of advanced computers with artificial intelligence, such as
singularity computers, that will, at some point, exceed the combined
intellect of humanity coupled with the development of self-replicating
smart nanobots (139–42).
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My impression from the book, in which I agree with the author’s
primary concerns, is that nanoweaponry is rapidly becoming the third
rider beside nuclear and biological weapons in a potential technological
apocalypse. This form of weaponry offers a new set of horrors that can
be inflicted upon humanity. The subject matter appears very science
fiction-like and is reminiscent of Frank Herbert’s 1982 novel The White
Plague in which a molecular biologist creates a designer bioweapon that
becomes a scientific reality, which exceeds even the early projections
of that genre.
That said, a basic criticism of Nanoweapons is that essentially no
literature review was conducted related to the small number of earlier
works on the technology predating this effort. While K. Eric Drexler’s
celebrated 1986 text Engines of Creation is highlighted—as are other
important nanotechnology related events and over 150 notes (typically
Internet citations) related to data points, technologies, and governmental
programs—specific topical works are ignored. For instance, no mention
is made of Daniel and Mark A. Ratners’ Nanotechnolog y and Homeland
Security, Jurgen Altmann’s Military Nanotechnolog y, or Margaret Kosal’s
Nanotechnolog y for Chemical and Biological Defense. Another criticism is that
Del Monte—by his own admission—is a technologist and not well versed
in policy, or for that matter, international affairs (187). So when he makes
military and arms control suggestions or envisions the international
system of 2050, he is not always authoritative in his arguments.
Even with these inherent criticisms, given the glaring dearth of
unclassified works on nanoweaponry, the book fills an important and
critical gap in an emerging and little-understood area of twenty-first
century military science. The area is one that the author, accurately
proposes will result in the rise of powerful nanoweaponry-armed
states (and, potentially, even corporations), and where a misstep with
this cutting edge technology could someday potentially result in an
extinction-level event equivalent to that of a strategic nuclear exchange
taking place between the Russia and the United States.

The Future of War: A History
By Lawrence Freedman
Reviewed by Robert J. Bunker, Adjunct Research Professor, Strategic Studies
Institute, US Army War College

L
New York: Public
Affairs, 2017
400 pages
$30.00

awrence Freedman, the author of The Future of War: A History, is an
Emeritus Professor of War Studies at King’s College London and
has had a long and illustrious career, which he points out is by no means
over. His is a familiar name to the Parameters readership—due both to
his decades long series of highly acclaimed books written on war and
strategy and his contributions to this journal; see, for instance, Beyond
Surprise Attack (Summer 2017) which draws upon The Future of War—the
focus of this review.
The work has been written as a historiography of future-war thinking
and projections—not as a projection of future (around mid-twenty-first
century) warfare itself. It predominately draws upon the perspectives
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of the United Kingdom and the United States, due to their sequential
positions as dominant global powers, and encompasses thought, theory,
and military affairs related to the late mid-nineteenth century into the
contemporary and emerging eras (xix). The book is divided into three
parts: the Franco-Prussian War of 1870–71 through the end of the
Cold War (1989), 1990s through contemporary issues, and developing
and future concerns. These three historical sequences are dominated
by multi- and then bi-polarity (such as great powers and superpowers);
unipolarity (the United States as the last remaining superpower), statefragility, and the rise of violent nonstate actors; and resurgent multi- or
bi-polarity along with the concurrent emergence of high-tech weaponry.
The book is well referenced, has an extensive bibliograpy, and an index
for keyword and name searches.
The approach utilized in The Future of War: A History is one that:
locates the writing on future war in the concerns of the time. The aim is not
just to assess how prescient different writers were, or whether they could
have done better given what was known about new weaponry or the experience of recent wars, but to explore the prevailing understandings about the
causes of war and their likely conduct and course. How people imagined the
wars of the future affected the conduct and course of those wars when they
finally arrived. Unanticipated wars, in forms that had not been imagined,
left participants and commentators struggling to understand where they had
come from and how they might best be fought (xix).

Much of the work’s value for the practitioner exists in its final
couple of chapters. Chapter 24 “Coming Wars,” for instance, initially
highlights Major General Robert Scales’s five schools of future wars
thinking (264–65). Chapter 25, “The Future of the Future of War,” on
the other hand, revisits important themes discussed in the book related
to the forecasting of knockout blows (such as quick victory scenarios)
(277–79), the significance of the development of nuclear weapons on
future war thinking (280–81), whether the America’s present position as
the predominant military power may continue (282), ring of institutional
boundaries related to the state, and even war and peace itself, as a result
of gray-zone conflicts (284–85).
Criticisms of the work are difficult to find, but a slight issue potentially
exists in the author’s ongoing use of thematic chapter foci—essentially,
the minivignettes, such as those, focusing on barbarism, cyberwar,
robots and drones, and megacities in some of the later chapters—which
provide a quick and dirty overview of a theme along with some dominant
concepts pertaining to it sourced to well-known scholars—for example
Mary Kaldor’s New Wars (143–44) or Dunlap’s “lawfare” (201–2). This
fast paced “short video clip” approach may lead the lay or undergraduate
reader to readily accept the lessons learned without needing or wanting
to understand the full extent of the argument Freedman presents.
In summation, Freedman’s The Future of War would be highly useful
for graduate and War College level military strategy courses and those
focused on better understanding the rationale behind and biases inherent
in producing visions of future warfare. While some general readership
interest may exist for the work, its arguments—and a reader’s ability to
contextualize them along the continuum of late mid-nineteenth century
military developments—are too daunting for undergraduate level study.
Still, the work is extremely well written and an erudite product produced
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by a renowned military theorist. It should, without reservation, be
considered a welcome addition to both the personal library of the more
seasoned scholar as well as that of the senior level officer.

War in 140 Characters: How Social Media is Reshaping
Conflict in the Twenty-First Century
By David Patrikarakos
Reviewed by James Farwell, Associate Fellow in the Centre for Strategic
Communication, Department of War Studies, Kings College

New York: Basic
Books, 2017
320 pages
$17.67

T

his lively account describes how Twitter and Facebook are changing
the dimension of warfare. He argues social media has helped to
dismantle traditional information and media hierarchies. That point has
been well made elsewhere. Patrikarakos’s contribution is to bring alive
the realities of this change through the experiences of individuals dealing
with the Middle East, Russia, and Ukraine to weaponize social media.
The stories of Palestinian Farah Baker and two Israelis, Lieutenant
Colonel Peter Lerner and David Rubenstein, show how social media can
create global impact.
Sixteen years old, Farah bore witness to Israel’s 2014 incursions into
Gaza. Her credibility lay in her status as an eyewitness. Photographs
and vivid language brought home the emotion and horror of a little
girl trying to survive battlefield violence. She used Twitter to highlight
the most extreme effects of war, garner sympathy, and build public
support for Gaza by showing the extent of the carnage that the Israel
Defense Forces (IDF) was wreaking. “BOMBING CHILDREN IS
NOT OKAY,” she tweeted. “That when u know that HUMANITY
DIED. #Gaza.”
Her tweets show how users reacting in real time can powerfully
bypass media filters and articulate ground realities. Using media to tell a
story that detailed what she was living through, Farah defined a powerful
message: war caused children to suffer. She showed that controlling the
narrative mattered as much or more than kinetic warfare.
Imaginative and brilliant Israelis such as Lerner and Rubenstein
proved resourceful. Israelis had to show they were not targeting civilians.
They responded rapidly, using YouTube to generate powerful visuals
to get out their narratives. Sending out clear and compelling content
caused legacy media—broadcast networks—to pick it up. Israel thus
refocused the perspective through which actions should be judged. Their
technique started sentences with verbs and created titles and subtitles for
the illustrations of the battlefield violence, which bolstered credibility.
In Ukraine, Anna Sandalova proved the power of Facebook in
assembling a volunteer network that supplied Ukrainian soldiers fighting
Russian-backed separatists. The author’s account of the effort provides
a primer on how to use weaponized Facebook for troop support.
Notable is the account of how Elliot Higgins proved that crowdsourcing
intelligence can beat government bureaucracy. He and a volunteer team
proved that Russian-armed separatists shot down Flight MH17.
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Interesting but less impressive is Patrikarakos’s account of Russian
trolling. That topic has been better covered elsewhere. The section lacks
depth in articulating Russia’s doctrine of hybrid warfare, Attributed
to Chief of the Russian General Staff Valery Gerasimov, it calls for a
“hybrid” capability for which the Internet is one tool in the arsenal.
Patrikarokos’s story of Russian troller Vitaly Bespalov is interesting. But
his account fails to explain, as others have, the trolling operation, and
the analysis of Putin’s strategy could use greater dimension.
Patrikarakos’s account of how the Islamic State used social media
to recruit individuals like Sophie Kasiki is well told but adds nothing to
what has been previously written. The final section discusses the State
Department’s Center for Strategic Counterterrorism Communications,
supplanted today by the Global Engagement Center, in countering such
narratives. Neither entity has proven successful.
Bottom line. This book is definitely worth a read. The author is a fine
journalist. While imperfect, the book’s strengths add strong insight and
keen understanding into a new, potentially decisive element in conducting
engagement and waging conflict in today’s threat environment.

Irregular Warfare
Eisenhower’s Guerrillas: The Jedburghs, the Maquis, & the
Liberation of France
By Benjamin F. Jones
Reviewed by Raymond A. Millen, Professor of Security Sector, Peacekeeping
and Stability Operations Institute, US Army War College

I

n Eisenhower’s Guerrillas, Benjamin F. Jones examines the operations of
Jedburgh teams in support of the Allied campaign for France in 1944.
Formed into three-person teams, comprised of American, British, and
French service members, the Jedburghs began parachuting into France
just prior to D-Day in order to organize, equip, and train the various
French resistance groups, the Maquis, in guerrilla warfare. Altogether,
93 Jedburgh teams deployed to France, organized tens of thousands of
guerrillas, and coordinated the delivery of hundreds of thousands of
weapons and munitions.
Jones’s research unveils new details regarding the Allied use of the
Maquis during the liberation of France. By delving into American, British,
and French war archives, as well as interviewing Jedburgh and Maquis
veterans, Jones provides fresh perspectives regarding Eisenhower’s
intent with, and ulterior motives for, the Jedburgh mission. Jones
expands on the history of the Jedburghs by tying together the planning
and implementation of their mission, the involvement of other Allied
special forces—often at cross purposes—with the Maquis, and the
reasons for successes and failures among the various Jedburgh teams.
Operating through the Maquis, the Jedburgh mission was to support
the Normandy invasion by sabotaging rail and road bridges, ambushing
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German occupation troops in Brittany, and actively interdicting
German units moving to the Normandy beachhead. Counterintuitively,
Supreme Headquarters Allied Expeditionary Forces (SHAEF) and the
Special Forces Headquarters (SFHQ) stressed that the Maquis were not
to instigate a wholesale insurrection for fear of indiscriminate German
reprisals against the population. Restricting Maquis activities until
after the Normandy invasion, SHAEF and SFHQ sought to preclude
German and Vichy French counterespionage operations to neutralize
the Maquis prematurely.
As more Jedburgh teams parachuted into the French interior during
June and July, 1944, the Allied invasion of southern France (early
August) prompted a change in mission—preventing German forces in
southwestern France from withdrawing to the east. The results were
mixed: German armored and mechanized divisions managed to avoid
capture; however, the Maquis forced the surrender of one German
infantry division. Ultimately, the failure to ensnare substantial numbers
of German troops permitted a defensive line to be established in eastern
France. One important lesson from the latter stages of fighting in France
is that the Jedburghs and the Maquis were more effective when rear areas
existed, but less so once German divisions began streaming eastwards.
The Jedburghs faced numerous challenges. This political tension
inhibited cooperation, and these groups refused to cooperate with one
another due to these differences. Paradoxically, the communist resistance
groups were better organized, motivated, and fought more effectively, a
fact the Jedburghs quickly recognized and supported.
The Jedburghs’s inability to arm hundreds of thousands of Maquis
who enthusiastically materialized after the Normandy invasion
stemmed from various causes. Significantly, SHAEF and SFHQ vastly
underestimated the number of French who wanted to end the German
occupation and replace the Vichy government. Successful supply drops
required good weather, appropriate moon phases, and secure drop
zones, which rarely aligned. Communications between the Jedburgh
teams and SFHQ to coordinate the airdrops was also problematic when
communications sergeants were injured or the radios were destroyed.
Finally, Eisenhower wanted to limit the number of armed Maquis (less
than 120,000) to prevent their activities from spiraling out of control.
For Eisenhower, the Jedburghs served a higher purpose than
disrupting German operations, a revelation that Jones explains in detail.
President Franklin D. Roosevelt and Prime Minister Winston Churchill’s
persistent refusal to recognize General Charles de Gaulle’s provisional
government, French Committee of National Liberation, until the fall
of 1944, posed significant challenges for the successful prosecution of
the war. To optimize combat power on the front, Eisenhower sought to
have de Gaulle’s provisional government assume governance functions
at the local and national level so as to minimize the need to secure the
rear areas with combat troops.
Accordingly, Eisenhower appointed French General Pierre Koenig
as a SHAEF field commander, making him responsible for the French
Forces of the Interior and the various French military delegates, as well
as control of the Maquis through the Jedburgh teams. As the Allies
liberated France, Koenig incorporated scores of Maquis groups into the
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Free French Army. In this manner, de Gaulle enjoyed the political support
of the French people and was able to assume control of government.
Jones’s account of the Jedburghs is often repetitious and confusing,
which is understandable given the complexity of French and Allied
attitudes and agendas regarding the political landscape, the plethora
of personalities involved, and the magnitude of the Jedburgh mission.
Fortunately, Jones provides two appendices on the French resistance
leaders and the Jedburgh teams, outlining names, assigned regions, and
deployment dates. The maps depicting Jedburgh locations and activities
are also essential for reader understanding.
For strategic leaders, Eisenhower’s Guerrillas provides useful insights
in the use of resistance groups in occupied territories in conjunction with
the execution of conventional military campaigns. Jones emphasizes
that Jedburgh-like teams are quite effective in occupied enemy
territories but fail dismally in enemy countries with domestic resistance
groups. He concludes such resistance groups lack the requisite passion,
organization, and wherewithal to overthrow the government of a police
state. Strategic leaders will find Jones’ history of the Jedburgh teams and
his keen insights invaluable.

Blood Sacrifices: Violent Non-State Actors and Dark MagicoReligious Activities
Edited by Robert J. Bunker
Reviewed by Nathan Jones, Associate Professor, Department of Security Studies,
Sam Houston State University

B

lood Sacrifices: Violent Non-State Actors and Dark Magico-Religious
Activities is an edited volume that addresses some of the more
extreme violence found on the twenty-first century criminal and
insurgent battlefields. Editor and author of a particularly strong chapter,
Robert Bunker has assembled a strong cast of authors including Dawn
Perlmutter and Paul Rexton Kan to explore this understudied topic.
The general thrust of their argument is that the role of blood sacrifice
and dark magic symbols, is understudied, under-recognized and underappreciated in the modern study of violent nonstate actors (VNSA).
In addition to the preface and introductory chapter, the book
consists of five topical essays, one review essay, four book reviews, and
a postscript. Various chapters introduce case studies on the use of dark
magico-religious activities—that are so defined because “they involve
morally reprehensible acts directed at other human beings”—including
case studies of al-Qaeda, the Islamic State, Boko Haram, the Lord’s
Resistance Army, and Mexican drug trafficking organizations such as
Los Zetas, the Beltran Leyva Organization, and La Familia Michoacána.
Dawn Perlmutter’s preface is masterful and its introduction of
etic and emic cultural anthropological concepts are useful for those
outside the anthropology discipline. Her argument is that a refusal to
acknowledge some of these VNSAs engage in dark magic violence has
led scholars to ignore an important motivation and factor in these violent
acts. Rational choice theorists are at a loss in these types of cases, and the
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dominance of these methodologies has stifled our understanding of and
willingness to even acknowledge VNSA’s use of dark magic.
Bunker’s introduction defines and operationalizes dark as “criminal
in nature and involves morally reprehensible acts directed at other
human beings.” He acknowledges that dark magico-religious criminals
are a small subset of all VNSAs in a useful chart, which provides a
framework for the analysis. As a researcher of Mexican drug trafficking
organizations, I enjoyed Bunker’s chapter on dark magico-religious
violence in Mexico and his discussions of the Saint Death, Santa Muerte,
which graces the cover art of the volume. Bunker argues that while
organized crime or rational choice explanations are not incorrect, “a
much deeper social process can also be said to be taking place.” He goes
on to argue traditional social norms are being supplanted by norms of
criminality, drug use, and violence.
This volume has already received significant attention on Borderland
Beat, a popular webpage covering border security issues, and was reviewed
by Patrick Corcoran for Insight Crime, another popular and respected
website covering organized crime in the Americas. While I agree with
Corcoran’s critique that viewing VNSAs through the economic and
political motivation lens is still best, though he does recognize additional
study is needed, the authors of this volume illustrate the importance of
acknowledging and understanding the dark magico-religious aspects of
their behavior.
Further, authors such as Rexton Kan acknowledge how the rational
choice and economic understandings of VNSAs are not mutually
exclusive with dark magico-religious practices. In his chapter on drug
use by organized criminals, guerrillas, and terrorists, Kan describes how
VNSAs incorporate drug use to enable gruesome killings that build a
reputation. Rexton Kan acknowledges the instrumental use of extreme
violence by terror groups and cartels to strike fear in the population and
rivals. A careful reading of Bunker makes clear he does not reject rational
choice explanations but sees deeper underlying phenomena at play in an
evolutionary or devolutionary process. This point could have been pushed
further to meld the rational choice theories with emic anthropological
perspectives on the use of dark magic violence by VSNAs.
Lisa J. Campbell’s Islamic State, al-Qaeda, and Boko Haram, dark
magic violence case study chapter is illuminating for those seeking to
understand the role ritualized executions can have in increasing the
internal cohesion of enemy fighters. She provides useful insights such
as Islamic State continued drug use, which is non-Islamic, pushing it in
the direction of a criminal network rather than a political insurgency.
As Corcoran argues in his review of Blood Sacrifices, there is no
systematic research telling us exactly how widespread these phenomena
are, such as what percentage of criminal or insurgent organization
members engage in this activity. This level of aggregate data is vexingly
hard to obtain and, even if it were fluid, criminal networks and insurgencies are dynamic. As the various authors persuasively note, however, the
practices are evolving and even when limited, have a wider symbolic
impact upon the VSNAs and are thus worthy of study and attention.
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The Forgotten Front: Patron-Client Relationships
in Counterinsurgency
By Walter C. Ladwig III
Reviewed by Jacqueline L. Hazelton, Strategy and Policy Department, US Naval
War College

I

n The Forgotten Front: Patron-Client Relationships in Counterinsurgency, Walter
Ladwig III argues that a liberal great power is more likely to coerce a
counterinsurgent government into making reforms when it makes its
support for its client conditional. Imposing tit-for-tat conditions on aid
and other types of support, Ladwig argues in this scholarly investigation,
tells the counterinsurgent government clearly that it must make the
demanded changes in its behavior if it wants to get more help.
The Forgotten Front makes the valuable and often overlooked
point that counterinsurgent governments backed by a liberal greatpower sponsor face significant domestic costs if they implement their
sponsor’s demands for reform. The interests of patron and client align
on defeating insurgency, but often little more. Reducing corruption
such as nepotism, expanding political participation, and initiating other
liberalizing reforms will deprive the host nation’s elites of the benefits
that they are fighting to protect (23). This is particularly a problem for
the host nation if it is focused on the short-term need to defeat the
insurgency quickly, Ladwig argues (34). Repression may quickly defeat
a challenge but increase violence longer term. The government’s liberal
sponsor, meanwhile, believes reforms will drive insurgent defeat and
lead to greater political stability in the longer term, though reform may
be destabilizing in the shorter term. The important related point Ladwig
also underlines is that the patron has relatively little leverage over the
client because it has already identified client survival as an important
security interest.
Ladwig focuses on how the patron can increase the likelihood of
implementing reforms to professionalize the counterinsurgent military
and increase political participation or otherwise reduce the grievances
driving the insurgency. The lavish provision of aid, he argues, is unlikely
to produce the desired changes in counterinsurgent government
behavior. He bases his argument on analysis of three US interventions,
in the Philippines against the Huk from 1947–53, in South Vietnam
from 1957–63, and in El Salvador from 1979–92. Ladwig identifies
specific US demands for reform and its behavior toward the client
(conditionality or inducement, sticks or carrots), and then evaluates
whether the counterinsurgent government complied with US demands
or not, and if so, to what degree.
His policy recommendations are sensible:
1. Expect tense relations with the client.
2. Do not fear coercing allies in crisis.
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3. Make conditions clear, measurable, and realistic.
4. Prepare for internal opposition.
5. Cultivate ties with local reformers.
This clearly written, well-researched study brings welcome attention
to counterinsurgent government interests and the client government’s
ability to resist patron pressure. Ladwig’s book fits well into mainstream
counterinsurgency studies with its assumption about the need for
reforms to defeat the insurgency but is more rigorous in its theoretical
and empirical analysis than much other work in this area.
One surprising gap is the limited reference to the work of
Douglas J. Macdonald, whose wonderfully named Adventures in Chaos:
American Intervention for Reform in the Third World makes an argument
similar to Ladwig’s. Ladwig cites Macdonald for his concept of the
commitment trap, in which a great power’s commitment to its client’s
survival reduces the great power’s leverage over that client (46). But
Macdonald, like Ladwig, finds that a tit-for-tat relationship with the
client is most effective in attaining reforms. In Macdonald’s study, the
patron increases its leverage over the client by bargaining for specific
reforms and providing support contingent upon implementation of the
previously specified actions by the client government. Macdonald, like
Ladwig, also finds unconditional commitments to the client mean less
success in coercing the client to implement reforms. The studies are not
identical, of course, though two of the authors’ cases (the Philippines
and Vietnam) are the same.
As with any scholarly work, there are limitations to the findings in
The Forgotten Front. Ladwig considers only grievance-based insurgencies
with significant popular support and those in which insurgents rely on
the populace for their existence. In addition, the study examines only
cases of US intervention during the Cold War. These scope conditions
properly raise questions about to what degree these findings may apply
to cases beyond the three studied. It is also not clear how the author
identifies and measures leverage and degrees of policy implementation.
The author also does not consider the relative cost to the client
of different reforms and different types of reforms. Ladwig notes that
military aid is of particular interest to the counterinsurgent government
but might have drawn this thread throughout his analysis (313). A
government is more likely to make policy changes that cost it relatively
less than other demanded changes, and it is more likely to make policy
changes that gain it more desirable benefits. Thus client compliance is
more likely on less costly reforms and on military reforms.
No one book can answer all questions, of course. The Forgotten
Front raises important questions for further study. The most pressing
questions involve client interests and behavior, including the relative
likelihood of client implementation of different types of reforms. Other
questions raised here likely to lead to further fruitful analysis include the
degree to which reforms are necessary for insurgent defeat, and to what
degree, if at all, symbolic reforms help defeat an insurgency (141).
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Gangs and the Military: Gangsters, Bikers, and Terrorists with
Military Training
By Carter F. Smith
Reviewed by Robert J. Bunker, Adjunct Research Professor, Strategic Studies
Institute, US Army War College

T

he author of Gangs and the Military: Gangsters, Bikers, and Terrorists with
Military Training, Carter F. Smith, possesses a unique blend of Armygang investigative experience, primarily gained in the 1990s, and advanced
academic qualifications that provide him with a deep understanding of this
national security concern as well as many insightful perspectives related
to the area of military-trained gang members (MTGMs). On a positive
note, the work also has the endorsement of a number of well-respected
gang researchers with considerable field time under their duty belts.
With a forward by Al Valdez, a former gang unit supervisor in
Orange County, CA, and the afterward by George E. Reed, a former
Commanding Officer, US Army Criminal Investigation Command
battalion, Fort Bragg, NC, the work focuses on “the intersection of gang
life and military services” with the gangs representing violent nonstate
actors (2). As specified in the work itself, a military-trained gang member
“is defined as a member of a street gang, prison gang, outlaw motorcycle
gang, or domestic terrorist group who appears to have received military
training either directly or indirectly” (2). Chapters five and six highlight
gang activity in the military and civilian communities, respectively, and
the criminality—including numerous homicides—that such members
have engaged in.
The fact that gang members are increasingly using military-like
tactics on the streets of the United States is made clear to the reader.
The threat these individuals represent elicits the author to propose “it
would make sense to respond to gangs whose members have military
training (whether in or out of the military) as if they were insurgents”
and recommend that a counterinsurgency approach, initially focused
on intelligence gathering and analysis should be followed to contend
with them (153).
Unsurprisingly, given such concerns, the book conceptually draws
upon the third generation gangs (3 GEN Gangs) model of which John P.
Sullivan and the reviewer are proponents (21–23). This model, developed
in the later 1990s, discusses the evolution of street gangs through turf
(1st), drug (2nd), and mercenary (3rd) generations of sophistication and
how the more evolved 3 GEN Gangs—Mara Salvatrucha (MS-13) and
Los Zetas type entities—are becoming a significant threat to domestic
security despite being a minority representation of gangs. This model is
in variance with more traditional criminological- and sociological-based
gang models, which focus on delinquency and deviance and are devoid
of any form of gang-derived national security threat potentials.
The reviewer found the work to be very well written and engaging,
with the overview on early gangs, from the seventeenth through the
mid-twentieth centuries, and their connections to the US military
quite fascinating from a historical perspective. It has been written with
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professionals, not academics, in mind which makes it more readable than
more densely written scholarly tomes. Critiques of the book are relatively
minor and focus on three primarily style and layout issues. First, the
work could benefit from a selected references section. Paging through
over 30 pages of notes to determine which works have been consulted
in the book can be rather tedious. Second, the notes section suffers
from overcitation of the works drawn upon, with full bibliographic
information then continually being provided rather than simply using
an “ibid.” Third, the use of stock photos tends to debase the value of
this unique and important work. All of these shortcomings could easily
be addressed in a second edition of the work.
The book has few, if any, equals with other works on this subject
outside of some US governmental gang reports—such as National
Gang Intelligence Center publications—or possibly Matt Kennard’s
Irregular Army, which is more of a journalistic account of gang members,
extremists, and other undesirables joining the US military after September
11, 2001. I see great value in the work for military readers as it candidly
chronicles an internal personnel issue—and metastasizing homeland
security issue—typically shunned by the services due to bad publicity.
In closing, Gangs and the Military—due to widening recognition of
this concern—should be of increasing interest to US military officers
and national security scholars well into the future. It provides them with
an understanding of how security threat groups have gained a foothold
in the armed services, the implications of their military-trained members
being unleashed on their constituent communities, and the author’s
recommendations for the military to address this issue (201–7). These
recommendations focus on providing commanders tools and options to
mitigate the emergence, existence, and effects of military-trained gang
members in their units as well as advocating a points system for agencies
to determine the gang involvement of military personnel.

Utility of War
War and the Art of Governance: Consolidating Combat
Success into Political Victory
By Nadia Schadlow
Reviewed by Conrad Crane, Chief of Historical Series of the US Army Heritage
and Education Center, US Army War College

Washington, DC:
Georgetown University
Press, 2017
344 pages
$32.75

A

ll of us who teach at the US Army War College have experienced
moments of epiphany when a student makes a particularly insightful
observation. In a recent session examining stability operations, Colonel
Pat Proctor observed the Army proudly proclaims it wins the nation’s
wars, when in reality, it is not structured organizationally or intellectually
to do so. Instead the service is content just to win the nation’s battles,
and strongly resists any attempts to go beyond that role, a position
reinforced by civilian leaders reluctant to concede any role to the military
in translating battlefield success into lasting political outcomes.
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As Nadia Schadlow argues persuasively in War and the Art of
Governance only the military has the authority and resources to
accomplish that difficult task in the wake of war. Through more than a
dozen rich historical case studies, she illustrates a persistent “American
denial syndrome” that refuses to properly recognize and prepare for
the political and military challenges involved in restoring order after
combat operations. She attributes this syndrome to four main causes:
democratic discomfort with the military leading political activities, a
traditional American aversion to any taint of colonialism, a belief that
civilians should always handle governance, and a narrow military view
of its proper professional role in war reinforced by interpretations of
Carl von Clausewitz and Samuel P. Huntington.
Well versed on national security issues from her work at the Smith
Richardson Foundation, Schadlow begins her historical analysis with
General Winfield Scott’s conduct of basic reconstruction in Mexico in
1847 despite a lack of guidance from Washington. In many ways the
exercise of military governance there and in the conquered territories
marked a sort of highpoint for the practice, as the American record
over the rest of next century was usually much worse. It was only with
the establishment in 1942 of a separate Civil Affairs Division on the
General Staff and the School for Military Government at Charlottesville
that the whole issue of military governance began to gather significant
interest and adherents further motivated by the problems General
Eisenhower was confronting in North Africa. Extended occupations
in Italy, Germany, and Japan produced models of what enlightened and
empowered military governance could accomplish. More limited and
less well-prepared efforts in Korea were not as successful. Schadlow’s
analysis could have also profited from looking at the American experience
in Austria, a 10-year occupation judged also to be successful, though
Austrians claim that was despite Allied polices and not because of them.
After examining Cold War postconflict reconstructions of Korea,
the Dominican Republic, and Panama, she moves on to the rather
dismal record in Afghanistan and Iraq, demonstrating how the denial
syndrome undermined any chance for strategic success in both theaters
of operation from the very beginning. And again, we have failed to learn
from that experience. She points out the Defense strategic guidance for
2015 specifically states US forces will “no longer be sized to conduct
large-scale, prolonged stability operations” that are actually essential
to consolidate political gains. (274) She argues the Army must be big
enough and capable enough to accomplish necessary governance tasks
along with conventional kinetic requirements, civilian leaders must be
prepared to relinquish operational control of such reconstruction efforts,
there should be real unity of command and not competing fiefdoms, and
everyone must understand how long political consolidation will take.
This very important book should be read by soldiers and
policymakers, although the message may not be one they want to hear.
As General Buck Turgidson proclaimed in Dr. Strangelove, “The truth is
not always a pleasant thing.” But until the US government realizes, and
acts on, the necessity of reforms, the nation will be destined to continue
struggling toward any strategic gains from modern conflict, especially
in contemporary wars among the people.
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Assessing War: The Challenge of Measuring Success
and Failure
Edited By Leo J. Blanken, Hy Rothstein, and Jason Lepore
Reviewed by John A. Bonin, Professor of Concepts and Doctrine, US Army
War College

Washington, DC:
Georgetown University
Press, 2015
352 pages
$34.38

A

ssessing War: The Challenge of Measuring Success and Failure is a timely
and needed anthology. The editors—Leo J. Blanken, Hy Rothstein,
and Jason Lepore—address a previously ignored and esoteric aspect of
national defense, military assessment, in a comprehensible manner. Two
of the editors serve in the Defense Analysis Department, US Naval Post
Graduate School. The third, Jason Lepore, is a professor of economics
at California Polytechnic State University. General George W. Casey
Jr (US Army Retired), the first commander of Multi-National Force
Iraq, provides the foreword, stating the importance of an assessment
process that anticipates challenges and identifies opportunities as well
as justifies changes. The authors include leading experts and veterans
of the recent wars in Iraq and Afghanistan. This book seeks to generate
recommendations and models for future strategic assessments and to
document historical accounts of this neglected aspect of military history.
The editors seek to provide a multidimensional look at military
assessments in theory and in practice through historic and contemporary
case studies as well as through alternative dimensions. In the introduction,
the editors describe “wartime assessment” to mean the act of gathering
information to update one’s belief as to who is winning the war with
subordinate lines of effort that may include “measures of effectiveness”
and “measures of performance.”
The first section of the book expands the theoretical basis for an
assessment process. In the first chapter, Blanken and Lepore, discuss a
metrics triangle composed of benchmarks, incentives, and information,
as well as the critically important separation between a state’s political
goals and its operational benchmarks. In the next chapter, Rothstein
further analyzes this “Clauswitzian gap” and argues it is often caused by
divergence between the experiences of political and military leaders. The
final chapter of this section discusses the three primary problems with
assessments: information overload, decision making without sufficient
information, and uncertainty.
The editors tasked the authors of the nine historical chapters of the
second section to consider, what types of assessments had been made and
how they affected actors’ conduct during the war. As with any anthology,
the case studies proved somewhat uneven in both subjects and sources.
Edward Lengel’s chapter on the American Revolution effectively argues
the centrality of George Washington, his headquarters for American
military assessments, and his growth in effective decisionmaking that
resulted in victory at Yorktown. The chapter on the Seven Years’ War
in America only assesses a narrow aspect, regarding the use of proxy
forces by the British and French during the first three years. Several of
the case studies, such as those on the Civil War and the Indian Wars,
cover only singular aspects of these long and complicated conflicts.
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Brian Linn’s chapter on “Assessing the Philippine War” proved to be
one of the best in that it covers this entire, almost forgotten, successful
counterinsurgency and concluded “the assessment process . . . worked
better than could be expected” (124).
Likewise, Conrad Crane’s chapter on measuring gains in Korea
effectively argues wartime assessments of successes and failures there
shaped future US policies, and not always for the best. The chapters
covering the two world wars only provide analysis of selected aspects
of strategic assessment. Stephenson considers Falkenhayn’s belief the
French could be bled white at Verdun and the German Navy’s belief
in unrestricted submarine warfare proved to be strategic failures;
Foch’s belief that a series of coordinated allied offensives in 1918 could
achieve decisive results proved correct. Gerhard Weinburg only looks at
assessments used during two major strategic decisions in World War II:
Hitler’s decision to postpone the invasion of Russia from his unrealistic
date in the fall of 1940 to his advisors preferred date in the summer of
1941 and Churchill’s controversial policy shift by the Royal Air Force to
night area-bombing of cities to prevent unacceptable losses.
The last chapter on Vietnam, and the third section, focus on more
current case studies during limited wars and counterinsurgencies. The
wars in Vietnam, Iraq, and Afghanistan proved difficult for the military
to assess as these included more nonmilitary factors such as political,
economic, and informational impacts on military efforts, and were
subject to the “Clauswitzian gap.” Despite practitioners’ perspectives,
not only is it too early to assess American success and failure in the latter
two conflicts accurately, but as Mark Stout tentatively presents, even
al-Qaeda does assessments.
The last section addresses alternative dimensions of assessing war.
These include a discussion of the Just War concept of proportionality;
the challenge of assessment in cyberspace; the significance of assessing
the war of ideas, or the battle of the narrative, and immature assessments
of expensive economic development efforts. Finally, the prolific author
on modern war Anthony Cordesman and Rothstein conclude the
United States must set meaningful strategic goals with appropriate
public narratives that can be assessed by suitable military assessment
organizations using realistic metrics.
Assessing War is a valuable book for serious students of strategy and
military policy and is a must for readers interested in assessing military
success. Expanded case studies that further investigate this important,
but often overlooked, aspect of military strategy and planning—assessing
how we are doing—are still needed.
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US Defense Budget Outcomes: Volatility and Predictability in
Army Weapons Funding
By Heidi Brockmann Demarest
Reviewed by Lawrence Korb, Center for American Progress

I
New York: Palgrave
Macmillan, 2017
205 pages
$106.00

n defense, dollars are policy. If the nation does not spend sufficient
funds wisely on procuring the correct amount of manpower and
matérial necessary to provide for the common defense, national security
will suffer. Unfortunately, most strategic thinkers do not spend sufficient
time mastering the details of the annual defense-budget process. Instead,
most prefer to focus on the more glamorous strategic and tactical issues.
The American political system was never designed to be efficient.
Instead, it emphasizes checks and balances and popular control.
Therefore, even though the women and men of the Department of
Defense spend at least eighteen months carefully developing the annual
defense budget for the armed services and defense agencies, the entire
Congress, individual committees, or even individual members or their
staffers can and do make numerous changes to specific programs in the
proposed budget. Moreover Congress is not only becoming increasingly
involved in the details, it is taking longer and longer each year to pass
a defense budget even in a time of war. In fact, Congress has not
passed a budget on time in nine of the last ten years. Therefore, it is
more important than ever for soldiers, scholars, and practitioners to
understand the relationship between policy, strategy, and budgets.
In her new book, US Defense Budget Outcomes: Volatility and Predictability
in Army Weapons Funding, Army Major Heidi Brockmann Demarest helps
close the gap. She does this by providing an excellent analysis of how
and why certain Army procurement programs were, or were not, funded
adequately or even at all in the annual Congressional budget process in
the period after September 11, 2001.
Demarest demonstrates even though the top line for defense
only changes incrementally from year to year, or even during the
Congressional process, there is a great deal of volatility in individual
procurement programs after the budget is submitted to Congress. She
does this by examining voluminous data from 1,152 programs over
several fiscal years. She analyses how the Congress alters funding for
40 percent of the programs in the Army budget each year, and alters
two-thirds of those programs by more than 25 percent. Major Army
programs like the Crusader, the Bradley, the Striker, the Ground
Combat Vehicle, Mine Resistant Ambush Protected (MRAP) vehicle,
and the Future Combat System are among the programs she carefully
and comprehensively analyzes.
According to Demarest, no single factor directly accounts for this
volatility. Instead, each program’s funding history is a combination
of its technical, industrial, and political characteristics. Moreover, the
Army’s ability to influence Congress depends more on the quality of the
engagement with Congress than the quantity.
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The book also offers some important suggestions on how to
improve, clarify, and extend the discussion of the budget as it makes its
way through Congress. According to Demarest, program funding is not
incremental, no single factor explains outcomes, quality Congressional
engagements can suppress funding volatility, and an incremental strategy
may control budget outcomes for individual systems most effectively.
While many people, particularly in the executive branch,
understandably become frustrated with what they perceive as
Congressional meddling in the budget process, Demarest points out
correctly that members of Congress or congressional staffers not only
can, but should, get involved in determining how the Army and the
Pentagon spend our taxpayers’ dollars each year. These women and men
are from the most representative branch of the American government.
Those who agree or disagree with their decisions have a remedy. It is
called elections.
I have spent the majority of my professional career analyzing
defense budgets, and spent five years actually helping to formulate and
defend them. Yet, I still learned a great deal from Demarest’s book and
recommend it to all who analyze national security or become involved
in the decision-making process.
To her credit, Demarest recognizes the results she outlines can be
expanded insuring that her conclusions are not exclusively driven by a
decade of war, or whether her insights apply to the Navy, Air Force, and
Marine Corps as well. Based upon my own research and involvement, I
would argue that the budgets of the Air Force, Navy, and Marine Corps
are not changed nearly as much by Congress as those of the Army, but
that can be the subject of her next book.
I do, however, have a minor suggestion to improve the usefulness
of the book. While Demarest has voluminous footnotes within and
references at the end of each chapter, the bibliography at the end does
not include the vast number of the references nor are many of them
included in the index.

The Origins of the Grand Alliance: Anglo-American Military
Collaboration from the Panay Incident to Pearl Harbor
By William T. Johnsen
Reviewed by Henry G. Gole, author of The Road to Rainbow: Army Planning for
Global War, 1934–1940

I

n the prologue of his Origins of the Grand Alliance, Professor William T.
Johnsen, of the US Army War College, tells the reader precisely what
to expect in this 256-page narrative validated by 85 pages of endnotes:
“The story told in this book is an effort to explain the origins of the
Anglo-American coalition, outline its early development, and clarify how
this early collaboration set the conditions that led to the Allied victory”
(prologue). This clear statement of intent is realized in execution so that he
can conclude “between December 1937 and December 1941 British and
American staff planners forged the foundation of the Grand Alliance.”
Historian Rick Atkinson, author of The Liberation Trilogy, highlights the

Lexington: University of
Kentucky, 2017
406 pages
$50.00
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singular importance of that alliance, calling it “the most vital American
partnership of the twentieth century.”
Scrutiny of that partnership has produced many excellent works,
but “no one treatment offers a comprehensive picture of the military
elements of the early Anglo-American process” (2). Johnsen provides
that comprehensive picture. Many earlier works begin with, and focus
on, the full-fledged staff talks in January–March 1941, the AmericanBritish Conversations known as ABC. They were “held in utmost
secrecy,” because President Franklin D. Roosevelt was concerned with
isolationists and noninterventionists still active in the United States
(6). Johnsen writes with authority grounded in tight organization,
thoroughness, extensive research in British and American archives and
secondary sources, and judgment shaped by his scholarship, teaching
experience, and military career.
Johnsen begins with two short chapters providing context, one on
the American-British coalition experience in the Great War and one
on the interwar years. Then, his descriptive chapter headings cue the
reader to the deepening relationship as it evolves from handholding to
marriage, which are abbreviated here and robbed of the wit found in the
original: Coalition Encounters, 1936–1939; Ties That Bind; Allocation
of War Matériel, 1939–1940; Assessing that Britain Would Survive After
the French Collapse, 1940; ABC in January–March 1941; Turning Grand
Strategy into Practical Military Plans; The State of Cooperation at the
Time of Pearl Harbor; and the Conclusion. Johnsen does a good job
sorting out what is essential to his story from what is interesting but
extraneous, focusing on coalition grand strategy. Political leaders agree
on grand strategy and provide coherent guidance to military leadership,
as poetry becomes prose.
Formulation of national strategy is a complex process; making
coalition strategy is even more complex. Then, providing military leaders
with coherent and timely guidance for implementation is problematic,
particularly when, as Johnsen and many biographers note, Roosevelt
“loathed closing any options” (238). His management style has been
characterized as divide-and-conquer with a strong preference for oral
communication that often left advisers wondering what he had really
said. His American military advisers, left in the dark, sometimes got
their guidance from British counterparts who were clearly guided by
Winston Churchill.
Unfortunately, strategy formulation does not flow textbook fashion
from national interests—in this case coalition interests—from policy
to strategy, with the latter’s component ends, ways, and means. It is a
human activity. Errors and misunderstandings abound. So do shading
of meaning and “spin” by staffers. And, sometimes in the course of
bilateral discussions and analyses, the US Navy and the Royal Navy
shared more on a specific issue than either navy shared with its own
national army or air force.
The best writing in the book is in Johnsen’s concluding chapter,
replete with wit and wisdom. He captures the special relationship of
Churchill (strategist) and Roosevelt (planner) as well as the evolution and
iteration of planning that led to victory. A “Reflection for the Future,”
his last words, are three pages on planning for coalition warfare and
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recommended for the curricula of staff schools and colleges as well as
for serious students to mull over.
Historians will forgive this reviewer’s counterfactual grace note.
What if Germany and Japan, in a grand alliance, had given priority
to defeating Russia by a coordinated offensive in 1941? Without Pearl
Harbor, the United States might have bowed to noninterventionists
as the Japanese exploited the defeat of Russia by grabbing Dutch and
French colonies. The Brits had their hands full defending the homeland,
combating German submarines in the Atlantic, and keeping open their
lines of communication through the Mediterranean to east of Suez. The
sinking of HMS Repulse and HMS Prince of Wales and the loss of Singapore
and its garrison demonstrated by actual events that the British cupboard
was bare. That German-Japanese grand alliance would have produced a
very different future, now past.
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